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ABSTRACT
Historians consider the years between World War I and World War II to be
a period of decline for German America. This dissertation complicates that
argument by applying a transnational framework to the history of German
immigration to the United States, particularly the period between 1919 and
1939. The author argues that contrary to previous accounts of that period,
German migrants continued to be invested in the homeland through a
variety of public and private relationships that changed the ways in which
they thought about themselves as Germans and Americans. By looking at
migration through a transnational lens, the author also moves beyond
older conventions that merely saw Germanness in language and culture.
Instead, the author suggests a framework that investigates race, class,
consumerism, gender and citizenship and finds evidence that German
migrants not only utilized their heritage to define their Americanness but
that German immigrant values, views and norms did indeed fundamentally
shape American national identity.
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Introduction

In 1937 Georg Durrschmidt, one of the roughly 600,000 German
immigrants that had arrived in the United States after World War I,1 wrote
a letter to the editors of the Sächsische Heimatbriefe (“Letters from the
Saxon Home”), a small make-shift publication that had recently reached
out to reconnect Saxon emigrants with their home state, and in particular
with the “new” National Socialist Germany.2 Funded by the Volksbund für
das Deutschtum im Ausland (“People’s Association for Germandom
Abroad,” or VDA), an organization dedicated to the preservation of
German language and culture across the globe, 3 the editors of the
Heimatbriefe were asking their readers all over the world
that you write back to us and tell us about yourself and the
Germans out there so that we can tell our boys and girls at
home and in school how you […] wrestle for self-assertion

1

LaVern Rippley, The German-Americans (Boston: Twayne, 1976), 198.
Georg Durrschmidt to the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland (VDA),
Sächsischer Landesverband, Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden (henceforth
abbreviated HSTA), Call Number 12460 Nr. 41, 1937-1036. Having received
thousands of responses from all over the world, VDA staff transcribed the letters.
They are stored in numbered folders (in this case: Nr. 41) sorted by region.
Within those folders they are numbered annually, though the year is not noted on
the respective document. I have thus consistently added the year to the citation
by inserting it between the number of the folder and the number of the
letter.transcripts survived the war and continue to be stored at the
Hauptstaatsarchiv in Dresden, Germany. I have translated all quotes from the
German. Spelling errors are omitted since it was often impossible to determine
whether writer or transcriber committed them.
3
The history and origins of the VDA will be discussed in Chapter 3. See
especially Section 3.4.2.
2

1

and for the reputation and continued existence of the Reich
that we are building for all future generations.4
Durrschmidt, a married tinsmith with two children and a veteran of
World War I, had moved his family to Queens, New York, where he had
secured a job with Bell Laboratories. He had been naturalized and had
adjusted his name from the original Dürschmidt to a more suitable
American equivalent in 1932. Durrschmidt owned a home where he and
his family lived and enjoyed the benefits of a steady income. Yet, his ties
to the small village near Zwickau in the heart of Saxony, where he was
born, had prompted him to respond to the editors. As he considered the
state of German America, he wrote: “We really shouldn’t be homesick
here in New York, after all, there are so many German churches, clubs,
amusement facilities etc. And yet,“ he continued, “especially among the
urbanites no intimate alliance will develop, something that is so much
easier to do on the countryside.“5
Historians of German America have long wrestled with the question of
what exactly happened to this group of immigrants once vibrant, visible,
and imbued with a “strong ethos of separatism.“6 How is it, they wonder,
that one of the largest ethnic groups7 ever to reach the United States fell

4

Sächsische Heimatbriefe, October 1934, 1.
Durrschmidt to VDA, HSTA, 41-1937-1036.
6
Kathleen N. Conzen, “The Paradox of German-American Assimilation,”
Yearbook of German-American Studies 16 (1981), 153.
7
“Ethnicity” is a contested term. I am employing Russell Kazal’s definition of an
ethny as a group with “a shared sense of peoplehood tied […] to specific Old
World ancestries”. See: Russell Kazal, “Revisiting Assimilation: The Rise, Fall,
and Reappraisal of a Concept in American Ethnic History,” The American
5

2

apart into disparate regional varieties while other groups from Europe,
particularly the Irish and Italians, left such distinct traces in American
national life and culture? Most scholars agree that the early twentieth
century was the key period in the “disappearance“ of German America.
They argue that both negative experiences such as the ostracism of World
War

I

and

increased

opportunities

to

join

the

American

“mainstream“ prompted Americans of German origin to blend into the
“white ethnic.“8
But German America did not just disappear. As George Durrschmidt
and many others writing from all over the continental United States
reported to the VDA, there still existed a vast infrastructure of German
American life as late as the 1930s, including stores, movie-theaters,
churches, clubs, and restaurants. There were public debates about the
future of the German community in newspapers and radio shows, but
discord seemed to triumph over unity. Alice Kern, the wife of the
prominent German American writer and scholar Dr. Albert J.W. Kern, had

Historical Review 100:2 (April, 1995), 439, footnote 7. For a good discussion of
the ongoing debate about the meaning of ethnicity, see: Jason McDonald,
American Ethnic History: Themes and Perspectives (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2007), 4-6.
8
For a good overview of older arguments in German-American History, see:
Patricia Herminghouse, “German-American Studies in a New Vein,”
Unterrichtspraxis 9:2 (1976), 3-14. For more recent work, see Conzen, “Paradox,”
and especially: Russell Kazal, “The Interwar Origins of the White Ethnic: Race,
Residence, and German Philadelphia, 1917-1939,” Journal of American History
23:4 (Summer, 2004), 78-131; and Kazal, Becoming Old Stock: The Paradox of
German-American Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). I offer
my own detailed discussion and critique of the migration historiography between
contemporary Germany and the United States in Chapter 1.

3

experienced the evolution of German America since her arrival in the
United States in 1884. Alongside her husband, who served as the
president of the United German Societies of New York City in the early
1900s, she had witnessed successful attempts to unite German American
organizations, only to see those efforts disintegrate during World War I.
The 1920s brought some resurgence, but as she wrote in late 1937, “our
German community today is more splintered than ever before.“

9

Importantly, neither Kern nor Durrschmidt described submergence or
disappearance, but rather disintegration and division – and both pointed to
interior causes rather than blaming outside forces. Such reasoning was a
general trend among the writers to the VDA. To be sure, there were many
complaints about German immigrant assimilation, about the lack of
enthusiasm many Americans of German heritage showed for German
culture and language. But the biggest cause for internal discord seemed to
have been disagreements about what exactly German culture was and
how to best express that culture in the United States.
This dissertation discusses intra-ethnic and transnational10 dynamics in
German America. Like other works on U.S. immigration history, my study

9

Alice Kern to VDA, HSTA 42-1937-112. Her date of arrival can be determined
via the 1900 United States Federal Census.
10
The term “transnational” has its own contested history, which I discuss in
Section 1.2. In general, I am utilizing Eiichiro Azuma’s notion of the transnational
as “inter-National”, a perspective “that stresses the interstitial (not
transcendental) nature of [migrants’] lives between the two nation-states.” See:
Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in
Japanese America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 5. For a good
overview of transnationalism’s potential and pitfalls, see: Bryce Traister, “The

4

builds on recent developments in trans-/international scholarship, which
emphasize the fluidity and global reach of the immigrant experience.
Rather

than

describing

immigration

in

linear,

teleological,

and

essentialized terms, historians have begun to employ a model that views
historical transformations as the result of multidirectional exchange of
people, goods, and ideas, while simultaneously pointing to the interrelated
attempts of nation-states to restrict, control, and profit from these
movements. This approach has been applied with particular success to
the Americas and to trans-Pacific movements. 11 While the history of
European immigration has certainly not been neglected, it has received
substantially less “transnational” coverage. 12 This gap is particularly
evident in the case of German America. Despite an emerging interest in
the role that emigration and “Germans abroad” played in the discursive
negotiations of national consciousness in Germany, 13 there have been

Object of Study; or, Are We Being Transnational Yet?” Journal of Transnational
Studies 2:1 (2010).
11
Azuma, Between Two Empires; David Gutierrez, Walls and Mirrors: Mexican
Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1995); Erika Lee, At America’s Gates: Chinese
Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882-1943 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2003); Lucy Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants
and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1995); George Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity,
Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993).
12
Donna Gabacchia and Vicki L. Ruiz, eds., American Dreaming, Global
Realities: Rethinking U.S. Immigration History (Champaign: University of Illinois
Press, 2006). Dorothee Schneider, Crossing Borders: Migration and Citizenship
in the Twentieth-Century United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2011).
13
Krista O’Donnell, Renate Bridenthal, and Nancy Reagin, eds., The Heimat
Abroad: The Boundaries of Germanness (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan

5

almost no studies investigating the impact of changing notions of ethnic
and cultural belonging on the status and identity of German migrants in
the United States between World War I and World War II. 14 However,
considering the academic assumption of German America’s demise after
1915, this is not surprising.
I argue that German Americans continued to be strongly invested in
the homeland throughout the interwar era,15 negotiating their hyphenated,
heterogeneous identities along lines of race, gender, citizenship, and
class.

16

More specifically, I identify transnational spaces for such

negotiations and explore the “discursive strategies and everyday

Press, 2005); Mathias Schulze et al, eds., German Diasporic Experiences:
Identity, Migration, Loss (Waterloo: Winfried Laurier Press, 2009); Neil Gregor,
Nils Roemer, and Mark Roseman, eds., German History From the Margins
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); Bradley Naranch, “Inventing the
Auslandsdeutsche: Emigration, Colonial Fantasy, and German National Identity,
1848-1871,” in: Eric Ames, Marcia Klotz, and Lora Wildenthal, eds., Germany’s
Colonial Pasts (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 21-40.
14
The only exception I am aware of is Hans-Werner Retterath’s 2000 dissertation,
which is available only in German. Retterath, Deutschamerikanertum und
Volkstumsgedanke. Zur Ethnizitätskonstruktion durch die auslandsdeutsche
Kulturarbeit zwischen 1918 und 1945 (PhD. Diss., Philipps-Universität Marburg,
2000).
15
It should be noted that I am not the first one to do so. In the past two or three
decades, numerous studies, particularly of urban German-America have found a
vibrant culture alive and well until at least World War II, sometimes beyond.
Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 2. See also: Ronald Bayor, Neighbors in Conflict:
The Irish, Germans, Jews, and Italians of New York City, 1929-1941 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Robert Paul McCaffrey, Islands of
Deutschtum: German-Americans in Manchester, New Hampshire and Lawrence,
Massachusetts, 1870-1942 (New York: Peter Lang, 1996); Leslie V. Tischauser,
The Burden of Ethnicity: the German Question in Chicago, 1914-1941 (New
York: Garland, 1990); Don Heinrich Tolzmann, The Cincinnati Germans after the
Great War (New York: Peter Lang, 1987).
16
Another important aspect, the role of German-language religious institutions,
could not be included in this dissertation.

6

practices,” 17 by which immigrants in the United States of all social
backgrounds used their pasts to explain the present and shape the future.
German immigrants to the United States continuously re-imagined their
position in American society through a prism that included both a
retrospective memory of their migratory experience and the homeland, as
well as a projective consideration of contemporary political, social, and
economic events. Since the majority of emigrants permanently stayed in
the United States their experiences became part of the American
experience in the interwar era.
In this sense, my work hopes to participate in a resurging debate about
the various manifestations of “Germanness abroad.”

18

While this

increasingly large body of scholarship investigates the ways in which
emigrants negotiated their sense of ethnicity and belonging within the
respective host cultures, such explorations have almost completely

17

Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires, 5. More specifically, Azuma’s work
confronts the “bounded meanings of nation and race through close analysis of
the discursive strategies and everyday practices that the immigrants adopted and
deployed relative to the different hegemonic powers.”17
18
See sources in footnote 13, and: Max Paul Friedman, Nazis and Good
Neighbors: The United States Campaign against the Germans of Latin America
in World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Malte Fuhrmann,
Der Traum vom deutschen Orient. Zwei deutsche Kolonien im Osmanischen
Reich 1851–1918 (Frankfurt: Campus, 2006); Andrew Zimmerman, Alabama in
Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the
New South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

7

ignored the United States, by far the most popular destination of German
emigrants.19
One objective of this dissertation is to contextualize and complicate the
argument that the period during and immediately after World War I was a
critical juncture, at which German Americans, once a vibrant and vocal
ethnic group, no longer felt the bonds of the Heimat and largely
assimilated into the American mainstream. Striving to explain this decline,
historians such as Russell Kazal have pointed to a slow process, in which
lower class migrants rejected the high culture celebrated in privileged
German American cultural organizations and became more confident to
embrace American culture particularly because their whiteness allowed
them to participate in public sphere and consumer marketplace.

20

Scholars have cited additional external reasons such as anti-German
hysteria during the war, Prohibition, and the 1924 Immigration Act to
explain why ethnic Germans never regained their prewar visibility as a
group.21 Some exceptions notwithstanding,22 the period after World War I

19

A recent conference, held at Berlin’s Free University, “Rethinking the
Auslandsdeutsche,” that brought together many of the most prominent scholars
on the topic, did not feature a single paper on the United States.
20
Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, passim.
21
To be sure, this was not an argument reserved for German immigrants.
Newcomers from around the world were seen as bearers of anti-American ideas
like Communism, Socialism, Anarchism, and Fascism. As Charles R. Crisp, a
congressman from Georgia, put it: “Little Bohemia, Little Italy, Little Russia, Little
Germany, Little Poland, Chinatown […] are the breeding grounds for unAmerican thought and deeds.” Quoted in: Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race
and Nation in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2001), 100.

8

has consequently received little attention beyond a focus on how
America’s Nazis overshadowed German American attempts to maintain
neutrality. 23 The problem with such approaches is their simplistic and
largely uncritical adoption of “Germanness” as a collective identity defined
by either bourgeois nationalists or, later, radical National Socialists. I
maintain that most German immigrants in the United States pragmatically
incorporated only those elements of Germanness abroad into their
personal (as opposed to collective) sense of belonging that helped them
master their complicated lives in the United States, characteristics such as
their whiteness, work ethic, economic prudence or civic education.
My work is thus more closely aligned with studies that have focused on
the impact of migration on civic and national consciousness in the United
States.24 The racial and political diversity of the immigrants that arrived in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century challenged the status quo
in the United States, as these new arrivals demanded the full benefits of
American cultural, political, and economic citizenship. At the same time,
22

Gregory Kupsky,“The True Spirit of the German People”: German-Americans
and National Socialism, 1919-1955 (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2010);
McCaffery. Islands of Deutschtum: Tischauser, Burden of Ethnicity.
23
Sander Diamond, The Nazi Movement in the United States: 1924-1941 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1974); Cornelia Wilhelm, Bewegung oder Verein?
Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik in den USA (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner,
1998).
24
Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of
the Modern American Citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008);
Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Schneider, Crossing Borders;
Wendy L. Wall, Inventing the “American Way”: The Politics of Consensus from
the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Oxford University Press,
2007).

9

immigrants continued to be heavily invested in the politics of the
homeland. 25 My dissertation shows that German Americans closely
observed the struggles to put Germany back on its feet after World War I
and that the sharp differences that emerged among the populace back
home changed the political, social and cultural standpoints of Germans
abroad. At a time when both Germany and the United States underwent
rigorous renegotiations of nationalism and belonging – usually ensconced
in cheery slogans such as Volksgemeinschaft and the “American Way of
Life” – the migrants who appear in this history had to find new ways to
think about themselves. Their heritage often became a means to escape
the reality of everyday life, make sense of it, or even resist it.
Writing Transnational History
For more than a decade, transnationalism has transformed academia.
Notoriously hard to define, it is best summed up as “a diverse, contested,
cross-disciplinary intellectual movement”26 without one definite meaning.
Generally, transnational histories attempt to investigate beyond the
national and international, beyond the domestic and foreign policies of one

25

In essence, this argument is at the core of transnational studies of migration.
Scholars describe networks rather than unidirectional trajectories. See footnote
29. For some recent applications, see: Azuma, Between Two Empires; Mark
Choate, Emigrant Nation – The Making of Italy Abroad (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2008); Richard S. Kim, The Quest for Statehood: Korean
Immigrant Nationalism and U.S. Sovereignty, 1904–1945 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011); Bruce Nelson, Irish Nationalists and the Making of the
Irish Race (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).
26
Laura Briggs, Gladys McCormick, and J.T. Way, “Transnationalism: A
Category of Analysis,” American Quarterly 60:3 (September, 2008): 628.

10

nation or another, thus decentering the nation-based narratives that still
shape much of public history. More importantly, however, transnational
theory compels us “to acknowledge that the nation […] is a thing
contested, interrupted, and always shot through with contradiction.” 27
History written from a transnational vantage point contextualizes
nationalism, it recognizes that national borders and boundaries as well as
the spaces, institutions, and traditions defining national identity are
constantly renegotiated and everything but stable.28
For my own work, transnationalism signifies a different understanding
of migratory processes. Transnational scholars view migration not as a
one-way-street, a teleological voyage with a final destination from one
national body to the other. Instead, they envision transnational spaces and
“multisited ‘imagined communities’ whose boundaries stretch across the
borders of two or more nation-states.”29 Migrants traveling back and forth
between origin and destination inhabit these spaces and use them to
reimagine who they are now and were in the past. That knowledge is then
passed on to the next generations. Through such processes, migrants
change our cultural understanding of nation, nationality, national identity,

27

Briggs et al., “Transnationalism,” 627.
A standard introduction to transnational history is: Thomas Bender, ed.,
Rethinking American History in a Global Age (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2002).
29
David Gutiérrez and Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, “Introduction Nation and
Migration,” American Quarterly 60:3 (September, 2008): 504. For an extensive
discussion of transnationalism and migration, see: Jorge Duany, Blurred Borders:
Transnational Migration between the Hispanic Caribbean and the United States
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 17-33.
28

11

and national belonging. A transnational approach thus enables historians
to understand migrants not as silenced, disappearing voices, at best
invisible to the “national” eye, at worst perceived and understood as a
threat to the nation-state. Instead, they become active participants in a
political, cultural, and social sphere in which they are empowered to
choose “among various strategies of accommodation or opposition” 30
available in the transnational space of the ethnic community.
An important example of such work is Eiichiro Azuma’s Between Two
Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America,
which chronicles the experience of Japanese immigrants in the United
States between the late 1800s and World War II.31 There were, of course,
differences between the German and the Japanese experiences, most
notably the racial politics of the time, which undermined Japanese
Americans’ civic rights. However, the similarities between the two groups
are just as striking: Both German and Japanese immigrants originated
from strong, nationalistic and militaristic societies, which emphasized race
as a crucial part of their self-definition.32 And both groups had to deal with

30

Kathleen Conzen, David Gerber, Ewa Morawska, George Pozzetta, and
Rudolph Vecoli, “The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A.,”
Journal of American Ethnic History 12 (Fall, 1992): 11.
31
Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires.
32
Studies of Japanese ethnic nationalism include: Kevin M. Doak, “Ethnic
Nationalism and Romanticism in Early Twentieth-Century Japan,” Journal of
Japanese Studies 22 (1996), 77-103; Kevin M. Doak, “What Is a Nation and Who
Belongs? National Narratives and the Ethnic Imagination in Twentieth-Century
Japan,” American Historical Review 102:2 (April, 1997), 283-309; John Dower,
Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 1986); Michael Weiner,
“Discourses of Race, Nation, and Empire in Pre-1945 Japan,” Ethnic and Racial

12

the intractable conflict of war, which forced them into an antagonistic
relationship with the American state and its people and left them in an
emotional no-man’s-land. Azuma’s work has been a guideline for my own
because of the juxtaposition of subjectivity and responsibility: Japanese
immigrants, Azuma wrote, may have been “caught between the
ideological and often repressive apparatuses of the two nation-states, [but]
their bodies were anchored in America, their interests rooted in its
socioeconomic structure, and their activities disciplined by its politicolegal
system.” In other words, while certainly remaining connected to the social
sphere of the homeland, Japanese immigrants had no choice but to deal
with the society they encountered – a hostile society, in which they were
racially othered, excluded, and eventually even imprisoned. At the same
time, Azuma held immigrants “accountable for their actions and inaction,
their choices and judgments, and their complicity and resistance.”33 This is
to say that immigrants were not merely victims, but agents of their own
fate – if only to the degree permitted by the society they encountered.
I believe that acknowledging this dichotomy is one of the fundamental
preconditions to any viable approach dealing with the history of German
America between the two World Wars. While certainly subjected to some
injustice, I will show that Germans in the United States engaged in

Studies 18:3 (July, 1995), 433-456, which is also reprinted along with other
essays on race and nationalism in modern Japan in: Michael Warner, ed., Race,
Ethnicity and Migration in Modern Japan (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005).
33
Azuma, Between Two Empires, 6 and 8.
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arguments amongst each other and against other groups, thus helping to
create new injustices while resisting and helping to dispel old ones. Like
Japanese-Americans they had to find ways to retain a sense of belonging
rooted in the past while embracing their presence and future as Americans.
Many did so successfully. Others only reluctantly followed suit. Still others
decided to embrace their German heritage and even remigrated to
participate in what the Nazis proclaimed to be a millennial empire.
Chapters
Chapter One of this dissertation explores how Germany’s conception
of national belonging developed throughout the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries and provided an ideological framework for the histories
of German migration to the United States. I maintain that German
American historians and writers such as Albert B. Faust and Rudolf
Cronau pursued transnational agendas in appealing to both American and
German discourses, particularly to nationalized prototypes of “the
immigrant.” In their descriptions of the migratory past, they focused on the
contributions of a mythical immigrant – the hard-working, virtuous pioneer
– to the settlement and development of the United States, while
simultaneously lamenting the lack of appreciation for those achievements
by the American and German publics. Unfortunately, their perspective has
rarely been questioned but frequently reproduced, setting the paradigm of
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victimization and decline that clouded much of German American
historiography during the Twentieth Century.
The next four chapters counter such arguments.
Chapter Two compares the transformation of two competing national
ideologies in Germany and the United States and discusses how migrants
navigated that divide. The 1920s and 1930s were two decades in which
the respective paradigms of citizenship evolved into strictly opposing
models, the German based on ethnicity (and thus exclusive), the
American based on a commitment to its civic norms (and thus inclusive
and open to repatriation).34 For German Americans this evolution was a
painful process. Many of them had employed their ethnic belonging as a
source of pride and, more importantly, as justification for their challenge to
Anglo-American superiority in the United States. German American
leaders continued to define Germanness in increasingly chauvinistic terms,
often closely following events back home and aligning with views
proposed by governments from Weimar to Nazi Germany. Meanwhile,
“average” migrants, far from simply being assimilated Americans,
continued to draw upon their heritage to negotiate challenges unique to
their particular group. As I will argue, they tried to define Germanness as
compatible with the “American Way of Life,” even though that eventually
proved to be impossible.
34
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Chapter Three examines the intersection of race and nation: German
migrants were outraged at their treatment during the “Great War,” which
undermined their belonging in the “white ethnic” by othering them racially
(the “Hun”) and by ostracizing them politically, culturally and socially. The
response may have been a thorough submergence into American society
for some, but many others were repelled by the treatment and vowed to
fight back against the prejudices. One way to do so was to reaffirm their
racial belonging in a campaign against the “Horror on the Rhine,” the
purported acts of sexual violence committed by black African occupation
troops against the German population in the Rhineland. The campaign
culminated in a mass meeting at New York’s Madison Square Garden on
February 28, 1921. Examining a variety of sources, including newspapers
and pamphlets from the United States and Germany, I argue that this
meeting helped set the tone for much of the next two decades, in which
German Americans stressed the racial unity of Northern Europeans and
white

European

Americans.

Invoking

transnational

discourses

of

whiteness and belonging, they used their German heritage to reassert that
they were members of humanity’s “finest race,” and thus demanded to be
accorded the full benefits of American citizenship. While widely
denounced by American media for its overt pro-German and anti-British
rhetoric, the campaign thus helped reinforce a racialized ethnic-national
identity among organized German Americans that opened the door to Nazi
propaganda a decade later.
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Chapter Four complicates the argument from the previous chapter by
pointing to internal divisions along social lines. It shows how German
American organizations alienated lower class immigrants by transposing
“old world” social norms and conventions on migrants, who frequently had
come to the United States precisely to escape these norms. At the same
time, these social constructions of Germanness abroad, which imbued a
seemingly homogeneous German people with qualities such as reliability,
character and the reputation for a strong “work ethic,” proved to be
advantageous for some individuals to achieve their goals in the United
States – not least, because contemporaneous American praises for the
“self-made man” and “free enterprise” were based on such virtues. These
contradictions appear throughout the 1920s and 1930s in letters – either
written to the VDA or published in the German American press – in
middle-class accounts of German American life, and in the internal
documents of German American organizations, which were reluctant to
accept working-class members among their ranks. Taking into account the
social and political conflicts dividing Germany at the time, I argue that
much of the frustration about assimilation and decline can be attributed to
social disagreements about what exactly it meant to be “German” between
1919 and 1939.
Chapter Five examines the intersection of gender and nation through
the prism of consumer culture, particularly focusing on German American
women and their adoption of a hyphenated identity to assert their essential
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role in private and public life. I focus especially on a 1932 incident that
caused righteous indignation among the German immigrant population in
Philadelphia: At the height of the Great Depression, the department store
Wanamaker’s

had

stopped

publishing

its

advertisements

in

the

Philadelphia Gazette Democrat, one of the most-widely read German
American dailies at the time. Several German organizations drafted
resolutions and individuals added protest letters demanding that the ads
be returned – first, due to the critical importance of the advertisements for
the financial well-being of the Gazette Democrat, an important
transnational space for the local German community; and second,
because the advertisements were perceived as important guidelines to
navigate private budgets and master the public shopping sphere. I
contend in this chapter that German Americans, particularly women,
attempted to preserve these hyphenated “safe spaces” and that their
failure to do so had little to do with neglect. Conversely, the unstoppable
expansion of mass consumer culture may be more to blame. A culture
“almost violently hostile to the past and to tradition”35 left little room for
ethnic niche markets, which had consolidated by the 1930s across the
United States and across all ethnic groups. Celebrations of European
migratory cultures remained local and did not reappear on a national scale
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until the ethnic revivals of the 1960s. Here, too, German emigrant history
mirrored, shaped, and became American history.
Conclusion
What constitutes Germanness abroad? German language, song, and
tradition? A German meal, Oktoberfest, and beer brewed according to the
German purity law, the Reinheitsgebot? Or can we locate the traces of a
transatlantic migratory wave in everyday American life today – in it’s racial
and social politics, in American patterns of shopping and consumerism,
and in the discursive negotiations of what it means to be an American? My
argument is: All of the above. All of these characteristics can potentially
help us understand the ways in which German migrants helped bring
about the contemporary United States, its culture and institutions, its
norms and values.
I believe the study of German migration to the United States is a wideopen field. Whereas other immigrant groups have been thoroughly studied,
German America has thus far rarely been examined through a theoretical
lens that exhausts the full potential of four transformative decades in the
study of immigration (see especially Chapter 1). This dissertation can
hardly close that gap. Instead, it aims to open up investigative areas for
future research. For every question it answers, it raises many more. When,
for example, I investigate the politics of citizenship and belonging in
Chapter Three, it is all but inevitable to draw a straight line to the civic
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discourse of the 1950s, when McCarthyism ruled in the United States,
driven by a populist anti-Communism deeply entrenched in the German
American community. And when I discuss the transnational negotiations of
modernity and consumer culture in Chapter Five, it raises the question,
whether or not German Americans drove the popularization of Austrian
economic ideas propagated by libertarian theorists Friedrich Hayek and
Ludwig von Mises, which led to the rise of the neo-liberal economics
during the 1960s and beyond.36
Moreover, the implications of my argument go well beyond the
American continent. At a time (2016), when Germany is once more
dealing with a perceived threat to its national cohesion, this time because
of a refugee exodus from war-torn Syria and elsewhere, the question of
what constitutes Germanness is as relevant as ever. “In Germany, a big
question is back on the table: What is German — and how German do you
have to be to belong to Germany?,” journalist Anna Sauerbrey recently
asked in the New York Times. Her answer: “For a disturbing number of
Germans, the answer is culture, including religion.”37
As I wrote and researched this dissertation, I learned quickly that the
vision of German identity propagated during the 1920s and 1930s still
influences the ways in which Germans think about belonging to the nation
36
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today. Even though some of the policies have been excised of their
essentialist, even racist connotations, these undertones still shape the
contemporary discourse on migration and belonging. The transnational
perspective on emigrated Germans in the “New World” and the role they
played in defining the boundaries of belonging there, thus serve as a
mirror to understanding “Old World” politics. As such, this dissertation is
more than just an historical inquiry into a demographic subgroup of the
United States – it is indeed a contribution to a contemporary political
debate.
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Chapter 1: A “Tragedy”? – German American Historiography in
Transnational Tension

1. Introduction
In 1940, the British historian John A. Hawgood published The Tragedy
of German America, a sweeping overview of German immigration to the
United States from the 1830s to the 1920s. In his study, Hawgood argued
that in their attempts to create a better Germany abroad, German
immigrants not only met with the resistance of Americans, who rejected
the hyphenated nationalism of all newcomers, but also with the dismissal
of Germans back home, who despised the emigrants for leaving the
“fatherland.” The “tragedy,” according to Hawgood, was this peculiar
position outside both old and new world cultures, while the reconciliation
of the two poles became the decisive challenge of the immigrant group – a
challenge that German Americans had thus far failed to overcome.38
The reception of Hawgood’s book by many historians of German
America at the time was quite positive, not merely because of its intriguing
argument, but also because of the quality of the research. Dieter Cunz of
the University of Maryland, a recent émigré from Nazi Germany, noted
that despite a large body of work covering German immigration to the

38

John A. Hawgood, The Tragedy of German-America; the Germans in the
United States of America During the Nineteenth Century--and After (London,
New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940), main argument on page 52.

22

United States, “German-American historiography has remained a quite
thorny and rocky field, in which only few flowers bloom that one can
enjoy.”39 In Cunz’ opinion, Tragedy was different. Hawgood had moved
beyond hagiographic – and quite common – descriptions of German
immigrants as virtuous pioneers and trailblazers. Instead, he observed
that they tended to stay clustered together, preferring the security of urban
areas and established communities to the adventure of the prairie. Even
the book’s shortcomings, for example its ignorance of social differences
among German Americans, did not undermine its scholarly acumen. To
the opposite, the fact that other scholars critically engaged with it was
evidence of its academic excellence.40 Even the New York Times, which
frequently criticized German American works for their ethnic chauvinism,
reviewed Hawgood’s book favorably, echoing Cunz’ criticism of German
American historiography: “Perhaps it took a disinterested outsider to give
a complete and unbiased report of the history of the Germans in the
United States.”41
I argue in this chapter that the lack of scholarly acumen, which
characterized German American studies from its beginnings until midcentury, was largely due to the struggle to come to terms with two
rejecting poles, German and American national identity. In other words,
39
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Hawgood’s “tragedy” argument applied to the historiography of German
America as well, particularly to those accounts written in the United States
by authors with German origins. They will be the focus of this chapter. As I
will lay out, these historians, many of them amateurs, aimed to relieve the
transatlantic tension by writing histories that attempted to please both
contemporary Americans as well as their kin in Germany. In their
narratives, Germans were both leading contributors in American life, while
also successfully preserving German language and culture abroad.
Unsurprisingly, given their political focus, many early works on German
America lacked academic objectivity. However, when met with criticism,
these historians frequently resorted to narratives of persecution and selfloathing, which transcended the postwar era and cast a long shadow on
German American historiography until today. Hawgood’s book could have
become a watershed – but it didn’t.
In fact, I suggest that much (though certainly not all) of the subsequent
scholarship written by German Americans was conceived within the
confines of that conflict. Whereas other ethnic histories 42 successfully
emerged from the pressures of Americanization during the 1960s and
1970s, German American history has struggled to come to terms with its
convoluted past, open up to modern academic trends and find meaningful
ways to attract new talents. Though some works have explored new
territories, such as gender, race, and class, too many others have been
42
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unable to transcend old narratives, engage with that history critically and
lead German American historiographical studies into the twenty-first
century. To be sure, this chapter will not be able to fill that void. But it
attempts to begin the discussion by exploring the transnational dynamics
in the “tragic” historiography of German America.
To do so, I have read and analyzed some of the most important texts
of the time. Unlike most of the following chapters, which use a variety of
archival sources, this chapter is largely based on the contextualization of
those histories and a discussion of the authors’ motifs. It is meant to start
a conversation on the transnational background of German American
historiography – but it also sets the stage for my exploration of German
American life during the interwar era in the chapters that follow. As such, it
is not only a metacritique of existing accounts through a transnational
prism, it also provides a detailed view on the discursive strategies
employed by migrants, in this case the writers of German American history,
to explain their present status through a historical lens.
In this chapter, I will thus first lay out in brief the history of German
emigration to the United States and, next, the role of that emigration on
the German national consciousness in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Then, I will discuss how the first authors wrote within the
confines of that context, which set the historiographical narrative patterns
that can – to a certain degree – still be found today.
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2. Emigration, Historiography and the Nation in 19th Century
Germany
2.1. Emigration to the U.S. and the Heterogeneity of German
America
A useful place to start this brief overview43 of emigration from Germany
to the United States is the period around 1815 and after. Though many
families had sought religious or political freedom as well as economic
opportunities in the “new world” before, emigration did not become a
widespread social phenomenon in the German states until then. Wars had
ravaged Central Europe, the old order of aristocratic and church rule had
collapsed while overpopulation and corruption challenged the survival of
countless families who could no longer live off the land. In 1816,
catastrophic harvest failures put many families on the brink of disaster. As
Mack Walker notes, there was “emotional turmoil at all levels of society,
for the old orientations of loyalty, status, and law were wrenched apart and
twisted into new.” In other words, it seemed as if an old way of life was
collapsing.44
43
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Desperate, the first families decided to emigrate, particularly from the
South Western German states that bordered the Rhine River, which
provided easy access to the transatlantic ports on the North Sea. Actual
emigration numbers remained comparatively low until mid-century,
ranging between a few hundred annually in the 1820s to a high of nearly
30000 in 1840,45 yet the period was critical for the establishment of major
migratory patterns: Once settled in rural farming villages or booming
industrial centers, those that had left sent letters home and told of their
lives across the Atlantic. Families, friends, and neighbors read of their
exploits and decided to tread the same paths as previous generations,
often migrating to the exact same town or city, where they knew fellow
villagers from back home. 46 Others followed the advice of bourgeois
adventurers like the doctor Gottfried Duden from Bonn, who contributed to
the excitement with descriptions of “freedom in paradise.” 47 In short,
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transatlantic exchange between Germany and the United States was a
critical component of migration from the start.
As most other newcomers to the United States, Germans emigrated
during the nineteenth century through necessity. Pushed by political and
religious restrictions, military duties, poverty and lack of opportunity, those
that left often did so with a heavy heart rather than, simply, because they
were drawn by the American promise. 48 As more and more families
established migratory “bridgeheads”, emigration numbers rose.49 Between
1845 and 1858, 1.3 Million people left the German states, constituting the
first of three large emigration waves to the United States during the
nineteenth century. 50 Mostly peasants and small-town craftsman facing
economic ruin from industrialization and the structural reforms that
benefitted the aristocracy and the middle-class, migrants faced a choice
either to move to German cities to work in factories – or to leave the
country. Mack Walker argued that the “prospect of joining the wage-labor
class, the lowest he [sic] knew, was abhorrent to the pride, training, and
traditions of the independent freeholder or artisan.”51
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Instead, those desperate to preserve their dignity and independence
chose to leave and preserve the way of life they knew elsewhere, with little
regard for the German nation: “He who chose Auswanderung [emigration]
might be attached to his home village, but probably not much to his home
country […]; if his roots must be torn up, let them be transplanted to a new
land, not another province or another duchy”. 52 Walker’s 1964 study of
German emigration to the United States in 1964 was thus an early
proponent of the “transplantation” theory; he argued that immigrants were
not simply passively “dislocated” or “uprooted,” dropping any “cultural
baggage” from the homeland as soon as they stepped foot on American
soil. 53 Instead, Walker describes them as active agents of their own
destiny with the clear intention to recreate as much of their old life as
possible. “The Auswanderer [emigrant] went to America less to build
something new than to regain and conserve something old, […] theirs
were not so much acts of radical affirmation as acts of conservative
rejection.” 54 Though Walker’s argument is somewhat simplistic, as a
general observation it has stood the test of time. More importantly, it
critically undermines the observations of later historians (see Section 1.3)
that envisioned German migrants as pioneers and trailblazers. By and
large, they were not.
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After the volume of emigration had slowed down during the 1850s,
numbers began to rise again in the mid-1860s, when the end of the
American Civil War and a number of armed conflicts in Central Europe
increased both the “push” and “pull” factors.55 During the second wave of
emigration, which lasted from roughly 1864 to 1873, about one million
migrants left the German states. A third wave began in 1880 and lasted
until the mid-1890s. In 1881 alone, 220,000 people left the German
Empire, which was unified following the Franco-Prussian war of 1871.56
Walker maintains that a general desire for security and independence,
which neither the German states nor Empire could provide, remained an
important reason prompting many families to leave.57 But there was a shift
in geographical origins and social backgrounds. During the first half of the
century, emigrants had been mostly peasants and artisans from the
Southwest. By the late 1800s, increasing numbers from the Eastern states,
from Mecklenburg, Saxony and Eastern Prussia, joined the flow. Instead
of landowning peasants they were agricultural laborers, factory workers
instead of skilled artisans.58
The change in the social makeup of the migrants had great
implications for the experience abroad. While earlier generations had often
become peasant farmers and settled in small rural German-language
55
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communities, now increasing numbers of immigrants went to America’s
booming industrial centers, opting for manufacturing jobs instead of
agricultural labor. “New and solidly German farming communities were
indeed established, in south-western states like Texas as well as the
Middle West, but the typical German experience in America was urban.”59
German immigrants were a large and vocal minority in cities like Chicago,
New York and Philadelphia, and they were influential in the development
of such smaller but no less booming cities as St. Louis, Milwaukee, and
Cincinnati.

60

And they were increasingly aware of the new social

categories that separated people into working class, educated bourgeoisie,
and

those

that

owned

capital.

This

strong

urban

association

notwithstanding, there has been a persistent “myth” in German American
historiography that claims the German immigrant was a frontiersman
realizing America’s “Manifest Destiny.” 61 Many, if not most Germans
instead preferred the security of “prepared” land or urban comforts to
daring ventures on the frontier. And they sought familiar environments –
the forested hills of Ohio for those from the Southwest, the ethnic
neighborhoods of Chicago and Milwaukee for later generations – where
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they could recreate the way of life they knew and preserve old world
customs.62
Finally, before discussing the impact of emigration on the burgeoning
German national consciousness, a small, but influential group of
emigrants should be highlighted: After the failed Revolution of 1848/963,
between four and ten thousand so-called “Forty-Eighters” escaped
persecution and left for the United States. Even though their number was
small, they wielded significant influence in the public life of the United
States. Equally important, they would shape the image of the German
American in American life. The “Forty-Eighters” often originated from the
educated middle-class and held respectable jobs – lawyers, professors,
scientists, writers and journalists – and they brought with them great
expectations about German culture abroad.64 While their contributions to
German American cultural life were significant, the new national self62
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confidence and pride they imported to the United States also caused
severe conflicts with older German Americans, particularly those who had
come to the United States to escape the damning influence of the German
bourgeoisie in proscribing a way of life.65 Many of these more established
migrants had no sympathy for the missionary zeal of the newcomers,
precisely because it caused an indiscriminate nativist backlash against all
Germans. I will discuss the internal conflicts in more detail in Chapters 2
and 4.
American nativists viewed the runaway revolutionaries with suspicion.
While they were often at best ambivalent about German migrants in
general “the refugee intellectuals of 1848 and their adherents received the
harshest bashing from the nativist camp.” 66 “Native” Americans worried
that the failed revolutionaries would meddle with American politics and
infuse American life with atheist views of European enlightenment.
European radicals, the Congressman Henry M. Fuller of Pennsylvania
believed, had “already raised the black standard of atheism, and declared
a war of extermination against the faith which supported [native-born
Americans’] ancestors.”67 As Mischa Honeck has observed, this fear was
not entirely unfounded. German liberals immediately got involved in the
social lives of their host communities and subjected the politics and
institutions to the harshest criticism. The German-language Turn-Zeitung,
65
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a newspaper published by a group of “Forty-Eighters,” exclaimed in 1853:
“Anglo-Saxon civilization, which measures the value of a human being
only on the basis of income, in which outer appearance is everything, truth
and honor nothing, leads to a moral servitude, material slavery, and
antisocial barbarity; it destroys all bonds of society, consolidates the
monarchical principle, wherever it exists, and undermines the republic.”
The German revolutionaries considered themselves to be the real
democrats. They felt that American democracy, though certainly politically
ahead of European nations, desperately needed some infusion of
(German) culture. “I would feel more comfortable here if there were more
paintings, better drama, and less religion,” the feminist journalist Ottilie
Assing, a confidante of Frederick Douglass’, wrote.68
In essence, then, by the late nineteenth century, the German American
community was no community at all. Social, religious, and regional
differences made it hard to celebrate a common culture, especially since
being German meant different things to different people and, more
importantly, since those that claimed for themselves the right to define
Deutschtum (Germandom) did not always find the support of others.69 The
successful ascension of the second German Reich into the rank of a
global world power and the consolidation of the nation-state around its
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racial/ethnic roots added another layer to the migrants’ complicated
negotiations of hyphenated belonging. While liberal revolutionaries in the
United States demanded the preservation of German culture abroad,
changing perception of the “immigrant” in the old world also increased the
pressure on those, who felt an emotional connection to the national project
back home. For many German migrants, however, the social discourses
that drove the evolution of turn-of-the-century American national identity –
decreasing

immigration,

Americanization,

suburbanization

and

the

evolution of a “white ethnic” – proved to be an appealing alternative. 70
However, as I will argue in the chapters to follow, they did so in ways that
reflected their own origins in ways that nationalists on neither side of the
Atlantic Ocean recognized.
World War I further subdued all-too public displays of immigrant
nationalism. American public opinion, never truly in favor of the Reich,
increasingly shifted towards a view of German monarchy and militarism as
antithetical to U.S. democracy. Reports of German atrocities in France
and Belgium early in the war further added to the mistrust, as did the
German sinking of the British passenger ship Lusitania, which killed 197
Americans in May 1915. The American entry into World War I in April
1917 set of an intense anti-German atmosphere. With suspicions of
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German fifth column activities in the United States circulating across the
country, many German Americans suffered from the comprehensive
Americanization campaigns that aimed to homogenize U.S. society and to
eradicate the remnants of German ethnic nationalism.71
The fact is undisputed that these Americanization campaigns
negatively affected German American life. 72 German Americans were
expected to show their loyalty by taking on American citizenship and by
abandoning the German language at home and in public. Vigilante
organizations, which often resorted to violence and intimidation, pursued
those that dared to question the American war effort. Readership of
German American newspapers declined sharply.73 And by early 1918, the
American government had enacted sweeping restrictions that forced all
“enemy aliens” to register, punished everyone obstructing the sale of war
bonds, and even went after those spoke ill of the American flag, its army,
its uniforms, the constitution or its government. 74 Moreover, “Germanlanguage training was expurgated from school curricula in communities
across the nation, patriotic ceremonies featured the burning of German
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books, and several states restricted the freedom to speak German in
public.”75
At the same time, recent research has shown that the German
American experience during the “Great War” was nowhere near as
catastrophic as earlier histories suggested. 76 The majority of migrants,
whether those in small towns or those in major cities, continued their lives
largely undisturbed. Some paradigmatic anti-German milestone events
have turned out to be much more complicated than originally assumed.
For example, the lynching of Robert Praeger, a German-born miner in
Collinsville, Illinois, was probably rather motivated by the victim’s socialism
than his German origins, an assumption supported by the fact that the
mob itself contained a great number of German Americans.77 Instead, it is
much more likely that the contemporary idea of what it meant to be
German led those willing and able to define Germanness in the United
States between World War I and World War II to the conclusion that
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German identity was fading. In order to understand that perception, we
need to take a closer look at the impact of emigration, particularly to the
United States, on the burgeoning German national consciousness
throughout the nineteenth century.
2.2. Emigration and Nationalism in Germany
Authorities in the affected “emigration” states, especially in the German
Southwest, almost immediately took note when emigration numbers rose
in the 1810s and 1820s. To make sense of what was happening,
governments commissioned reports, quickly learning about miserable,
stranded emigrants crowding roads and harbors across Europe. From the
Americas, they heard tales of broken promises and miserable migrants
living in great poverty. Assuming wrongly that merely the poorest of the
poor as well as discontented radicals were leaving for a better future
elsewhere,78 officials and aristocrats in states like Württemberg, Bavaria or
Hessen showed little concern for the effects of emigration. They failed to
appreciate its causes, in particular the hopelessness and distrust in
government that pervaded many rural areas.79

78

Bradley Naranch, Beyond the Fatherland: Colonial Visions, Overseas
Expansion, and German Nationalism, 1848-1885 (Baltimore: PhD diss., Johns
Hopkins University, 2006), 24-25. Kamphoefner, “Immigrant Epistolary,” 36.
79
Mack Walker’s book Germany and the Emigration, esp. 1-41, continues to be
the definite study on emigration and its causes. See also Kamphoefner,
“Immigrant Epistolary,” 34.

38

On a local level, some officials encouraged emigration, fearing “rioting
and revolt at any moment if the distressed people did not leave.”80 In that
sense, municipal and state governments often saw emigration as a “safety
valve,” an easy way to solve overpopulation and dislodge political
dissent.81 Others, incapable of grasping the impact of what was happening,
described emigration as a disease, a “fever” or an “epidemic.82 There also
existed a widespread belief that “the Auswanderung [emigration] was
created by swindlers and demagogues, disturbers of the public order who
exploited the misery of the populace” with empty promises of free passage
and free property in the United States. 83 Rather than recognizing their
citizens as active agents seeking a better future elsewhere, aristocrats
and authorities often saw passive victims of exploitation and deceit.
Rather than accepting a duty to support them at home, they saw in their
citizens little more than assets of the state, to be used for military and
economic exploitation. Many of the perfunctory explanations “tended to
deny the emigrant his or her unique and often sensible reason for leaving
their ancestral homelands to seek better opportunities or career prospects
for themselves and their children abroad.”84
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If state governments routinely failed emigrants, they found powerful
advocates within the growing nationalist movement to unify Germany that
picked up in intensity during the 1820s and 1830s. In fact, care for
emigrants proved to be an ideal way to showcase the paternalistic
concern of the educated bourgeoisie for the people, a core message of
the movement. Nationalists spoke of, and often believed in, the organic
composition of the people, which “belonged” in and to Germany. As both
the national movement and out-migration picked up in volume and
intensity, nationalists envisioned emigration as a process akin to a body
losing blood,85 and they lamented the virility of emigrants lost to “foreign
acres, where only foreigners harvest the fruit,” according to the colonial
officer Johann Jacob Sturz (1800-1877).86
Bemoaning the failure of the burgeoning national community to feed
and protect its citizens, liberal intellectuals like Ludwig Gall (1791-1863),
was needed and it was frequently denied if an individual had a criminal record or
was in debt. Some states, on the other hand, actively encouraged criminals and
the poor to emigrate.
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who had emigrated to the United States in 1819 but returned one year
later,87 implored state governments to support emigrants. “The state was
to serve both as a paternalistic protector and defender of German
interests abroad and as a caring and compassionate maternal figure who
did not abandon her children to foreign exploitation and appropriation.”88
But in their attempts to initiate more proactive government action,
bourgeois agitators like Gall met with the resistance of German authorities,
especially those in the rising power Prussia, who declined to take on any
responsibility for emigrants. 89 This failure of the state to act, writes
historian Bradley Naranch
became a long-term political grievance that had a profound
impact on the confidence of later generations in the cultural
resiliency of the German nation to prosper in a modern
environment characterized by international economic rivalry,
global exploration, and colonial conquest.90
Emigration became one of the defining challenges to German nationalist
pride and self-confidence.
With governments slow to respond to requests for action, members of
the intellectual middle-class invested in the politics of emigration turned to
the private sphere to enact their own imperial adventures. Here, migration
intersected with visions of a powerful German nation on par with other
87

According to his account of the travels, the first sentence Gall was confronted
with upon his arrival in New York was: „On ce [sic] more damn’d emigrants!“ He
soon decided the United States was not for him. Ludwig Gall, Meine
Auswanderung Nach Den Vereinigten-Staaten in Nord-Amerika, Vol. 2 (Trier: F.A.
Gall, 1822), 6.
88
Naranch, Beyond the Fatherland, 42.
89
Walker, Germany and the Emigration, 24-28 and 59-60.
90
Naranch, Beyond the Fatherland, 28.

41

European empires. Instead of losing German emigrants to “foreign acres,”
as Sturz had suggested, bourgeois nationalists envisioned future German
colonies in the Americas that would add to the glory of the would-be nation,
a new Germany abroad “that was not riven by internal conflicts of class,
region, and confession.” Again misjudging the motivations of those who
left, they felt that migrants shared in that dream and that the “colonies”
they founded could help establish a permanent German presence
abroad.91
Countless new organizations were founded during the 1830s and
1840s, which purported to (and often did) provide for the welfare of
emigrants. They sought out spaces, where national feelings could be
strengthened and nationhood maintained. For example, one such
organization devoted to promoting “colonization” abroad, the Verein zum
Schutze deutscher Einwanderer in Texas (“Association for the Protection
of German Immigrants in Texas”) planned to establish a permanent and
independent German colony there. “Organizers of the society had two
objectives: land investments that would increase in time and a safe outlet
for countrymen who wanted to emigrate.”92
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The Revolution of 1848 and 1849 and the assembly of national
delegates in Frankfurt93 put this discourse on a political foundation and
provided an arena to further debate the impact of emigration on the
developing German nation-state. The result, not surprisingly, was “a mixed
record of colonial fantasy and practical, if unrealized, measures designed
to connect the fatherland to its disparate communities of ‘nationals’
abroad.”94 Colonialism and emigration, in other words, emerged as two
interconnected issues where anxieties about population loss, cultural
decline and the threat of alien invasion converged. Bourgeois elites could
position themselves as custodians of a superior culture, educated, hardworking, spiritually sound, and destined to protect “Germanness” against
the denigrating influence of everything non-German. The constitutional
congress in Frankfurt aimed to set up a unified German state capable of
protecting emigrants and asserting Germany’s role as a leading super
power akin to its British and French counterparts, while simultaneously
protecting and controlling its subjects at home and abroad.95
An emblematic trope in this vision became the figure of the
Auslandsdeutsche (the ‘German abroad’). Bradley Naranch has described
how this “imagined identity” came to express in the post-revolutionary
middle-class print culture “the conflicted feelings of national pride and
93
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powerlessness felt by many Germans who were interested in the fortunes
and misfortunes of German emigrants in the United States, Latin America,
Western Europe and elsewhere.”96 The terminology signified a paradigm
shift: whereas during the first half of the nineteenth century, middle-class
nationalists often described emigrants as Auswanderer, powerful,
adventurous individuals who took on their own destiny and voluntarily left
Germany for good, the Auslandsdeutsche represented tragic loss of the
homeland. Much like the patronizing assessments of governments and
aristocracy, this had little to do with the reality experienced by emigrants.97
While bourgeois Germans envisioned romanticized images of the nation
and its empire in cultural and ethnic terms, millions of peasants, artisans,
and workers that saw their way of live permanently destroyed and left
European societies not to resurrect a German empire abroad but to save
an old, quite regional or even local way of life. “The Auslandsdeutsche,
quite simply, was not the German emigrant […].”98
This is not to say that emigrants abandoned everything German or
denied their heritage, as many observers alleged. But most emigrants
merely possessed a rudimentary sense of German national identity. While
their way of life collapsed in the old world, lower-class Germans remained
disenfranchised politically, economically and culturally – to them,
“Germany” had little to offer. As I discussed in the previous section,
96
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emigrants were in fact aiming to transplant life to the United States in a
much more active and optimistic manner than assumed by bourgeois
observers. When the latter fantasized about emigrants’ separation from a
mythical homeland, they only partly captured migrant reality. Emigrants
lost a Heimat, but not necessarily a nation, and their losses were far from
mythical, they were real. Like the terminology describing it, bourgeois
visions of emigration
did not encapsulate the immense diversity of experiences
and cultural identities of the millions of persons of German
descent living around the globe. Instead it located them in a
monolithic national imaginary that denied their claims to
individual expression and autonomy of self in ways that were
politically and rhetorically useful domestically.99
This conflict between myth and reality, between Auslandsdeutsche and
Auswanderer, arose when the liberal revolutionaries in the late 1840s
arrived in German American communities across the United States. The
“Forty-Eighters” found the state of German America to be lacking.
Politically, they despised slavery and uniformly supported the Republican
Party, whereas older immigrants “found their ideas of liberty and equality
in the Jeffersonian doctrines of the Democratic party,”100 which tolerated
slavery. And while established immigrants often congregated in religious
institutions where German language, culture and traditions were passed
on, the liberal revolutionaries founded social and cultural clubs as well as
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parochial schools. The 1848 liberals often rebuked older settlers publically,
“calling them barbarians, without art, music, and culture.”101
When liberal nationalists reported their observations back to Germany,
they further added to the already deteriorating opinion Germans held
about their kin abroad. The more the reality of German unification
converged with colonial fantasies and an increasingly racial view of the
nation, the less German America fit into the romanticized descriptions of
migrant life that pervaded the German public sphere for much of the
second half of the nineteenth century.102 Originally, the Auslandsdeutsche
had been, “the ultimate cultural colonizer, bringing the values of hard work,
spiritual vitality, classical education, and love of order to the inferior races
on the imperial periphery as well as to the civilized metropolises of
Western Europe and the United States.” 103 Now, many questioned the
suitability of emigrants to extend the German nation beyond its borders.
Some even spoke of an “emigration fever” and suggested that emigrants
left not because of poverty or social immobility but due to their own lack of
roots and ability. To others, emigration amounted to treason.104 In essence,
elites blamed the émigrés for the conditions that pushed them out. By the
1890s,
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growing Anglophobia, skepticism of the ultimate national
allegiances of German-American families, and the end of the
last major wave of German transatlantic migration further
eroded the importance of the Auswanderer as a symbol of
national identity. The Auslandsdeutsche and the possibility
of seeking new colonization spaces for the German diaspora
in its African colonies and a German-dominated Mitteleuropa
became a fixture in the nationalist imaginary of the radical
right.105
As I will attempt to show throughout this dissertation, such rejection by
the fatherland greatly disappointed German Americans. For many
migrants that had left Germany disillusioned after the failed Revolution of
1848/9 – as well as many others106 – the country’s ascension into the elite
circle of world powers was a matter of great personal pleasure. To be sure,
liberals were missing some of the democratic elements that they had
fought for during the revolution, but even those critical of some of the
Kaiser’s policies “found it difficult to hide their enthusiasm over
developments in Bismarck’s Germany.” 107 Not surprisingly, many of the
historians, activists and writers who first told the story of German migration
to the United States shared a great “pride in the progress of Germany”
and they attempted to appeal to the Germans back home by writing
histories of hard-working, diligent, and resilient settlers, who preserved
105
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German language and culture abroad.108 In that sense, as I will argue in
more detail below, early German American history was steeped in the
transnational politics of belonging from the start: its writers participated in
a transatlantic debate about the past, presence, and future of German
America.
It was not until the 1920s that German nationalists again reached out
to Germans abroad,109 when German foreign policy discovered ethnicity
as a political lever following World War I.110 The Versailles Treaty curtailed
German military, political, and economic might. Cultural approaches were
often not merely the only affordable means to make international politics,
but also the only ones accepted by the Allies. Aiming to reverse Versailles,
the German government, and in particular the German Foreign Office, the
Auswärtige Amt, believed that it could awaken the ethnic national
consciousness of Germans around the world and use them politically. The
United States, which was not only becoming a major global power, but
also had an enormous number of citizens that were ethnically German,
became one of the main targets of the cultural foreign policy of Weimar
Germany, which aimed to rekindle the pride in German heritage through
culture, language – and history. I will discuss in more detail throughout the
following chapters the implications of that shift for German migrants in the
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United States. Here, it should simply be noted that in its increasingly
racialized manifestations, the post-World War I German nationalism
emphasized the history of its people to create a symbolic transnational
unity (particularly in Europe, of course) around the simple argument that
despite outmigration and diaspora, Germans all over the world had
retained their traditional character.111
3. The Historiography of German America
3.1. Origins and Early Developments up to World War I
Apart from some scattered local and clerical histories largely written by
amateur historians, there was no professional or scholarly effort to capture
the German experience in the United States prior to the 1850s. Among the
first authors to take on such a task was the jurist and historian Franz von
Löher (1818-1892) who published his Geschichte und Zustände der
Deutschen in Amerika (“History and Circumstances of the Germans in
America”) in Cincinnati in 1847.112 Von Löher was a temporary visitor to
the United States. In fact, having stayed only seven months, he returned
to Germany the year his book was published and participated in the
German Revolution the year after. His views were similar to those of other
liberal revolutionaries, who – before settling in the United States
111
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themselves – believed in the achievements of the Auswanderer and
lamented the Anglo-American establishment’s lack of appreciation for the
German “element”.
Von Löher may also have believed in the power of history to unite
German migrants around an ethnic-national identity that was still in its
development.113 That belief was more prevalent a few decades later, when
German American historiography experienced its first scholarly and
popular impulse. With nativism on the rise, Anglo-American master
narratives questioned the contributions of German immigrants and
threatened to further exclude them from the evolving American identity.114
A new generation of historians attempted to counter that trend by
establishing a more pluralist vision of the United States. They “saw in
German American achievements an argument for the retention of their
own identity and distinction apart from others, and they viewed history as
the means to preserve and further ethnic group pride and solidarity.”115
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Moreover, since they were intimately familiar with the accusations and
prejudices discussed in the previous section, I argue that they also hoped
to appease German nationalists back in the old world by highlighting the
great achievements of their kin in America.116
Writers like the historian Albert Bernhard Faust (1870-1951), the
philologist Julius Goebel (1857-1931) or the journalist and painter Richard
Cronau (1855-1939) were either born or trained in Germany.117 They had
spent many of their formative years in the old world. And the model of
German American history they created hinged upon a hybrid nationalism
molded in the transnational immigrant world that most German migrants
lived in, a world shaped by their desire to belong as full members to the
United States, while simultaneously retaining a stake in the evolving
German nationalism back home. As such, writing German American
history they developed discursive strategies, to use Eiichiro Azuma’s
terminology, to position themselves and the ethnic group they purportedly
spoke for between two evolving empires: Germany and the United
States.118
Of course, historiography was only one part of the larger German
American project that aimed to entrench its culture, its language, and its
unified political voice firmly in mainstream American life and as a part of
116
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American national identity. The historian Hans-Werner Retterath has
recognized three interrelated strategic “pillars” in that struggle: First, the
idealization of the German American, which meant homogenizing and
stereotyping groups and individuals by highlighting their virtues and their
character, both to show achievements past, but also to proscribe a way of
life

to

contemporary

generations

that

slowly

drifted

towards

Americanism; 119 second, the preservation of language in institutions,
publications and communities;120and third, a consensual historiography of
German American achievements.121
Retterath argues that one of the unique characteristics of German
American historiography – as opposed to German or American
historiography – was its assimilatory approach. Whereas German writers
often attempted to emphasize how migrants had kept separate, German
American authors aimed to convince their audience that the historic
achievements of their subjects had helped build the contemporary United
States, earning them the right to define what it meant to be American.122
They thus sought to counter nativism and Americanism in the United
States, increase the self-confidence and pride of German Americans in
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their own heritage, and establish a collective identity as well as a sense of
unity among the heterogeneous group of immigrants in the United
States.123 And they did not, as Kathleen Neils Conzen once noted, accept
assimilation as “the normal fate of any immigrant group,” but rather literally
wrote against that assimilation by stressing the historical achievements of
German immigrants.124
As early as 1883, German Americans had begun holding annual
German Days across the country to commemorate their own and their
ancestors’ achievements. Around the same time, the first histories of
German America were published.125 In 1886, the first German American
historical society was founded in Baltimore, others followed in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania in 1891 and in Chicago, where the German American
Historical Society of Illinois began publishing its journal, the DeutschAmerikanischen Geschichtsblätter, in 1901.126
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But activities remained scattered and largely unorganized on a national
level, so that by the late 1890s, German American leaders attempted to
unite the entire ethnic group in one national organization. In 1901, this led
to the foundation of the National German-American Alliance (NGAA,
Deutsch-Amerikanischer Nationalbund), a federation of hundreds of
German immigrant organizations and by far the largest group ever
attempting to represent the entire German ethnic group in the United
States.127 Of course, the NGAA did more than to publish histories. Its selfproclaimed aims included the unification of German Americans, their
protection against nativist attacks and the promotion of a good relationship
between the United States and the German Empire. 128 The NGAA
organized cultural events, proposed and lobbied for public policies
supporting the perpetuation of German culture and language in the United
States. And to drive the latter objective, the NGAA financed a variety of
historical

publications

outlining

the

achievements

of

German

immigrants.129
Importantly, the NGAA was largely run by members of the educated
middle and upper classes with strong ties to Germany. Charles J.
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Hexamer (1862-1921), president of the NGAA from 1901 to 1917 was an
engineer and the son of a failed 1848 revolutionary who had fled Germany
in 1856.130 The German-born and educated Rudolf Cronau, famous for his
paintings of the Sioux, continued publishing his articles in middle-class
German magazines like Die Gartenlaube long after he had permanently
settled down in the United States. 131 Richard Bartholdt (1855-1932), a
Congressman from St. Louis who arrived in the United States as a
sixteen-year old adolescent in 1862, pressed for the official incorporation
of the NGAA in Congress in 1907 and was a frequent visitor to the
homeland until his death.132 And Dr. Marion Dexter Learned (1857-1917),
Professor of German at the University of Pennsylvania, who edited the two
NGAA publications, the academic Americana Germanica as well as the
bulletin Mitteilungen, was a key member of the transatlantic academic
network that drove the advancement of German Studies in the United
States.133 All of these men had distinct ties to the German bourgeoisie, a
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personal and professional interest in preserving German culture in the
United States – and limited insights on the experiences of working class
German immigrants across the country. Their social bias may, in fact, be
the common denominator in a group that was still highly diverse in
regional, religious, and political backgrounds.
It is an important aspect of this historiography – one that I will explore
in much greater detail in Chapter 4 – that many of the texts coming out of
this network never reached a mass audience, for one because they were
written from a vantage point representing the authors’ social perspective.
As the historian John Appel has shown, among the members of the GAHS,
there was an outspoken disdain for “popular” or “readable” books.134 This
is surprising given their objective to awaken widespread awareness
among America’s German migrants for their past achievements. Oddly
enough, writers who otherwise praised the agency and achievements of
their subjects, particularly working-class “pioneers”, explicitly excluded
them from reading their texts.135 This aspects is a striking example of the
gap between myth and reality discussed in the previous section, a
disconnect that prevented German American historiography from ever
making an impact, either in academia or the public mind. Whereas Italian
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and Irish American ethnic cultures were rooted in the working class,
German American culture was frequently not.
***
As noted above, a deeply political, revisionist and consensual
historiography was an essential tool identified by the NGAA to reach its
aims of unification and advancement. “To value something,” Hexamer
argued in 1901, “one must know its history.”136 To pass on that knowledge,
the NGAA encouraged the foundation of local and regional historical
associations, explicitly in order to include the contributions of German
Americans in the history of the United States. In 1901, the NGAA also
created a national organization, the German-American Historical Society
(GAHS), to coordinate its activities and homogenize the message. 137
Based at the University of Pennsylvania, the GAHS published an
academic journal, the Americana Germanica, renamed the GermanAmerican Annals in 1903.138 Americana Germanica had been founded in
1897, four years before the GAHS made it its official organ, and its board
members represented the highest echelons of American academia
including the University of Chicago’s Starr W. Cutting (1868-1935), Faust
of Cornell, 139 and Harvard University’s Kuno Francke (1855-1930), who
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devoted a lifetime to developing and curating the Germanic Museum
there. 140 The German-American Annals focused on the historical and
present-day

achievements

of

German

Americans,

with

special

considerations to language and literature. 141 While ostensibly objective
and academic, the journal always provided ample room to make the
political case for “German Achievement in America,” for example when it
reprinted an eponymous speech given by NGAA president C.J. Hexamer
at Madison Square Garden in New York in November 1902, in which he
praised the historic accomplishments of German migrants.142
But it was the historical monographs written by and for the NGAA that
would permanently transform the historiography of German America. In
March 1904, the Germanic Department of the University of Chicago
announced the Conrad Seipp Memorial Prizes, donated by Mrs. Catherine
Seipp in memory of her late husband, a successful German American
brewer. The prizes were to be awarded to the three best monographs
written in German American history, or more precisely on “The German
Element in the United States with Special Reference to Its Political, Moral,
Social, and Educational Influence.” The books were to number roughly
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800 pages in volume and could be written in either German or English.143
The three members of the committee to select the winners were
Professors Hanno Deiler (1849-1909) of Tulane 144 , Bryn Mawr’s Karl
Detlev Jessen (1872-1919)145 and the famous pioneer historian Frederick
Jackson Turner (1861-1932), then a Professor of history at the University
of Wisconsin.146
The first price of $3,000 was eventually awarded to Albert Bernhard
Faust’s two volume The German Element in the United States (1909).
Faust, a regular contributor to the Annals, approached the subject from a
strictly academic point of view. At the time, his book fulfilled all standards
of the historical discipline and was praised, by one reviewer, for “its
scholarly thoroughness, its impartiality, its logical arrangement, and its
interesting style.”
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American history”.148 In fact, Faust’s book still stands out single-handedly
as the defining work on German America of that time. It was reprinted as
late as 1995 and favorably reviewed as late as 2005.149
The committee awarded the second prize, worth $2,000, to Rudolf
Cronau’s Drei Jahrhunderte deutschen Lebens in Amerika (“Three
Centuries of German Life in America”). Cronau had first visited the United
States in the 1880s to report about the American West for the bourgeois
magazine Die Gartenlaube. After permanently relocating to the United
States in 1901, he became involved in German American organizations
and wrote extensively about the migrant experience in the United
States.150 Published in German only, his book went through two editions in
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1909 and 1924, reaching a broad audience in the United States and in
Germany. Like the third-prize winner, Georg von Bosse’s Das deutsche
Element in den Vereinigten Staaten (1904), its aim was to rekindle the
relationship between Germany and German America by highlighting the
achievements of German migrants in the United States, both with regards
to their prosperity and to the preservation of German language and culture
abroad.151
In essence, all these histories shared a joint perspective that attempted
to establish the impact of German virtues – loyalty, modesty, diligence,
efficiency, frugality, sense of duty – on the “New World” from the
beginning of European discovery: The authors “found” Germans among
the Vikings, Germans in Jamestown, Germans in New Amsterdam,
Germans on the frontier. They described the diligence of German settlers,
hailed the bravery of their military achievements – for example by General
von Steuben in the Revolutionary War and the countless Germans fighting
in the Civil War – and praised the loyalty of contemporary German
Americans, whose character and personality made them ideal assets to
the United States. 152 The suggestion was, as Russell Kazal has aptly
summarized “that Germans did not simply contribute to the progress of
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America but counted among its founders—just as much as AngloAmericans, if not more so.”153
German American historiography was always written in a transnational
context of two competing, increasingly aggressive nationalisms that could
hardly be combined into one, hyphenated hybrid identity. That, as
discussed above, was the tragedy of German America, as the British
historian John Hawgood would describe it in the 1940s. The effect of this
transnational intermingling was that German migrant historians lent
heavily from their colleagues back home, engaging in, for example,
aggressively anti-English arguments as well as constant laments about
the lack of appreciation that American historiography showed for the
German achievements. 154 “How often have American circles hated,
ridiculed and even persecuted the strange, but noble German ways,”
Julius

Goebel,

head

of

the

German

Department

at

Stanford,

complained. 155 Somewhat more cautiously, A.B. Faust simply declared
“the prominence of the Germans as a formative element of the American
people, their continuous participation in the labors of peace and the
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burdens of war, suggested a need of a record of the essential facts in their
history.”156
Noticeably, some authors also attempted to refute accusations by
German writers, who criticized the absence of a cohesive German culture
in the United States. And if they admitted that absence, they blamed it at
least in part on Germans back home.
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Again, Goebel: “It is

incomprehensible that the children of the nation [des Volkes] that
produced the greatest historians of the modern era did so little to foster
the memory of its past in the world.” Interestingly, Goebel largely blamed
this absence on the failures of German aristocracy to comprehend, protect
and respect emigrants. “Too shortsighted and narrow-minded to
comprehend the value of overseas settlements and unable to accompany
the

Auswanderer

to

America,

they

sought

to

characterize

the

Auswanderer as a criminal.” Goebel continues:
Back then, the heinously ridiculous view may have
developed and spread that is still widespread today, that the
Auswanderer to America were forever lost to the fatherland.
And since then Germany has burdened itself with the
unforgivable guilt of not taking care of the weal and woe
[Wohl und Wehe] of its emigrated children […]. 158
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By

merging

German

middle-class

values

with

well-known

characteristics of American ideal types – the frontier, or self-made man;
the soldier; etc – German American authors attempted to create a valid
hyphenated identity that would allow them to celebrate the culture they
loved while regaining the cultural capital to participate in the American
public sphere. Or, in the words of Rudolf Cronau: “the reverent love which
the Germans bear the land of their birth in no way tends to diminish the
loyalty which they owe to the country of their adoption.”159
3.2. German American Historiography after World War I
World War I dealt a serious blow to all efforts to entrench historical
German achievements in American national identity. Prior to the U.S.
entry into the war, the NGAA, many of its members, and countless other
German American organizations openly lobbied for American neutrality
and called for a weapons embargo against the Allies, specifically against
Great Britain.160 In the nationalist backlash that followed, many German
American organizations yielded to the public pressures and disappeared
from public view, as did the NGAA, which dissolved in April 1918 already
under investigation from the federal government for its disloyal
activities.161 The German-American Annals published its final two issues in
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1919 with a total of three contributions, none of which touched upon
German culture in the United States.162 Some professional careers ended
during the war, such as Detlev Jessen’s, who had once judged upon the
best monograph in German American history and whose German classes
at Bryn Mawr simply ceased attracting students in 1918. 163 At the
University of Michigan, the Iowa native Carl E. Eggert and the German
citizen Ewald Boucke, both of the German Department, were dismissed
for allegations of “pro-German” activities, along with three other
colleagues. Enrollment in the Germanic Studies programs subsequently
plummeted from 1300 to 150.164
Beyond such disparate and anecdotal instances, however, the
academic careers of those involved in attempting to rewrite German
American history continued largely undisturbed. For example, Alexander R.
Hohlfeld (1865-1956), a constant board member of the Annals from its first
to its final issue, remained on the faculty of the Wisconsin German
Department from 1901 until he retired in 1936. While there, he supervised
25 major works on Anglo-German literary relations, training scholars that
“assumed leading positions in German departments and professional
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organization” across the United States. 165 Kuno Francke (1855-1930),
whose moderate affirmation of his German heritage was favorably
reviewed by the New York Times in 1916, retained his position as the
curator of the German Museum at Harvard until 1929, a year before his
death.166 And Albert Bernhard Faust, the author of the German Element,
stayed at Cornell until he retired in 1938 with his reputation intact –
despite having received honors for his work in Germany as late as 1937.
Upon his death in 1951, the university praised his work and bemoaned the
loss of “a member who, by his personality, his writings, and his teaching,
has contributed much to [the university’s] lasting distinction.”167 Like the
ethnic leadership, most regional and local historical societies continued
their work largely uninterrupted throughout World War I and beyond.168
At the same time, the post-war era offered plenty of space for new
voices in German American studies. The most influential was Carl Wittke,
a second-generation American, whose research focused especially on the
German-language press and the Forty-Eighters. As Don Heinrich
Tolzmann noted in 1988: “Although affected by the assimilationist
perspective of his time, his work contributed to reestablishing German
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American history as an area of study and research, and it remains a point
of departure for a number of fields."169 Wittke was indeed influenced by
the historiographical trends of time – particularly the “Melting Pot” theory
of immigrant assimilation and Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis.170
But he argued that German Americans, though ultimately unsuccessful,
fought assimilation much longer than other ethnic groups.171
Wittke’s career – and many others – showed that even though the
attraction of German language, history and culture as a field of study
suffered during and immediately after the war, the 1920s offered plenty of
opportunity for its resurgence. Weimar Germany and the United States
edged much closer both politically and culturally during the decade. As a
rising global superpower, the United States depended on Germany as an
economic and political partner in the rebuilding of Central Europe.172 And
New York still had the second-largest German population after Berlin, an
important electorate to appease. As New York mayor Jimmy Walker, in
office from 1926 to 1932, aptly concluded: “I don’t know who started the
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war and I don’t know who won it, but what I do know is this: let’s forget it
for once and for all!”173
Many German Americans, however, did not simply forget the period –
they strove for the full redemption of their ethnic group. To them, the war
had shown that the United States did not appreciate its German element
and those that had felt persecuted before the war had seen their worst
suspicions become a reality. For them, now was the time to reestablish
German immigrant culture as part of the American Way. At the same time,
they were acutely aware they needed a change of tone to appease and
appeal to the American public. When former members of the NGAA
founded its successor organization, the Steuben Society of America (SSA)
in 1919,174 they dropped the rhetorical belligerence, installed English as its
operating language and only admitted American citizens. 175 Instead of
overstressing ethnic pride and separatism, the SSA crafted its public
message in a language more palatable to an American audience. Its
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official mission, for example, was merely “to arouse citizens of German
descent to a greater sense of their civic and political duties and rights.”176
Nonetheless, the focus on common roots and the “arousal” of ethnic
awareness remained at the center of the SSAs activities. As did its
mission “to keep alive the many noble contributions that persons of
German birth and ancestry have contributed to [the] country.”177 Just like
the NGAA, the SSA thus had its own historical association, the Concord
Society (CS). 178 Recounting the history of German achievement in the
United States was, according to Victor Richter, its secretary, “the
precondition of all political work by Americans of German heritage.”179 And
Frederick Franklin Schrader, its first president, told the Journal in
Milwaukee, where the CS was headquartered, that his organization aimed
“to reawaken a feeling of pride in the achievements of great Americans of
German extraction […]. A new spirit is ready to assert itself in reclaiming
for the German race on this continent its just dues.”180
Not surprisingly, then, the books and articles on German American
history that were published during the 1920s largely pursued the same
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arguments as those before the war. 181 They aimed to preserve the
memory of the heroic deeds committed by German immigrants throughout
American history and they strove to (re-)awaken the “justifiable race-pride”
of German Americans in those contributions. 182 They also displayed
immigrants in line with German expectations, as cultural preservers of
“Germanness.” Take for example, this passage from Frederick Franklin
Schrader’s The Germans in the Making of America (1924): “The Teutonic
race is inherently a race of naturalists and of land and home seekers, and
deep and abiding as is the love of the individual German for his native
land, the romantic tendency of his nature […] has carried him to the
remotest corners of the earth in his individualistic capacity, and accounts
of traces of his presence in almost all early exploring expeditions.”183 In
the interwar years, the idealized German immigrant as pioneer and selfmade man, always true to his German roots, increasingly served a political
purpose, namely to invoke the common historical bonds between
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Germany and the United States, to rekindle that cooperation and, as a
consequence, to defend the German right of self-assertion. As HansWerner Retterath notes, historical events were selectively accentuated
and exploited to comment on current political and economic affairs, for
example by overemphasizing the historical cooperation between the
United States and Germany’s predecessor states or the involvement of
“German” soldiers in American wars, especially the War of Independence
and the Civil War.184
However, when U.S. and German politics once more drifted further and
further apart in the late 1920s and 1930s, it became near impossible for
individuals and organizations to navigate this treacherous mélange of
conflicting national interests, whether they focused on history, language,
culture, or politics. Those that attempted to do so were inevitably
confronted with a political backlash that threatened careers and, in the
case of ethnic organizations, their mere survival. In Philadelphia, the
Deutscher Klub und Technischer Verein (“German Club and Technical
Association”), struggled to arbitrate between its moderate and its
increasingly radicalized ethnic-nationalist members (see also Chapter 4).
Another example of such transnational conflict is that of the Carl Schurz
Memorial Foundation (CSMF), a heavily endowed organization devoted to
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German language teaching, education exchange and cultural preservation,
which produced several historical works,185 cultivated connections to the
Weimar Republic and, later, the Third Reich. The CSMF was, by all
accounts, the only organization capable of driving a politically motived
historiographical agenda during the late 1920s and 1930s. And it
attempted as much, establishing its publication, the American-German
Review, “as the central organ of publication for German-American studies
[…]. Because of its slick format and popular style it attained a sizable
readership consisting of the interested German-American public as well as
scholars.”186 As Gregory Kupsky has shown, the CSMF’s members saw
“closer intellectual relations between the United States and Germany” as a
way to enrich their domestic program. Despite strong internal opposition
against cooperation with the Third Reich, the CSMF eventually pursued a
pro-German agenda and intended its publications, historical and otherwise,
“to inoculate the American public against the ‘distortions’ of the
185
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mainstream press.” 187 Ultimately, the CSMF lost many of its most
influential members and much of its American support over its inability to
sever its ties from Nazi Germany.188
Beyond the pressures of American disapproval, German Americans
found it difficult to divest from Nazism due to the aggressive involvement
of the Nazis in German American affairs. Beginning in 1933, the new
National Socialist government pursued geopolitical influence through
cultural programs between Germany and the United States, particularly
German America. According to the historian Cornelia Wilhelm, such plans
included a historiographical agenda that aimed to make U.S. history
appear more “German.” Attempting to create a strategic partnership
between both countries, the Nazis wanted to “’educate’ […] the Germans
in America of their supposed ‘Germanness’ and to win their sympathy for
Germany.”189 Ignoring the heterogeneous origins of America’s Germans,
the Nazis “imagined that they could rely on the exaggerated number of 20
million ‘Germans’ in America.”190
While such designs were doomed to fail, their success with many
German Americans historians seriously damaged the reputation of the
field – in the 1930s and beyond. A good example of this development is
the engagement of Heinz Kloss, an amateur historian sponsored by the
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Nazis, who collaborated with various German American organizations,
including the CSMF. In 1937 Heinz Kloss even suggested the foundation
of an “American-German research institute” at the behest of the CSMF, an
idea that was thwarted by the increasing tensions between Germany and
the United States.191 Among German Americans there was little resistance
to Kloss’ non-scientific approach. His work imbued German American
historiography with a view of ethnicity that defined “Germanness” around
racialized values and characteristics. 192 According to Wilhelm, Kloss
claimed that “all German people shared a common essence, which united
them and which was manifested in the traditions, folkways, crafts,
language and relationship with the soil […].”193 Furthermore, following now
familiar

narratives,

in

his

1937

book

Um

die

Einigung

des

Deutschamerikanertums, Kloss overemphasized the importance of
German American organizations and achievements, and lamented the
lack of appreciation thereof by mainstream American historiography.194
All together, it was an approach that one reviewer rightfully dismissed
as “wishful thinking” but too many others applauded. 195 The inability to
reject such racist views ultimately led German American historiography to
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write itself into the margins of academia and American public life during
the 1930s.
Of course there were those who tried. In his review of John Hawgood’s
book The Tragedy of German-America, quoted in the opening paragraphs
of this chapter, Dieter Cunz196 criticized the absence of scientific, objective
studies on German America. According to Cunz,
the consistent attitude of most German-American historians
is apologetic. Based on the feeling that the merits of the
German element in America have always been unduly
ignored, they elevate and push the contributions of the
Germans in such an untenable and blatant tone that every
decent German blushes as a consequence.197
Indeed, it was hard not to notice the hyperbole and cultural chauvinism
permeating the pages of German American historiography before World
War II. Readers learned only, to quote Rudolf Cronau, “of the glorious past
of the German element in America, of its well-nigh endless record of
achievements and sacrifices on behalf of the nation, of its enduring
patriotism when others failed of their duty or knew not where to turn.”198
Instead of producing balanced accounts, which displayed the modesty
they purportedly valued as characteristically “German,” German American
authors created a mythical past that offered at best a fraction of the history
it purported to represent and had little foundation in actual scientific

196

Cunz was himself a recent émigré to the United States. He eventually
published several studies on Germans in Maryland.
197
Dieter Cunz, “Die Deutsch-Amerikaner,” 343-348.
198
Cronau, German Achievements in America, 7.

75

research. Their work helped manifest a mythologized imagery of the
devout German settler on the frontier – cultural, educated, religious, hardworking – that may have inspired some readers. But it did not resemble
the urban reality that many German Americans now experienced. In fact,
life in the industrial city – which was the predominant reality for German
Americans at the time, was hardly mentioned at all.199 To make matters
worse, such ethnic-nationalist accounts could only meet with the
resistance of most American readers during the late 1920s and 1930s. Not
only did the United States and Germany drift towards a military conflict,
the period was also marked by the cultural juxtaposition of the American
Way and the totalitarianism of Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany.200 The
consequence, in short, was an almost complete submergence of German
American historiography during the 1940s and 1950s.
4. Ethnic Revival and the Continuities in German American Studies
It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that the historiography
of German America once more received a serious scholarly impulse from
199
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academia. This was in part thanks to a renewed popular interest in the
immigrant past. During the ethnic revival of the 1960s many European
Americans began to search for and to celebrate their Old World roots.201
In academia, immigration scholars of the new social history became
interested in examining the story of their immigrated ancestors back in the
old world202 as well as from a variety of new perspectives, including race,
gender, and class. This period brought forth countless reinvigorating
approaches to the history of German America from scholars like Kathleen
Neils Conzen, Werner Sollors and Walter Kamphoefner, to name just
three prominent examples. 203 Moreover, it coincided with a renewed
interest in the study of migration in Germany, where academics had
largely avoided the topic since World War II.204 The 1980s and 1990s thus
saw a substantial increase of serious scholarship with special emphases
on the history of German labor migration to the United States, 205 the
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unearthing of female migration histories as well as the role of gender in
the migration process,206 and immigrant letters.207
However, this did not lead to the rejuvenation of German American
studies as an academic field. The reason for that failure is complicated,
but part of it lies, I believe, once more in the inability of German American
organizations to adequately address their complicated past. Unlike
German society itself, which was forced to work through its involvement
with National Socialism and the Holocaust, German Americans could
ostensibly look back at their ethnic-cultural roots without too much regret. I
suggest that the existence of countless grassroots ethnic historical
societies, made up not only of professional scholars, but also of amateur
historians with a personal stake in German American historiography, has
done much to delay that process. More precisely, the persistent emphasis
on immigrant contributions and achievements, on the same markers of
“Germanness” – language, high culture, etc. – as well as the lack of
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scholarly impulses from and exchanges with American academia as a
whole, has left German American history on the sidelines.
I want to briefly outline some examples of such continuities. First, there
was a continued focus on “contributions” in too many influential histories of
German America written in the United States that I reviewed for this
chapter. Ubiquitous examples include Henry A. Pochman’s 800-page
investigation of German Culture in America, published in 1961, which finds
traces of German philosophical and literary influence everywhere in
American life and in the works of many famous Americans, from Samuel
Longfellow through Ambrose Bierce, Henry James and, of course, Mark
Twain; 208 Richard O’Connor’s admittedly non-academic treatise, which
attempts to discover “what social and historical impact the GermanAmerican has made on the United States”; 209 and LaVern Rippley
declaration in The German-Americans (1976), still a standard history, that
he aimed to “demonstrate the tremendous impact which the German
immigrants in the United States exercised on the cultural growth of
America”.210
Another continuity that I find troubling is the largely uncritical and
persisting use of the term “German element.”211 Its origins in immigration
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history have not yet been adequately analyzed, but it certainly predates
Faust, who utilized it in the title of his 1909 history of German migration to
the United States, The German Element in the United States. During the
early 1900s, many ethnic historians applied the term to various different
groups – it was part of the common academic vocabulary.212 However, the
term suggests an essentialized, even racialized understanding of
humanity that is not only completely outdated but should be treated with
special care by those dealing with German history, whether “at home” or
“abroad.”213 This is not to suggest that I believe any of the authors who
used or use the term are beholden to the essentialized values of a bygone
age. But I do think it signifies a certain resistance to critical thinking and
innovation necessary to further and keep alive the study of an immigrant
group.
Finally, it is perhaps the survival of the “idealized immigrant” of turn-ofthe-century historiography that is most surprising and most troubling.
Rather than questioning this trope utilizing the scholarly resources
available on both sides of the Atlantic, author after author simply copied
Jones, “The German Element in Colonial Georgia,” Report of the Society for the
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the hard-working and diligent “German,” an archetype established more
than a century ago by those still dreaming of an American way of life
defined by its German immigrant minority. Take for example, Carl Wittke’s
1936 history of German-Americans and the World War, which describes
“millions of enterprising, thrifty, and law-abiding [German] settlers who
came to the United States to make it their permanent home.” Wittke
continues:
Artisans, tradesmen, farmers, highly-trained professional
men—they had been welcomed as valuable additions to the
American population. The German-American element took a
natural and pardonable pride in the phenomenal progress
made by the Fatherland, especially after 1870, and tried to
preserve their cultural heritage in the new country as long as
possible by supporting newspapers and countless
organizations which should keep alive their language, their
music, their literature, and their entire German
Lebensanschauung, in a new environment. But their real
home was America. Here they established their families and
often achieved the prosperity which the old Fatherland had
denied them. They became American citizens and played,
for the most part, an important and honorable and
sometimes distinguished role in public affairs.214
A decade later, Wittke again introduced German Americans as
the patient, home-loving, philosophic, phlegmatic, plodding
German peasant and artisan, who settled in the city to ply
his trade and, by thrift and industry, acquired a home, or who
went into the West to become a farmer in the prairie country.
The German represented the plain, homely virtues of
perseverance, patience, thrift, and respect for authority, with

214

Carl Wittke, German-Americans and the World War, 3.

81

just enough idealism to save and build homes in the New
World.215
In 1962, the historian John J. Appel built on Wittke’s model to portray
German immigrants as those who merely “desired a secure, stable family
life more than riches or adventure and who preserved, with inevitable
modifications, many of the social, economic, religious and cultural patterns
of the homeland.” 216 Paraphrasing Wittke, Appel argued that German
migrants “resisted Americanization longer than most other European
nationalities.”217 That same year, Theodor Huebener, then the head of the
Department of Foreign Languages in the New York City public school
system,

published a

book

called Germans

in

America.

In

his

acknowledgements, Huebener readily admitted that for a lack of better
sources he relied heavily on Faust’s German Element and Wittke’s We
Who Built America. Consequently, his narrative was built around the same
stereotypical depictions of heroic, noble German settlers, who never forgot
their German heritage. For example, in a chapter called “The German –
The Fearless Frontiersman” Huebener writes:
215
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The German pioneers were a sturdy lot, their women
working in the woods and fields together with the men. They
were honest and thrifty, but because of the difference in
language, they generally refrained from taking positions of
leadership in the community. That may explain why they
have not been given adequate mention in the average
American history text.
Huebener’s style was not quite as chauvinistic as that of his turn-of-thecentury predecessors, but the message is the same: Despite Hawgood’s
findings that Germans had indeed rather preferred the safety of urban
America, Germans once more appear as sturdy, honorable pioneers, who
preserved their language abroad and paid the price with their secondary
role in the United States and the amnesia of American history.218
This brand of history as attracted its critics before me. As early as 1976,
Patricia Herminghouse lamented that not only did early historians like
Faust still provide the most definite accounts, unfortunately, “their
[academic] approach has seldom been transcended either. With varying
degrees of popularization, almost every book available today on the
Germans in America is written in the same filiopietistic, positivistic vein
with little serious analysis of the effects of the American experience on the
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immigrants.”

219

With the exceptions of some works, Herminghouse

concluded, “it seems reasonable to assume that the ethnocentrism of
most of the existing materials and the tainted past of some of the research
contributed to a general shunning of the whole field.”220
Perhaps worse, in recent years, there has been a deterioration of
scholarly standards. In his review of two then recent works on German
Americana between the two World Wars, historian Jeffrey Sammons had
to realize the debate on German American internment during World War II
was not only tainted by unscholarly representations and the willful
misinterpretation of data but that other colleagues in the field, while
similarly disconcerted, had resigned themselves to “a feeling of
helplessness.” Sammons alerted his readers “to a deterioration of
scholarly standards” in the discipline and warned: “If we do not maintain
vigilance about standards and integrity, we run the risk of losing the
respect of a constituency that I think we do not always sufficiently
consider: our academic colleagues in other disciplines.”221
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Sammons criticized what he deemed fabricated evidence of a
widespread “campaign” that argued the German American community was
the victim of persecution during World War II. In a similar case in 2001,
Ron Robin attacked Stephen Fox, author of America’s Invisible Gulag for
Fox’ pseudo-scientific attempt in “victimology” and criticized “the author’s
inability or unwillingness to distinguish between the bearers of indignities
and those who confronted existential threats.” 222 There is, in fact, no
credible evidence of any widespread persecution or internment of German
Americans in the United States comparable to the fate of Japanese
Americans.
Indeed, the comparison suggested in Fox’ title seems inappropriate,
but the larger point here is a different one: There seems to be an
unwillingness or a lack of serious scholarly interest in bridging the gap
between victimization and vilification, between the “Good German” and the
Nazi, in historical accounts of German Americana between the two World
Wars. German American Studies has repeatedly failed to adjust to critical
developments in modern academic scholarship or to come to terms with
its convoluted past. An in-depth analysis of that failure would go beyond
the scope of this chapter – indeed it seems to me that a critical
examination of German American studies as a field is long overdue.
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5. Conclusion
In a 2011 volume on the future of German American Studies, its
editors Cora Lee Kluge and Mark Louden argued that in the past three
decades the field had “reinvented” itself. Contrary to the 1980s, the
authors argue, it now offered “a wide range of interdisciplinary
perspectives […], community history, art history, historical geography,
political science, law, immigration studies, literature, folklore, music,
language, and linguistics.” 223 Looking back at more than a century of
German American Studies in general, and specifically its historiography, I
would suggest that this is not much of an improvement, not to speak of a
“reinvention”. Literature, folklore, music, language, and linguistics have
always been at the center of a discipline attempting to find a presence of
“Germanness” in the United States strongly based on the characteristics
proscribed a century ago by the proponents of Deutschtum on both sides
of the Atlantic.
The authors continue: “No longer seen as relics of an uninteresting
past, the contributions and traditions of immigrants from German lands are
now viewed as an integral part of our country’s fabric,” they write, once
more reiterating a claim that is as old as German American Studies
itself.224 The obliviousness is all the more startling considering the fact that
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the volume itself includes chapters, whose authors criticize old narratives
of “contributions” and victimization. Walter Kamphoefner’s excellent piece
on “Elvis and other Germans,” for example, rightly demands research
beyond characters that fit into existing patterns. Suggesting one route,
Kamphoefner calls for more research into the roots of anti-Communism
using such prominent characters as Joseph McCarthy, who grew up in
and was politically supported by the Catholic German community in rural
Wisconsin. There is a German contribution worth looking into.225 Moreover,
Kamphoefner also suggests opening up the field to transnational
investigations of American religious history and argues that German
American Studies has much to learn from the blooming research on
Hispanic Americans. 226 In the ensuing chapters I will aim to transcend
traditional boundaries of Germanness in the hope of developing new ways
to talk about the historical and present-day traces of German migrants in
the United States.
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Chapter 2: “[H]ere you are only a foreigner and a German one at
that” - Immigration, Citizenship, and Belonging after World War I

1. Introduction
During and after World War I, many German Americans felt like
second-rate citizens in the United States and a great number of them
expressed frustration with their status as Americans of German descent.
For example, Paul Schulze from Manchester, New Hampshire, who had
immigrated in 1892, complained that “here, the German only counts, when
he has to do his duty, but when he asks for his rights, he is only a
foreigner.”227 Similarly, Käte Küchler from New York, a more recent arrival
in the United States, lamented that “here you are only a foreigner and a
German one at that.”228
There were, of course, many reasons why German Americans felt
rejected in the interwar period. Much of it had to do with the anti-German
atmosphere caused by World War I and, later, the racist, exclusionary,
and belligerent policies of the National Socialists. Another reason was the
shared sense among German immigrants that they should be afforded a
status superior to, for example, immigrants from Eastern or Southern
Europe (see also Chapter 3). However, many Germans also struggled
with the new realities of the interwar years, which forced them to negotiate
227
228
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increasingly absolutist definitions of Americanness and Germanness. In
the global order arising after World War I, states increasingly attempted to
police and control populations around a set of new values and obligations.
The respective national implications of this process were shaped not
merely by lawmakers but in an ongoing public discourse, in which many
Americans actively participated. I argue in this chapter that German
immigrants to the United States weathered this storm – much like other
ethnic groups – within a transnational framework that included the political,
social, and cultural realms of old home and new home. By pushing back
against nativists, who tried to force them to give up their religions,
languages, and histories, German Americans helped transform the norms
and values of the changing United States. However, while many
successfully embraced key aspects of Americanization, such as English
language and American history and simultaneously used the tenets of
American democracy as a defense of their cultural differences, others
were left frustrated with a sense of “inbetweenness” that was impossible to
reconcile with such exclusive definitions of national identity.
In this chapter I first lay out the global developments, which led to the
manifestation of stronger boundaries between nation-states and the
apparatuses designed to police them. Next, I discuss the respective
implications of this process in the United States and Germany, focusing in
particular on the increasing significance of “Germanness Abroad” during
the 1920s and 1930s. Finally, I examine how immigrants could utilize
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letters to organizations back in Germany like the VDA to navigate these
two competing identities and stake out a space for their own transnational
negotiations of belonging.
2. The “Golden Age” of Identification: The Global Politics of
Citizenship and Belonging
As I have discussed in the previous chapter, during much of the
nineteenth century, migration from Europe to the United States solved two
interrelated problems: Overpopulation and hunger in the Old World and
labor shortages in the New.229 Whereas local, regional and state laws had
initially restricted migration, by the 1850s more and more states in Europe,
and particularly in Germany, realized that such restrictions inhibited
international trade and the growth of the global economy. “For the political
elites, the integration of markets was more important than matters of
security policy.”230 Consequently, during the second half of the nineteenth
century, border controls as we know them today were almost non-existent
for travel in North America and Central Europe and migrants needed no
passports or visas to cross borders or stay abroad.231
But by the late 1800s industrialization and urbanization had begun to
transform traditional societies in Europe and the United States, resulting in
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the development of massive urban centers, where hundreds of thousands
of people lived in anonymity and, often, great poverty. Millions of migrants
traveled around the globe in search for new opportunities, bringing in
contact heterogeneous and disparate cultures.

232

Riots and strikes

frequently disrupted the social fabric of cities on both sides of the Atlantic,
while epidemics wreaked havoc among the urban poor and crime rates
escalated. Amidst the chaos, social reformers in North America and
Europe attempted to impose order through comprehensive social policies
and municipal reforms.233 Equipped with an unwavering trust in “objective
knowledge” and the emerging disciplines of modern science, these men
and women were concerned with the ways in which diverse populations
were to coexist and how to regulate that coexistence both externally and
domestically. Some questioned the capability of minorities, immigrant or
not, to participate in the democratic institutions of modern nation-states
and there were systematic attempts to disenfranchise, marginalize, or
simply exclude segments of the population along lines of race, gender,
class and religion.234 Others devoted themselves to pedagogical reforms
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or urban hygiene programs, realizing that educated, healthy citizens were
needed to preserve the social peace and guarantee stability.235
Though attitudes differed, the discourse on how to solve the problems
of the time was a transatlantic one. Between the 1870s and 1940s “the
North Atlantic economy formed […] a world mart of useful and intensely
interesting experiments. […] These were the years […] when other nations’
social politics, in short, were news.” 236 This applied especially to the
exchange of knowledge and experience between Germany and the United
States. Both countries were ascending geopolitical powers with booming
industrial centers in steady need of labor. Both were suddenly confronted
with millions of migrants leaving, passing through, or permanently settling;
both subsequently implemented major legal and social reforms that
extended the reach of the national government into the private sphere.
American scholars often studied at German universities and vice versa,
developing extensive networks for the exchange of information. 237 Not
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surprisingly, both countries frequently found similar solutions to solve
comparable problems. This is especially evident in the case of migration
and citizenship.
The United States, a frontrunner in the liberalization of global migration
policy, was also a leading force to curb the global flow of immigrants in the
late nineteenth century. As I will discuss in Section 3 of this chapter, the
new immigration law of 1882 and the establishment of Ellis Island as a
gateway for migrants in 1891 centralized a national immigration policy and
redefined the ways in which states dealt with immigrants and cross-border
travel. Almost simultaneously, the German Reich changed its policies of
emigration, not least because American immigration authorities in Ellis
Island sent back every migrant perceived to be destitute or carrying an
infectious disease. Germany thus instituted a systematic control apparatus
and determined migration paths, establishing for example Berlin’s
Ruhleben train station and Hamburg’s emigration harbor for that purpose.
There, migrants were checked for diseases – often discriminating against
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some groups on a racial or ethnic basis and sometimes even for their
political orientation. Other countries like Italy, the Netherlands, Great
Britain or Norway, adopted similar policies. 238 It was during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, then, that the idea of policed
borders around territorial nation-states became the ruling paradigm.
Nations across the globe devised cultural narratives of their cultural, civic,
or ethnic composition and from a contemporaneous point of view these
narratives provided legitimacy to the argument that it was necessary to
control cross-border movement. States also extended the rights and
duties of citizenship beyond the national borders, remaking consulates
and diplomatic services from trade hubs for merchants into places citizens
could turn to for everything from lost luggage to legal advice.239
There were, of course, critical differences between the United States
and Germany that emerged in the years leading up to World War I. For
example, the U.S. Expatriation Act of 1907 stipulated that naturalized
Americans could lose citizenship after being abroad for five years and that
American-born women would lose theirs upon marriage to a foreigner,
whereas the 1913 German Nationality Law set forth that German
citizenship was based on descent without regard for birthplace and
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residence.240 But these differences were never as diametrically opposed
as some scholars have suggested in the past. Pointing to critical cultural
components of every national identity, even Rogers Brubaker – a wellknown proponent of the ethnic-civic divide in citizenship theory – recently
conceded that such normative distinctions are “at best problematic.” 241
Creating a sense of separation and difference always depended on the
creation and perpetuation of cultural narratives and many modern nationstates thus realized the critical importance of a “national” education.
Germany and the United States, for example, instituted agendas of
nationalization – attempting to “Germanize” or “Americanize” the next
generation – or set up juvenile courts (the United States in 1900, Germany
in 1908) intended to police the behavior of children and adolescents.242
World War I, unlike any other war before, depended on the loyalty and
participation of its citizens. Unprecedented numbers of men were drafted
into military service, while women supported the war effort from the “home
front.” The war was no longer fought merely on local battlefields but
affected the entire nation. When increasing instances of sabotage and
espionage made the question of loyalty a matter of national security, many
countries engaged in the war expanded policies to control the movement
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of both their own citizens and foreigners. Great Britain, for example,
adopted the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 to increase the government’s
ability to police the movement of non-citizens, while France instituted an
obligation for foreigners to carry an identity card in 1917. What had been
designed as temporary measures soon became permanent policies, so
much so that political scientists today refer to the interwar era as the
“golden age of ‘identification practices.’”243
In this context, we need to take a closer look at the consequences of
the Versailles Peace Treaty that ended the war. For many observers
World War I had signaled a collapse of the global order it deemed to
protect. “It dealt a severe blow to the power and prestige of the leading
imperial powers […]. The war strained the resources of European powers,
exposed as hollow their claims to superior civilization, and decimated the
image of Western military invincibility […].”244 The statesmen and policymakers that met in Paris in early 1919 not only set out with the goal to
fashion everlasting peace but also to bring about a global civil society
guaranteeing permanent political stability and economic prosperity. At the
same time, activists from all over the globe – labor leaders, female
suffragists, anti-colonialists, and spokespeople for oppressed nations from
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Albania to Vietnam – arrived to plead to the conference on behalf of their
respective causes and constituents.245
But the contentious negotiations behind closed doors in Versailles paid
little attention to these various interests and its result, the Versailles Peace
Treaty, was “a symptom of [the negotiating parties’] disguised internal
disunity.” 246 Most importantly, it produced a blueprint for the future of
international politics by privileging irredentist nation-states and thus
retroactively legitimizing the nationalist frenzy, which had started the war
in the first place. Historians continue to debate whether the aims of those
involved were nobler and the Peace Treaty simply an aberration, a
falsification of those noble aims.247 The American delegation, in particular,
sported the political clout of a moral cause, representing a system of
government that was, for many, a model for the world. “[U.S. President
Woodrow] Wilson explicitly cast himself and America as defenders of the
weak against the powerful, of common folk against autocratic regimes, of
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small nations against great powers.” 248 But the visible cracks in the
American system – most notably the consistent discrimination against
African-Americans – were already receiving global attention. And
President Wilson, a Southerner, was not exactly known for his proactive
stance on race relations.249 Consequently, what little consensus could be
reached among a quarreling and divided group of Allies in Paris was
based on the smallest common denominator produced by decades of
“scholarship” on human differences: That some people had the capacity to
govern themselves and others did not and that the stability of the world
depended upon the guidance of those “civilized” enough to take control.250
After all, Communist uprisings threatened stability in Eastern Europe and
anti-colonial movements threatened imperial rule in Egypt, Indochina, and
India. Rather than addressing the woes of the colonized and removing the
“yoke” of foreign expression, the Versailles peace treaty thus proved to be
the “apex of imperial expansion,” solidifying Western rule and deferring (if
only temporarily) the cause of freedom and self-determination in favor of
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stability. 251 Moreover, the Versailles Treaty established a new political
logic in Europe by rooting the legitimacy of nation-states in ethnic origins,
thus creating new political entities like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.
“The principle of nationalism, which […] took the self-determining nationstate as the sole legitimate entity in international relations thus became a
central component of the new international order […].” 252 Ultimately,
however, the new nation-states proved to be “too weak to project a clear
national identity and they became breeding-grounds for mutually
conflicting irredentist claims and for experiments in enforced nationalist
regimentation.”253
In fact, these “experiments” occurred all over the Western world
throughout that period, as nation-states attempt to craft cohesive national
populations by imposing a common language and culture. Migrants were,
of course, particularly affected by that “national regimentation” especially if
they attempted to preserve their cultural peculiarities in a foreign land. Not
surprisingly, attempts to control migrant populations frequently prompted
fierce resistance. Polish families, for example, protested pedagogical
attacks against their native language in Germany, while Germans often
viciously opposed similar attacks on their language and culture in the
United States. As ethnic groups defended themselves against the
increasing intrusion into their private lives, it became clear that state policy
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frequently “produced agency rather than discipline.” 254 In other words,
rather than succeeding in their disciplinary aims, state policies encouraged
the resistance of those subjected to the measures.
This urge to retain a connection to the homeland was particularly
strong for both Irish and German Americans, who both underwent grand
transformations in their hyphenated consciousness during the 1910s,
stemming from World War I and the Irish revolution. “[B]are in mind that
American citizenship means something more than rights; American
citizenship includes necessarily the ideas of duty, the idea of
responsibility,” reminded the Irish-American activist Daniel Cohalan an
audience in New York City in 1921 (see also Chapter 3). “You have no
right to withdraw yourselves as a class apart. The man who comes here,
the woman who comes here, the race which comes here and which is not
satisfied to be American, ought better never to have come.” Citizenship
was a duty and it included “the duty of taking an active part in the public
affairs of the country, the duty of helping to create a public sentiment by
which the country is going to be swayed […].”255 As I will discuss below,
German völkisch nationalists invoked similar ideals, reminding Germans
abroad that their duties were to the German people – even if they were not
citizens. It is one of the objectives of this dissertation to examine the
discursive negotiations of these competing nationalisms by German
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Americans still heavily invested, willingly or not, in the politics of the
homeland.
Germany and the United States also engaged in experiments in
“enforced nationalist regimentation” and what these experiments meant for
the migrants that traveled between those two nation-states.
3. Immigration and Citizenship in the United States after World War I
The debate about immigrants and their integration into the American
body politic has received considerable attention by scholars who have
examined themes of citizenship and belonging with a special focus on
immigrant communities in the interwar period. During the 1920s, disputes
about race, gender, and labor relations stirred up vicious debates among
Americans about the social fabric of the nation. This section provides a
brief summary of that history.256
3.1. Restricting Immigration, Enforcing Americanization
Chinese workers were an early prey of nativist agitation when the
Exclusion Act of 1882 prohibited their entry and established legal
precedence for the principle of exclusion.257 The act and the subsequent
judicial quandaries “helped set the parameters of American immigration
law and to establish the rights of all aliens.”258 The consequences of such
legislation for European immigrants became clear, when a report by the
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Dillingham Commission published in 1911 lamented the slow assimilation
(particularly by immigrants from Eastern Europe) and recommended a
new restrictive and ethnically discriminating immigration policy based on
the presumption that some immigrants were inferior in education, ability,
and genetics. Not coincidentally, an entire volume of the Report entitled, A
Dictionary of Races or Peoples, was based in part on the German
physician Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s scheme separating humans into
“Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, Malay, and American,” which was
critical to Germany’s own development of a model of citizenship.259 The
report also proposed a quota for immigrant groups and demanded a
literacy test (enacted in 1917), thus bridging the gap between ethnic/racial
and civic qualifications for American citizenship.260
During and after World War I, the national mood towards immigration
deteriorated further: Many Americans were highly skeptical, if not afraid of
the ideological experiments currently at trial in Europe – such as
Communism in Russia and Fascism in Italy – and felt that immigrants from
those areas would pose a challenge to American ideals. Economic fears
about the country’s own future thus paired with xenophobia and a rejection
of European culture and civilization after the cataclysmic collapse of the
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“Great War.” 261 In many ways, then, the 1924 Immigration Act was a
logical consequence of a national discourse that increasingly pushed
aside alternating views such as the cultural pluralism of Horace Kallen and
Randolph Bourne, who had stressed the qualities of a heterogeneous
United States, arguing that “pluralism represented what was best not only
for the individual, but for democracy and for American governance.”262 The
Act set annual quotas according to national origins at two percent of the
respective nationality’s total number in the 1890 United States census. It
thus significantly impeded immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe,
which had reached its height between 1890 and World War I. Moreover,
by defining nationality along racial lines, it shut down immigration from
Africa and Asia all together.263 In 1929, a second version of the National
Origins Act reduced the number of immigrants to 150,000 per year and
further manifested Anglo-Saxon dominance by increasing the quota for
Great Britain and decreasing the numbers for Scandinavia, Ireland, and
Germany. The racist nature of the acts, writes Roger Daniels,
“perpetuated old injustices and created new ones.”264
It is hard to determine the exact consequences of the Johnson-Reed
Act on German America. To be sure, German Americans recognized in
the legislation the “shameless discrimination against Skandinavian [sic],
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Irish and German elements in favor of a pauperized unemployed English
proletariat,” 265 because it prohibited a new flow of immigrants from
Germany after the war. And indeed, official numbers for immigration
showed a significant decrease for the period between 1925 and 1933,
from nearly 100,000 in 1924 to little over 3,000 in 1932.266 However, at the
same time I would argue that immigration legislation was beneficial for
German immigrants, because it appeased nativist anger and defined
belonging by way of skin color. It was the Americanization campaign
accompanying immigration reform, which ultimately proved to be most
detrimental to the cause of German Americans, particularly for the
“gatekeepers,” who had profited from ethnic divisions for many decades.
For them, the pluralist doctrine was most appealing as it stressed the
diversity of the American people as an essential characteristic of the
nation as a whole and allowed them to balance political loyalty to the
United States with cultural allegiance to the homeland.
Unfortunately for many of these ethnic gatekeepers, whether German,
Irish, Italian, or any group, the overwhelming political stream embraced
“Americanization.” The concept held that those portions of the citizenry
capable of attaining equal rights of full citizenship needed the necessary
education to exercise those rights and to exploit their full potential. In most
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views, this vision excluded African-Americans, Native Americans, and – as
of 1882 – Asian Americans, who were not seen fit to participate in the
American body politic. But immigrants from Europe were also increasingly
singled out as targets of the Americanization campaign. In his famous
speech on anti-hyphenation, for example, Theodore Roosevelt had
specifically accused German and Irish immigrants of betraying American
institutions, arguing “those hyphenated Americans who terrorize American
politicians by threats of the foreign vote are engaged in treason to the
American Republic.” 267 After the war had ended, social reformers, who
had identified poverty and social divisions as the main issues dividing the
country, clashed with nativists and patriotic activists, who saw immigrants
as the main carriers of socialism, bolshevism, and anarchism and wanted
to erect “Americanism” as a bulwark of freedom against these ideologies.
Though

generally

benefitting

from

their

“whiteness,”

German

Americans were subjected to attacks that questioned their political loyalty
and integrity. This was by no means self-evident. German Americans had
long been presented as ideal immigrants: ambitious, zealous, and highly
willing to naturalize. But immediately before and during the war, American
nativists and interventionists accused German immigrations of disloyal
behavior and portrayed them in racial iconography as the “Hun”. Hysteria
followed the sinking of the Lusitania in early May 1915 along with
increasing suspicions of fifth column activity after immigrants were
267
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implicated in incidents such as the explosion of the “Black Tom” munitions
depot in July 1916 and the purported radicalization of labor, such trends
provided the ideological foundation for the popular embrace of
“Americanization”

and

“100%

Americanism”

campaigns

directed

particularly, though not exclusively, against German Americans. German
was no longer taught in schools and sometimes even completely outlawed
in public, as in Iowa, which had a sizeable German population. But after
the war, the image of the evil alien changed once more. If the “Hun”
embodied the enemy during the War, this role was assumed by the
(foreign) revolutionary after war’s end.
What exactly nativists meant when they wrote and talked about
“Americanization,” apart from the naturalization of its immigrants,
remained unclear and was often vague and contradictory. The image of
the “American” was mainly defined in the negative, as opposed to the lazy,
disloyal anarchist revolutionary: Americans were hard-working and loyal.
This provided an opening for German American activists, who stressed
the historical contributions of German immigrants and demanded the full
rights of American citizenship, including the right to criticize American
participation in the Great War (see Chapters 3 and 4).268
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3.2. A new concept of citizenship: Rights vs. Duties
World War I also marked a critical change in the relationship between
state and citizen. Christopher Capozzola has shown that terms such as
duty, sacrifice, and obligation entered the everyday language and public
sphere of the United States during and because of the Great War, as
Americans discussed whether or not to participate in the military conflict in
Europe, how to oblige the population to participate and how to celebrate
the war once it was over. “Political obligation,” writes Capozzola,
“energized, mobilized, and divided Americans during World War I.”269 The
structural changes that transformed citizenship during that time included
military service and jury duty, a federal income tax, the DillinghamHardwick Act, which legalized the deportation of (broadly defined)
anarchists, and the infamous Espionage and Sedition Acts, which made
disloyalty a crime and undermined free speech. In many ways, the rules of
citizenship began to function as a “demarcation line between friend and
enemy.”
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These transformations had very real consequences for

immigrants from Germany as the United States entered World War I on
April 6, 1917 and roughly 250,000 non-naturalized German American men
became “enemy aliens,” women followed in the Spring of 1918.271
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Countless voluntary associations across the United States enforced
the unwritten rules of the new civic law. The roots of this enforcement
dated back to World War I but persisted beyond its end. “America’s first
world war marked an unprecedented mobilization of social institutions,
human labor, and popular will.” The boundaries between the public and
private, between social and personal responsibility began to soften. “Now,
the private obligations were suddenly fundamental to war mobilization in a
moment of crisis, prompting state intervention into American bedrooms,
kitchens, and congregations, places where the federal government hadn’t
always been before.” Doing one’s part in “the war effort thus became not
just a good deed but a duty, and serious consequences ensued for those
who failed to join in. People were, therefore, obliged to volunteer in a
culture of coercive voluntarism.” 272
As I have discussed above, German Americans were suddenly forced
into an unbridgeable conflict. They wanted to show solidarity with both
their old and new homeland and many of them pushed for a policy of
isolation during the war. Incidentally, they often used voluntary
associations like ethnic clubs and churches to resist militarism and
coercion. Like other isolationist organizations in the country, these
institutions “sheltered draft dodgers, gave voices to workers’ demands,
[and] protected German Americans from the onslaughts of 100 percent
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Americanism.” 273 At the same time they experienced the violent hyperpatriotism and coercive voluntarism directed against “draft dodgers, food
hoarders, or subversive ‘Pro-Germans’.” Christopher Capozzola notes that
it “was not a mere psychic aberration or a deviation from American
political culture. Pervasive political violence, willingly undertaken, reflected
politics as usual. Coercive voluntarism made America’s first world war
both its most democratically mobilized home front as well as its most
violent.”274
At the ideological core of these changes was a strengthening belief in
the duty “to work, to be loyal to the nation, to conform to the norms of the
community.”275 The question was exactly how to define those norms, how
to enforce conformity and where to draw the legal line between
appropriate government intervention and overreach. During the war,
wartime legislation allowed severe measures to silence dissent, such as
wire-tapping or the monitoring of private mail.276 And, as the Palmer Raids
to deport anarchists in late 1919 and early 1920 showed, these measures
had been everything but temporary. In January 1902, the Bureau of
Investigation (BI), a precursor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
had rounded up roughly 10,000 labor organizers, communists, and
hundreds of innocent bystanders, many of them American citizens, in an
273
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attempt to “[hunt] down […] enemies of the United States.” In close
coordination with the Justice Department and the Immigration Bureau, the
BI manufactured accusations, denied aliens legal counsel, and forged
false confessions, revealing in the process “its hostility toward ethnic and
religious minorities.” “Thus, the [BIs] reports insinuated that IrishAmericans who favored Irish independence, Jews who advocated the
establishment of a national homeland in Palestine, civil libertarians who
defended the rights of dissidents, and anyone who argued that the United
States should recognize the Soviet Union were engaged in ‘subversive’
activities.” Public support for the radical measures was strong and
remained so even in spite of persistent organized initiatives protesting the
treatment of those arrested. Those defending the rights of the accused in
courts and public hearings risked being ostracized as unpatriotic or “unAmerican.”277
Germans, then, were by no means the only “victims” of the
extraordinary mobilization of public and politics against ethnic pluralism
that would became a prevalent element in the United States during the
next decades; a blend of public and official sanctions created an
atmosphere of submission among many groups of immigrants. Those
unwilling to accept the political status quo as well as their new civic duties
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were often treated harshly by neighbors, employers, and
the state. Political radicals of a variety of faiths, including
anarchism, socialism, and communism, were also
vulnerable to ostracism, persecution, and the declaration
that they were un-American. During periods of national
crisis, nonassimilating immigrants and political radicals
became the targets of state-sponsored coercive campaigns
to strip them of their now alienable rights to free expression
and free assembly.278

In many ways, this was the legacy of World War I, a legacy that persisted
throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The next section describes the changing
conception of national belonging in Germany and its consequences for
Germans abroad with a special emphasis on the United States.
4. Emigration and Transnational Belonging in Germany after WW I
I have discussed the relationship between migration, the nation-state,
and national consciousness in Chapter One, emphasizing in particular the
historical contingency of “Germanness.” While ethnicity and culture were
always at the core of German nationalism, the idea of “ethnic” (and thus
almost perpetual) belonging to the German nation, ius sanguinis, had only
been uniformly codified a year before the outbreak of World War I in the
1913 Nationality Law of German Empire and States (Reichs- und
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, short: RuStAG). Though based on older
regional legal traditions, this law determined German citizenship according
to blood lineage rather than membership in the territorial community of a
278
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state and distinguished between citizens, non-citizens, and “ethnic”
Germans living outside of the boundaries of the state. The latter group
was provided with an “automatic right of entry to and citizenship of”
Germany. 279 But what were the duties inherent in this ethnic form of
belonging for citizens and ethnic Germans? And what was the duty of the
state towards those not living under its auspices?
The negotiation of these relationships entered a critical stage in the
interwar period when the fate of Germans abroad – emigrated or
displaced – became a dominant issue in the public discourse of Weimar
Germany, not least due to the German political impotence after World War
I. The terms negotiated in the peace accord at Versailles had placed the
entire guilt and the upcoming burden in the form of reparations on
Germany, which was forced to abandon its air force and reduce its military.
More specifically, the Versailles Treaty "not only eliminated Germany as a
major military factor by sharply limiting its armed forces, it also reduced
the country's population, territory, and resources, and, through the
mechanism of reparations, converted Germany into the world's major
debtor."280 Millions of Germans were suddenly living outside of the new
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boundaries of the post-Versailles Weimar Republic and hundreds of
thousands emigrated, especially to the United States. No longer capable
of simply flexing the country’s military and economic muscles, German
statesmen and politicians had to look elsewhere for geopolitical leverage
and this provided an opening for ethnic, so-called völkisch nationalists,
whose activities had thus far been largely ignored by those in charge.281
4.1. The Weimar Republic and the Politics of Self-Determination
In his now famous “Fourteen Points” speech to the American Congress
on January 8, 1918, U.S President Woodrow Wilson had suggested the
principle of self-determination – though not yet verbatim – as a way to
divide territory along lines of "nationality" without explicitly specifying, who
was entitled to their own “nation” and who was not.282 His program later
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became the foundation for the peace treaty negotiated in Versailles, even
though many critics at the time noted the racial and religious hypocrisies
that granted the right of self-determination to some while denying it to
others. But for the defeated Germany, this emphasis on ethnicity provided
a small opening in a dire situation for three important reasons: first, by
stipulating that the nation-state be the base unit of international relations, it
reestablished Germany as an important geopolitical player in Central
Europe with “ethnic” legitimation; second, it provided a divided Weimar
Republic with a powerful anti-narrative against the “shameful diktat” of
Versailles, which had divided the ethnic community by placing Millions of
Germans outside of the country’s territorial boundaries; and third, because
the
repulse of Russia and the division of central, eastern and
southern Europe into a handful of small and medium-sized
states […] gave Germany the chance to establish an
informal hegemony in the region by expanding her economic
and cultural influence through a policy of accommodation
and co-operation with the new nations.283
Many German statesmen and völkisch nationalists were keenly aware of
the potential card they had been dealt and realized that cultural diplomacy,
Auswärtige Kulturpolitik, would be a critical tool in future international
negotiations. 284 Consequently, it emerged as a systematic, state-funded
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feature of German foreign policy in the 1920s and “was seen as a lever to
extend German influence now that the Reich had lost the traditional assets
with which it exercised power within the international system: a strong
economy, a large army and reliable allies.” 285 However, the official
government policy remained subdued and secretive, as diplomats realized
the detrimental implications, should cultural diplomacy be misunderstood
(or accurately recognized) as propaganda.
The cultural diplomacy of the Weimar Republic pursued three
overarching strategies largely aligned with the general objective to
reestablish Germany as a global power: The first strategy was to stress
the ethnic unity of the German nation in order to revise the borders by
actively utilizing ethnic Germans abroad as instruments of foreign policy.
The conventional wisdom during the 1920s was that roughly 25 Million
Germans, a quarter of all ethnic Germans worldwide, lived outside the
boundaries of Germany and Austria.286 These so-called Volksdeutsche (or
Auslanddeutsche) were the target of both direct efforts to stir up
discontent and initiate a process leading towards territorial reunification as
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well as indirect efforts that aimed to utilize Volksdeutsche in order to
change the policy of other countries towards Germany.287 In the words of
Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann:
Politically [Germans abroad] will be called upon, to shape
the politics of the foreign state which they help sustain in a
way that is beneficial to the German Empire; culturally they
will serve as born mediators for the proliferation and
understanding of German culture and German world view
amongst the people of their state.288
Stresemann’s statement applied particularly to German Americans, not
least because German politicians like Stresemann “actively cultivated
American goodwill and support” during the 1920s.289
The second strategy attempted to exploit the global appeal of science
and knowledge during the 1920s: By supporting new academic disciplines
focused on the “folk,” German cultural diplomats hoped to support ethnic
nationalism by providing it with a scientific foundation. 290 Organizations
like the Deutsche Ausland-Institut (DAI) and the Deutsche Akademie (DA)
collected a wealth of information on German settlements around the globe
to examine and document “Germandom abroad in its origin and
development, its character and achievements”. For example, scholars like
the seasoned politician Otto Boelitz (1876-1951), the young economist
Martin Lohmann (1901-1993), or the former Catholic bishop Franz Xaver
287
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Geyer (1859-1943), a child of the colonial age, were sent to the United
States to study the language of local communities in Pennsylvania and the
Midwest and examine their critical role in the preservation of German
culture abroad. 291 Historians like Gottfried Fittbogen and Heinz Kloss
wrote volumes about the contributions of Germans in American history
and helped initiate celebrations of historical characters with German roots
like Baron von Steuben and Peter Minuit.292 The goal was to
invigorate understanding for the deep meaning of the
community in language and heritage, in spiritual life and in
culture and thus strengthen the consciousness of common
identity of all Germans; and finally to raise the meaning of
German spiritual labor and German culture in the entire
world.293
In other words, it was to provide a scientific foundation for the belief that
ethnic identity was worth preserving and that German language and
culture provided a foundation for the many positive contributions Germans
could make to foreign countries like the United States.
Finally, the third strategy consisted of attempts to improve the German
reputation and economic opportunities by praising German cultural
achievements both at home and abroad, thus “making a good
impression”.294 Using some of the same means discussed above, like the
celebration of German history and language, scholars wanted to appeal to
both the general American and the specific German American audience.
291
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Celebrations of German culture were meant to renew pride in German
heritage, generate a collective identity abroad and counter the
“Americanism”

and

cultural

propaganda

dominating

U.S.

public

discourse.295 The idea that this form of cultural propaganda could produce
any results also went back to World War I, since “the legend went,
Germany had failed to present her cause convincingly to the international
public, whereas her adversaries had led a ruthless but effective
psychological campaign which isolated the Reich.”296
It is worth noting that while the overall goals of the political
administration certainly changed in 1933, Katja Gesche has shown that
the process of actual change in cultural diplomacy was rather slow.
“Instead of a new, explicitly national-socialist cultural diplomacy many
projects that had begun in Weimar and are still known today, simply
continued [throughout the Third Reich].” Gesche lists, for example the
Goethe Institute, the German Academic Exchange Service DAAD
[“Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst”], and several international
treaties. What changed, of course, were the messages that were sent
through these programs and many countries were rightfully suspicious of
the cultural foreign policy of both the Weimar Republic and, even more,
the Third Reich.297 Therefore it was key strategy of German foreign policy
in the interwar period to pursue an inconspicuous approach and support
295
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groups that were ostentatiously neutral and independent. Among these
groups was the so-called Verein [later renamed: Volksbund] für das
Deutschtum im Ausland.
4.2. Volksgemeinschaft and the VDA
Before taking a closer look at the VDA, it is necessary to discuss the
Volksgemeinschaft – or “community of the people” –, an ideological trope
that gained prominence in the political discourse of Weimar Germany
throughout the 1920s. More amorphous than tangible, the concept itself is
somewhat hard to define. Similar to the völkisch movement, which
popularized it, the ideology supplementing the Volksgemeinschaft was
disparate

and

heterogeneous.

To

be

sure,

belonging

to

the

Volksgemeinschaft meant being part of a large community that
transcended the boundaries of the German nation-state, whether in its
current, past, or imaginary manifestations. Being German was defined as
a kinship that transcended generations and was certainly not lost when
transferred across the Atlantic. It was a “community of blood and history”
that came with rights and duties.
According to a paradigmatic article published on the eve of World War
II in the Thüringische Landes-Zeitung, Germans vowed “to realize their
greatest good, for which they will stand up with life and limb, in the
German Volkstum 298 , in the conservation and consolidation of the
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unadulterated character [Wesensart].” The article did specify the duties
entailed in this ethnic-national identity. Apart from vowing to defend the
German Volkstum with life and limb against “influences of foreign peoples
and

foreign

blood”

[fremdvölkische

und

fremdblütige

Einflüsse],

nationalists appealed to Germans to cultivate “German virtues” and
German culture in order to preserve them for the future. 299 And even
though German citizenship became increasingly defined in ethnic terms,
membership in the ethnic community was not defined as such:
“participation in the Volksgemeinschaft was independent of citizenship in a
state. […] A citizen of another state could remain loyal to his state yet
consider himself part of the German Volksgemeinschaft.”300
In essence, then, the historical significance of the Volksgemeinschaft is
to be found in the fact that “large portions of the German population saw in
the Volksgemeinschaft a desirable social goal, even though they
connected quite disparate contents with this term.” 301 Moreover, even
though a great number of political parties in Germany adopted political
programs based on the Volksgemeinschaft, historians agree that it

“essence, character of the people, as it finds expression in its life, its culture”
[Wesen, Eigenart des Volkes, wie es sich in seinem Leben, seiner Kultur
ausprägt]. I would argue that Volkstum is in essence an attempt to record and
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remained a myth and that its descriptive historical value for the period
between 1919 and 1945 is low. If anything, it was the “promise, the
mobilization, not the detection of an actual social condition [which] was
crucial to the political power of the talk of the ‘Volksgemeinschaft’.”302
As noted above, for völkisch nationalists, the collapse of the monarchy
was an opportunity to further manifest German notions of belonging on
culture, custom, language, and heritage that transcended the borders of
nation-states. Throughout the 1920s, organizations like the VDA were
pivotal in popularizing their own vision of the Volksgemeinschaft. The VDA
was the first and foremost important organization devoted to Germans
living in the United States, not least because it was “the largest
organization concerned with the cultural, economic and political status of
ethnic Germans outside the Reich” during the 1920s.303
Founded as Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein [“General German
School Association”] in 1881 to promote and fund German-language
schools for ethnic German minorities outside of the Reich, the VDA 304
profited immensely from the nationalist upswing during and German
geopolitical impotence after World War I. “At the very moment when we
302
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lost our former state, we won our people,” wrote VDA president Franz von
Reichenau in 1919. 305 World War I had been a moment of collective
“rediscovery” and “reawakening” as Millions of German soldiers, nurses,
and others involved in the war effort returned home with stories of ethnic
Germans who had retained language and culture abroad. Building upon
these

experiences,

the

VDA

exploited

the

social

and

political

fragmentation of postwar Germany by romanticizing the sense of
belonging experienced in these ethnic communities, thus enforcing “the
notion that all Germans formed a wider Volksgemeinschaft.” 306 They
supported

a

pluralistic,

classless

interpretation

of

that

concept,

nonetheless in its racialized rhetoric, the VDA “did much to contribute to
the attitude of racial superiority already held by many Germans and to
soften the reception of violent anti-Semitic view enunciated by National
Socialists throughout the 1920s.”307
The VDA portended to be above partisan politics after the National
Socialists took control in 1933. The organization welcomed the rise of the
Nazi Party and once more changed its name from Verein to a more ethnonationalist Volksbund. For the first years the VDA enjoyed the protection
of some high-ranking Nazi officials like Rudolf Heß and received major
financial support from the new administration, partly because of
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overlapping goals such as the revision of the Versailles Treaty.308 In 1933,
the major ideological difference between National Socialism and the VDA
was that the latter stressed the allegiance to all ethnic Germans around
the globe, whereas the Nazis mainly looked to ethnic Germans abroad as
pawns in their geopolitical games.309 And even though some conflicts with
competing organizations like the NSDAP-AO arose, the VDA was able to
continue their work until at least 1937, when efforts to reach Germans
abroad were centralized in the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.310
While the VDA’s geographic focus lay mainly on the “lost territories”
and ethnic German minorities in Eastern and Southern Europe, it always
cultivated good ties to the United States, if only for financial support.311
When the victory of National Socialism ushered in “a new era,” the
organization could increase its efforts across the Atlantic thanks to
generous state support. The VDA hired an official representative in the
United States, Carl Günther Orgell, sent speakers on continental tours,
and acquired the addresses of countless German Americans around the
country. 312 Starting in October 1934, it also increased its emphasis on
publications and began sending out the Heimatbriefe, a newsletter
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distributed by the VDA’s regional chapters under different names, for
example as Buten und Binnen (“Outside and Inside”) from a branch in
Lower Saxony, as Thüringer Heimatbriefe from a branch in Thuringia, and
as Sächsische Heimatbriefe from the chapter in Saxony.313
The very first issue of the Heimatbriefe defined its role in the new Nazi
state: “to suffuse the entirety of the German people of all classes with
understanding and sacrificial spirit for the pan-German task.” The VDA
thus presented itself in line with the SA or the Hitler Youth as participating
in a common struggle for “the protection of the German borders and the
German territory in the Baltics, in Upper Silesia, on the Ruhr and in
Carinthia.” 314 Editorials in the Heimatbriefe were written in the form of
letters and attempted to establish a personal connection with the readers
by using the informal Du as opposed to the formal Sie and by explicitly
soliciting responses, which were featured prominently in subsequent
issues. The Heimatbriefe were, as one editorial argued, more than just a
magazine but “a private letter between comrades, worthy of your personal
response.”315 Rather than pressing an openly partisan agenda, the VDA
purported to be apolitical, emphasizing emotional representations of the
homeland and imagery of industry and improvement. Beneath that thin
layer of political neutrality, however, the VDA was part of the Nazi
propaganda machine. Racial Darwinism and notions of ethnic unity
313
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permeated the Heimatbriefe: “The war against the German people”, one
editorial argued,
against German culture, German character and life is being
continued; German school, language and education,
German territory and economic power are extremely
endangered. The de-Germanization [Entdeutschung] of
Millions of Germans is the goal of countless […] forces.316
German Americans would both embrace and reject this assessment.
Given the “anti-German propaganda” that many detected in newspapers
and the anti-immigrant legislation that discriminated against Germans just
as it did against Irish, Italians, Poles and other groups, their sense of
cultural superiority was injured. However, especially in the context of the
United States, talk of assimilation and de-Germanization always took on
an accusatory tone, suggesting that German migrants had somehow
“given in” to Americanization and assimilation. The following section will
show how the recipients of the Heimatbriefe crafted transnational
responses that reflected the interstitial nature of their own position
between Third Reich and “American Way.”
5. German migrants between Third Reich and American Way
Throughout the next chapters I will be examining how German
Americans participated in the transnational discourse of national belonging
by negotiating in the United States. I will show how old world conflicts and
consensuses along lines of class, race, gender, and religion were
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transported to the new world and how some of them were transformed or
pervaded to divide or unite German Americans and many other ethnic
groups in the multicultural space of urban life. The letters to the VDA in
response to the Heimatbriefe cannot capture the entire German American
experience in all its heterogeneity. Nevertheless, they speak to a larger
trend among migrants who had left Germany during the late nineteenth or
early twentieth century. These letters associate the idea of German
Volkstum and heritage both as an emotional reference to explain who the
migrants were and how they felt about their place in U.S. society. It should
be noted that the Heimatbriefe portrayed an overly optimistic image of
National Socialism and respondents generally viewed Hitler’s rise and the
“New Germany” positively. Moreover, they evidently accepted the VDA as
sufficiently trustworthy to describe their experience in the United States.
Built on ethno-cultural theories of human history, the narrative presented
in the Heimatbriefe provided a nationalized legitimacy to the sense of
dislocation, exploitation, and disillusionment widely shared among
German

Americans.

Nonetheless,

writers

often

offered

nuanced

perspectives on migrant life in the United States and complex views about
the intersection of class, race, and national heritage. Though some
responded warily, not knowing who stood behind the publication, many
accepted the Heimatbriefe as a medium to express their views about the
“New Germany,” including criticism and, in some rare cases, outright
rejection. Moreover, the men and women who wrote the letters often used
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their origins to reassert their position in American society, defying both
dominant U.S. discourses that frequently stressed a fundamental
dichotomy between the two nations as well as German appropriations of
their fate for political purposes. The letters offer a fascinating glimpse at
the discursive negotiations of Germanness during the 1930s. As such they
are certainly not comprehensive, but – as I hope to show in this section –
might well be paradigmatic.
***
German nationalists had frequently singled out German Americans for
their lack of devotion in preserving German culture abroad. Subjected to
repeated accusations of assimilation, cowardice, or treason from various
representatives of the fatherland, the respondents immediately turned the
argument against the German state upon receiving the Heimatbriefe. An
overwhelming number of those who responded from the United States
expressed satisfaction that they had not been forgotten back home. For
example, Rudolf Blumentritt of Troy, Alabama expressed his gratitude to
the VDA for taking up the cause of Germans abroad: “It is a joy to know
that, finally, the Heimat is remembering those who still feel German and
are voicing their Germanness on an advanced post.” 317 In the past,
Blumentritt suggested, “you would have to be a half-starving VolgaGerman […] before the Heimat remembered those that often left not light-
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heartedly and under pressure of the circumstances.”318 If the Heimatbriefe
served in part to remind Germans all over the world of their duty to the
fatherland, Blumentritt and others like him proposed mutual responsibility
between the German nation and its people: “Those of us who are doing
well abroad can contribute much to the defense of the fatherland against
encroachments. Greetings from home like yours will help to revive flagging
courage and fighting strength.”319 If the Heimatbriefe were indeed a call to
duty, Blumentritt was ready to act, though he never made it clear for whom
he was fighting exactly and how he intended to contribute. But his letter
was also a reminder that many migrants were not doing well, particularly
in the United States, where unemployment and disillusionment still reigned
in 1934, at the height of the Great Depression.
Hertha Winkler of Buffalo, New York similarly described the cultural
vacuum that had been filled by the Heimatbriefe in 1937. Many times, she
writes, she had heard her compatriots complain: “Why did former German
governments never care for Germans abroad [Auslanddeutsche] and their
problems? How much value has been lost to the Heimat in this manner –
but for decades we were only looked on as pariahs!”320 Perhaps Winkler
was masking her own thoughts behind the opinion of others, but postWorld War I immigrants repeatedly expressed a general sense of neglect,
betrayal, and alienation, paired with new hope in the future. Fritz Spindler
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described the near-decade he had spent in the United States as “nine
years of foreign service [Auslandsdienst].” 321 And Paul Herchert in
Cleveland, Tennessee asserted that “[the heart] may be in the second
fatherland for the longest time, but the Heimat stands strong and true in
the heart […] We, too, are sticking to our Führer, even though we are not
under his care.”322
Pre-World War I immigrants generally felt more settled in America, and
felt more loyal to the United States than more recent migrants.
Nonetheless, they also responded to the Heimatbriefe in great numbers
and voiced a similar blend of joy and indignation. “We were lost to you,
forgotten,” wrote Otto Köhler in December 1936, 32 years after he had
arrived in the United States. A builder by trade, Köhler had established
himself as a prominent member of the German American Lutheran
community in Staten Island and in many ways exemplified the “assimilated”
immigrant. Köhler, too, applauded VDA efforts and affirmed his connection
to the Heimat: German Americans, he wrote, were “Amerika verpflichtet,
Deutschland verbunden [obligated to the United States, tied to
Germany].”323
The slogan Amerika verpflichtet, Deutschland verbunden, as Cornelia
Wilhelm has shown, was popularized by the German American Bund, a
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pro-Nazi organization of ethnic Germans living in the United States. The
Bund’s members admired the achievements of the “New Germany” and
propagated an ideology of anti-Semitism, anti-Communism, and, later,
isolationism, which aimed to prevent the United States from joining World
War II on the Allied side. Their self-proclaimed purpose was to combat the
“missing conscience among German-Americans regarding their cultural
and völkisch roots in Germany.” Organizations like the Bund, Wilhelm
argues, functioned as a space in which migrants could “for the first time
experience the real Volksgemeinschaft.”

324

Köhler did not claim

membership in the Bund, but his use of the slogan suggests at the very
least some loose affiliation. The slogan’s repeated appearance in
numerous letters testifies to its success.325 The Bund soon attracted the
attention of American authorities, which became increasingly nervous
about the proclamations of common “blood and race” that supposedly
united all Germans, trumping political loyalties and citizenship.326
Nevertheless, the letters show that German Americans did not simply
“buy into” the message of National Socialism, whether propagated by the
Bund or the VDA. In a particularly striking instance, Fritz Strecker of
Staten Island recalled the “German Day” on 1 August 1937 with great
joy.327 He described the constant pressures to shed all German “layers” in
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public and expressed his satisfaction with the possibility to “shed all
American ‘layers’” during the German Day. There “we enjoyed our
Frankfurters and Sauerkraut and beer […]. The German national anthem
was well received and gladly sung.” But, he added,
it was different with the Hitler salute. Heaven knows, we are
all Americans here, after all, and not Hitlerians. Maybe most
of those present, naturalized German-Americans, felt the
same way. The Hitler flag and so on next to the American
flag is “all right” in my opinion. There are many Germans in
this country. But still, I must ask you: Has anyone here ever
seen masses of British or French flags fly in celebration of
British or French festivities? – And if the Italians do it, and
the Bolsheviks, the German should feel like the Brit:
Nobody challenges German rights, because the USA is as
German as it is British. Or is not?328
Strecker had arrived in the United States in 1927 and had made a new
home for himself and his family. And even though his own letter had
alluded to the challenges of being German in the United States, Strecker
remained certain that Germans had their rightful place in American society.
Moreover, he felt that celebrations of German heritage, such as the one
that took place on the “German Day,” reaffirmed his position as an
American: his German “stock” put him on equal terms with other “white”
Americans. Italian politicians like New York mayor La Guardia, he argued,
would remain the exception, since “Southern Humanity” belonged to the
Southern hemisphere of the Americas. “North America will remain, if God
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permits, Nordic, Saxon! Well, let’s say Germanic; the Anglo-Saxons are a
part of it, Scandinavians and Dutch, too.” As such, the homeland
nationalism expressed at “German Day” celebrations reflected Strecker’s
pragmatic belief in the redemption of German America. He also echoed
the nationalist racialism of Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard and other
proponents of a “white” United States, thus underlining his belief in the
racial privilege of German Americans (see also Chapter 3).
Strecker was optimistic that the United States would accept a certain
amount of old-world patriotism among its migrant population. In the United
States, he argued, “man stands above the state that he constitutes to
protect his freedom.” And despite the fact that the freedom may have had
some shortcomings, Strecker rejected German reproaches about German
American assimilation:
In Germany one tends to call that cowardice, weakness or
treason against Germandom, against Germany. But in the
end to every German the fatherland means just as much,
as the Germans means to the fatherland. […] In other
words: May the fatherland serve the German! If the
fatherland serves the German, then, maybe the German
abroad will also serve the fatherland.329

Strecker’s letter thus articulated a complex relationship between German
migrants and the Nazi state. Strecker had attached a note to his letter,
writing that he had long hesitated to send it, because it contained “political
opinions.” But, he added, “I believe that every man has a right to have his
329
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own opinion and soul.” Moreover, in yet another note attached to the letter,
Strecker’s wife apologized for her husband’s harsh words: “He has not
fully recovered from his nervous breakdown.”330
Despite acknowledging the benefits of the United States, however,
many writers voiced a general sense of loss and unhappiness,
denouncing the United States as a corrupt and heartless country. Käte
Küchler, who lived on New York’s Upper East Side, for example, praised
the American health care and education systems, food and electricity
prices, the radio, and the availability of consumer items, such as electric
washing and sewing machines. Even though her husband, a painter, had
trouble finding steady employment, a union salary ensured that all bills
were paid. “I don’t know how a worker scrapes by a living in a Berlin
tenement,” Küchler ruminated, “maybe he envies me.”331 At the same time,
life in New York and the recent economic crisis had left her with a bitter
sense of disappointment. “Often, I keep a yearning watch for the rays of
sunshine that have long left us in our street shafts […] but are cheerfully
reflected in the windows of the high elegant residential hotels that are 20
stories high or more.” 332 Life back home may have been hard, Küchler
continued, but
on Sundays we packed our backpacks and off we went into
the wonderful nature with our wonderful folk songs. What a
330
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happy wanderer my husband was and I tippy-toed next to
him in good spirits, oh and that gave us strength for the
whole long workweek.333
Küchler concluded her letter with a lament: “We are uprooted, that is the
tragedy of our life here, never will I take roots here, from the Heimat we
are weaned […] and here you are only a foreigner and a German one at
that.”334
With the Heimatbriefe, the VDA appealed to emotions of loss and
disappointment, prevalent in many German American attitudes towards
both Germany and the United States. The editors connected the plight of
individuals and the national community to global changes threatening the
economic, cultural and, ultimately, racial survival of Germans and
Germanness across the globe. By invoking the Heimat, they spun a web
that promised to alleviate the metaphysical sense of loss with
transnational solidarity but also exploited economic and cultural fears by
playing into omnipresent notions of social and racial Darwinism, which
depicted Germany in a dramatic struggle for survival with its enemies.
Nazi visions of the Volksgemeinschaft propagated collectivism over
individualism and freedom from the bonds of global capitalism at a time
when capitalism was experiencing its largest crisis to date. The letters
show that many migrants accepted such “old world propaganda.”
Paradoxically, however, the exchange also helped German migrants to
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imagine and assert their position in American society. Shifting perceptions
of racial and civic belonging to the American body politic were
simultaneously undermined and reinforced by transnational exchanges
between German America and the Heimat: the Heimat back home helped
German Americans find a Heimat abroad.
6. Conclusion
As the above examples show, German-language migrants continually
re-imagined their position in American society through a prism that
included both a retrospective memory of the migratory experience and the
Heimat and a projective consideration of contemporary political, social,
and economic events. The relationship between migrant, homeland, and
host society depended on individual assessments of inclusion or exclusion,
of opportunity or the lack thereof. Many migrants had left Germany for
pragmatic reasons, and used the same criteria to judge their presence and
future prospects in the United States. Strecker or Küchler may have
agreed on defining Germanness in terms of racial heritage, but they chose
their loyalties in ways that reflected their experiences. In judging the
present through the lens of the past, they integrated into and became a
part of the diverse, heterogeneous United States. The next three chapters
will discuss different manifestations of that process.
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Chapter 3: The Campaign Against the “Black Shame” Race and Whiteness in German America

1. Introduction
On March 1, 1921, most New York newspapers, and many others
around the country, had the same big story on their front page, describing
an event that highlighted the political fault lines dividing the city: “Probably
the greatest meeting New York City has known,” noted the New York
American, “was held in and around Madison Square Garden last night.”
“Fifteen thousand persons crowded into Madison Square Garden,”
reported the New York Herald. And even though the New York Times had
counted only 12,000 that night, it also devoted front-page coverage to a
controversial event, the apex of a vicious debate that had divided the
United States in the weeks before: The “Horror on the Rhine Mass
Meeting” on February 28, 1921. 335 Organized by a diffuse group of
individuals – appropriately named “The New York Campaign Committee
Against the Horror on the Rhine” – the meeting was the result of months of
public protest against the presence and purported crimes of black African
occupation troops from Northern Africa, Senegal, and Madagascar against
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the local German population during the French occupation of the
Rhineland following World War I.
This chapter explores the politics of race that permeated the “Horror on
the Rhine,” thus offering a new angle into the persistent presence of
German America in the political discourse of the United States in the
interwar era. I argue that a coalition of German and Irish Americans
coalesced around this transnational cause to reaffirm their right to speak
and participate in the American public sphere, from which they felt unjustly
excluded. As one speaker at the event, the distinguished veteran Colonel
Alexander Edward Anderson put it: as Americans, “we have the duty to
protest against such kind of occupation. (Applause.) You would not be
loyal to your own blood, you would not be loyal to humanity, and not being
loyal to humanity, you could by any manner of chance be loyal to the
traditions of America.”336 The participants thus reaffirmed a familiar pattern
of claiming whiteness to earn civic and material inclusion in the United
States. Moreover, looking back at a Germany that many participants had
“never seen […] except through the eye of imagination”337 this diverse,
heterogeneous group of Americans employed a transnational lens, which
allowed them to redefine their heritage as cultural and racial credit in the
struggle against “Americanism” and for participation in the American public
sphere.
336
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This chapter will discuss the origins of that history by reinserting the
debate of race and belonging in the history of transatlantic migration. Race
and national identity converged in discursive negotiations of hyphenated
belonging among German Americans during the early 1920s. These
intersections also implicated questions of class and gender, but those will
receive more attention in the following chapters. After summarizing the
historical importance of race and racial thought – particularly as it
pertained to questions of immigration and immigrant rights – I turn to the
events in Germany. The “Horror on the Rhine” caused a socio-political
wave of protest and indignation large enough to cross the Atlantic to the
United States, where it provided the context that highlighted questions of
belonging and that left a permanent impression on German American
identity abroad. Finally, the chapter briefly explores implications of such
transnational negotiations of whiteness and belonging upon the German
American interwar experience.
2. Race, Whiteness, and German America
The plight of African-American slaves and their descendants as well as
central structures of exclusion, violence, and inequality have left indelible
marks on U.S society. They have defined the country’s history from the
day European settlers and their slaves arrived on North American shores.
For almost as long, countless scholars and scientists have attempted to
justify, criticize, or simply explain the discrepancies between the American
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promise and its reality as well as the asymmetrical relations of power
among the nation’s heterogeneous populations. Race, in its various
theoretical manifestations 338 , has been frequently invoked, not least
because “white” settlers legitimized conquest and slavery based on the
inherent superiority of Anglo-Saxons. Though notoriously intangible, race
has thus become “the lingua franca of American society and politics.”339
Ironically, even though the founders of the Republic practiced slavery
while preaching freedom, and preached peace while unleashing war on
the continent’s indigenous populations, the metaphorical blame for the
contentious conflicts that followed has often been shifted to its victims.
White explanations for racial strife typically assailed people of color by
338
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emphasizing not the contentious history of white racism but the mere
presence of blacks in the white United States. Thus, post-Civil War
Southern lore romanticized its antebellum history as an era of stability and
order, while Northerners unfamiliar with conditions in the South frequently
blamed the seeming lack of civic engagement among African-Americans
on their innate inferiority rather than realizing the impact of violent
intimidation and continuous suppression. In other words, the “race
problem” became the “Negro problem”.340
In recent years, however, scholars have deconstructed the scientific
myth of whiteness as well as the cultural narratives that enabled and
enforced it. 341 As Matthew Frye Jacobson writes, “[t]he contest over
whiteness—its definition, its internal hierarchies, its proper boundaries,
and its rightful claimants—has been critical to American culture throughout
the nation’s history, and it has been a fairly untidy affair.”342 Whiteness, in
that sense, never simply equaled race and signified more than merely skin
340
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color. Instead, it represented power and social capital. 343 In the U.S.
Northeast, for example, where more established Americans frequently
defended their cultural and social advantage vis-à-vis European
immigrants from Ireland, Germany, Italy, and Eastern Europe, “race was
marked by language, nationality, religions, and social status, as well as by
color.” 344 Many of the new immigrants of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century faced challenges to their whiteness and were only
accepted as “white” over time.345 Race, Jacobson explains, “is a theory of
who is who, of who belongs and who does not, of who deserves what and
who is capable of what.” 346 The struggle over race and whiteness was
thus part of the larger cultural competition between disparate and
heterogeneous populations that met, and often clashed, in the United
States. And while it frequently intersected with religious and political
343
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discrimination, by the early twentieth century it emerged as the staple of
the xenophobic nativism that attempted to regulate immigration and close
the “Golden Door” for most of the world’s population.347
During the 1920s, Americans discussed questions of racial belonging
in the context of emerging political threats, particularly Bolshevism, which
anti-immigration activists described as a “condition” rather than a mindset,
thus questioning not only the loyalty of immigrants, but their “racial”
compatibility with the institutions of American democracy. 348 Americans
with ethnic backgrounds in Northern and Western Europe viewed
immigrants, especially from Southern and Eastern Europe, “as white but
inferior to northwest European ‘Nordics’.” 349 Even Progressives, who
aimed to educate the newcomers questioned immigrants’ inherent ability
to participate in American civic society. They embodied, writes Matthew
Guterl, Richard Hofstadter’s “classic description of the Progressives as
conservative anti-Semites, paranoid fascists, and zealous rivals of the
upstart robber barons. […] The growth of the cultural institutions in the
early twentieth century was an integral part of patrician efforts to resolidify
347
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cultural authority and social status.” 350 Immigrants often responded
indignantly by showcasing their ability to blend and assimilate into white
America.351
At the same time, however, other newcomers were unwilling to simply
submit themselves to that logic. Irish and German Americans especially
resisted the “Anglo-Saxon argument,” which emphasized the kinship of the
United States and England. They felt left out of and excluded from the
narrative that established a normative American national identity as British
derived. An Irish newspaper thus once complained about school curricula
teaching “each rising generation of Irish, German, French, Scandinavian,
Polish, Italian and other children that they were the descendants of a class
of commercial marauders in England styling themselves the great ‘AngloSaxon race.’”352 This resentment conflicted with immigrants’ definition of
their own destinies in the United States and ran afoul of their treasured
heritage as Irish or Germans (or French or Italians). Irish Americans in
particular could not overlook the cruel irony of living in a country
dominated by Anglo-Saxons, whose rule they had tried to escape by
coming to the United States in the first place. Why would they shed their
history at the request of the old colonizer? 353 Many other Americans
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agreed. Progressive era proponents of cultural and ethnic pluralism like
Horace Kallen and Randolph Bourne thought that American democracy
was well suited for a diversity of sorts: “Democracy,” wrote Kallen,
“involves not the elimination of differences,” but their “perfection and
conservation.”354 Similarly, Bourne argued that an American “cosmopolitan”
ideal should draw on the various immigrant traditions to serve a
democratic culture – he even called for “dual citizenship.”355 Supporters of
ethnic nationalism went even further: they wanted to nurture old world
identities in the United States, fighting for the homeland’s future on the
American front.356
The racial discourse in the United States entered a new age when
millions of African-Americans migrated to the urban North to escape the
vicious and violent racism of the South. It was during the 1920s that the
“Negro” began to be perceived as the “utmost social threat” and whiteness
brought an opportunity for recent immigrants, particularly from Eastern
and Southern Europe, to remake themselves into members of the white
establishment. 357 When race riots broke out in cities across the United
States in 1919, it signaled that the line between white and non-white had
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finally begun to blur. Race, a term still frequently used to signify national
heritage (i.e. the German “race,” the Irish “race”) increasingly came to
mean color.358 For European immigrants living in the very cities that were
the final destination for most African-Americans – such as Chicago, New
York, and Philadelphia – the differences between Italians, Irish, Germans,
Czechs, Poles and countless others slowly disappeared and after the
1924 Johnson-Reed Immigration Act foreclosed immigration, “the
development of a racialized consumer society speeded the absolute
assimilation of immigrant groups (previously understood as racially
distinct) into the singular ‘white race.’”359
The discourse about race and belonging cannot be accurately
captured

without

pointing

to

the

complex

history

of

global

imperialism/colonialism. The supremacy of the “white race” was an
essential ideological trope to legitimize all colonial conquests. In the
United State, it, too, helped justify the displacement of Native Americans
under the ruse of “Manifest Destiny.” And race certainly played a critical
role during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when both
Germany and the United States reached out for colonies beyond their
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immediate continental neighborhood.

360

Colonial settings provided

opportunities to assert white masculinity in the context of imperial war and
this was especially true for immigrants lingering on the boundaries of
whiteness: As colonial soldiers they could prove their virtue and civilization.
The colonial context gave immigrants the opportunity to include
themselves in the “white race” while simultaneously excluding the
“savages.” 361 Imperialism “fostered a pan-European, pan-white political
sensibility that countervailed the otherwise divisive logic of Anglo-Saxon
supremacy dominating other arenas of public discourse.”362 Moreover, it
“left a heritage of race-feelings that enriched the emotional appeal of
Anglo-Saxon nativism.”363
For German immigrants arriving in the United States during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the imperial arena provided a
transnational logic to explain human hierarchies. Germany, after all, had
360
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recently engaged in colonial adventures of its own, and narratives of white
supremacy permeated the fabric of German everyday life. It was no
wonder that German Americans fought in America’s imperial wars in great
numbers. 364 In the colonies, the coexistence of whites and blacks was
never a problem as long as no one transgressed social hierarchies
between colonizers and colonized. In that sense, U.S. imperial endeavors
also added another complicated layer to debates on American citizenship
and belonging. American discourse alternated between self-confidence
and a sense of cultural crisis, “between a belief in the superiority of the
Anglo-Saxon race and a fear that ‘the race’ could be corrupted through
miscegenous [sic] relations with immigrants and ‘Negroes,’ and through
the mere fact of overlordship in tropical climates.” 365 A broad antiimperialist movement used the racial logic to paint a dooming picture of
the “post-colonial” age, when the United States was to accept “the peons,
negroes, and Indians of all sorts, the wild tribe of Comanches, the bugand-lizard-eating ‘Diggers,’ and other half-monkey savages […] as equal
citizens of the United States.”366 In fact, the notion that these “savages”,
Native Americans, African Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, Mexicans, etc.,
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were not suited for American citizenship was one of the very few matters
that both imperialists and anti-imperialists could agree on.367
Colonial settings reinforced the notion that race was a defining factor in
human history and that the purity and dominance of the “white race”
needed to be preserved. “The policing of sexual boundaries—the defense
against hybridity—is precisely what keeps a racial group a racial group.
[…] Thus sexuality is one site at which all the economic advantages,
political privileges, and social benefits inhering in a cultural invention like
Caucasian converge and reside.” 368 Sexuality, then, was precisely the
area where critics of both German and American colonialism, saw the
“barbarizing repercussions.” In other words, contact with uncivilized
peoples, especially sexual contact, threatened the racial purity and
integrity of the colonizers. Germany and the United States shared a
colonial experience in that sexuality and miscegenation played critical
roles in the making of “race” and the protection of the boundaries thus
established.369
In this context, it is important to note that a transatlantic “scientific”
community provided the logic of racial difference, which defined the ways
in which Americans and Germans thought about human hierarchies.
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Academic racism and eugenics were part of a dominant belief system
among a populace ready to trust “scientific” explanations. Madison Grant
(1865-1937), an influential American eugenicist, argued that “Members of
the Nordic race, if they hoped to secure their tenuous grasp on world
domination

and

genetic

magnificence,

needed

to

recognize

the

transnational, transreligious, translinguistic, and transatlantic nature of
their racial identity.”370 For many observers, World War I was the catalyst
of a more forceful argument. If increasing immigration, crime, and (for
some) alcoholism had not already been ample warnings of the impending
decline of white civilization, World War I certainly amounted to a racial
suicide of global proportions. “From a race point of view,” wrote Grant in
his influential 1916 work The Passing of the Great Race, “the present
European conflict is essentially a civil war and nearly all of the officers and
a large proportion of the men on both sides are members of [the Nordic]
race.”371 His point was that instead of killing each other, Europeans should
collaborate with their white American kin to defend their continents against
the onslaught of a (perceived) non-white aggression.
370
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Such theories also reached German America during and immediately
following the “Great War.” The Philadelphia Tageblatt, a Philadelphiabased German-language newspaper published in cooperation with the
German unions, positively reviewed the publication of the 1920 treatise
The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy by the journalist
and historian Lothrop Stoddard (1883-1950). Stoddard had predicted the
weakening of the white race due to immigration and miscegenation and
warned of an impending racial war between whites and non-whites. The
difference between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Tageblatt
wrote, was that “now white people are more or less in a defensive role
against a dreadful wave, which rolls against it and that will be especially
dangerous, now that the yellow races [sic] have learned so much in the
World War.” 372 This particular Tageblatt piece made no mention of the
Great Migration, but as Russell Kazal has shown, the newspaper
constantly reported on the increasing presence of African-Americans in
Philadelphia’s German districts and it progressively moved towards a
position that identified black migration as a threat, showing a stance that
shifted “from indifference to concern and, at times, pronounced fear and
hostility.” 373
This shift reflected an overarching trend among German Americans. In
fact, by the end of World War I, many felt threatened by the presence of
372
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blacks in traditional white neighborhoods like Philadelphia’s Germantown
– as did other white Philadelphians. They responded with exclusion,
intimidation and sometimes outright violence, while others began fleeing
the city for the suburbs. In doing so, they joined forces with other
immigrant groups – Poles, Russians, Italians and especially Irish. 374
During the 1920s and 1930s, many German Americans in Philadelphia,
particularly

those

of

working-class

and

Catholic

backgrounds,

“increasingly saw themselves as sharing identities in common with other
European-Americans, including the ‘new immigrants’ entering their
neighborhoods and parishes.” Their “common denominator,” writes Kazal
about Philadelphia-Germans, was their whiteness:
Their touchstone was the Great Migration, which brought
tens of thousands of black Southerners to Philadelphia in the
late 1910s and 1920s, and saw large numbers of African
Americans settle, for the first time, on the edges of
traditionally German neighborhoods. These changes gave
such ‘not-black’ identities, including white identity, greater
salience for German Catholics and workers, at precisely the
moment they were starting to mix with Slavs, Italians, and
the Irish.375
While this may seem like a convincing argument for assimilation, the
answer is more complex. To be sure, whiteness was a solidifying factor in
the “Americanization” of German America. At the same time, however, for
374
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many migrants their Germanness was constitutive of their whiteness. In
other words, by celebrating their German roots, German Americans could
place themselves among the ranks of America’s established elites.
3. “Black Horror on the Rhine”
In the months after the Armistice in November 1918, Germany was in
chaos: small and large revolutions erupted across the country while the
population confronted the collapse of the Second Reich and the
unconditional surrender of its troops to allied forces. The Versailles Treaty
furthered German humiliation in its insistence that Germany alone was
responsible for World War I. 376 Many conservative elites, who had
enthusiastically supported the war and had dreamt of a global empire, now
needed to explain and to escape the crisis. Driven by a blend of nationalist
ire and anxiety, these elites soon singled out a number of scapegoats to
blame for the current crisis, including the “dishonorable French,” “Jewish
press scoundrels,” “the “November criminals,” who had signed the
Versailles Treaty and thus subjected Germany to its harsh conditions.377
Perhaps the gravest provocation occurred in the winter of 1918/19, when
between 25,000 and 45,000 French colonial soldiers from Northern Africa,
Senegal, and Madagascar entered the Rhineland – an area west of the
Rhine bordering the Netherlands and Belgium – as part of the French
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occupation forces. They became known as the “black beasts.”378 To many
Germans, and as we shall see to many others, the presence of these
black troops signaled the fulfillment of the worst fears voiced by Stoddard,
Grant and others: African occupiers on hallowed German grounds. It was
one thing to be at war with whites – to be occupied by black colonials was
quite another.
The presence of these troops as occupiers became a critical rallying
point to reestablish the faltering power base of German conservatives and
reunite a divided German populace around a reactionary ideology.379 They
inspired a campaign anchored in the discourse of self-victimization and
self-pity, which dovetailed with a broader narrative of duty and obligation
that appealed to the “national honor” of the German people in the face of
“national catastrophe”. During its height, from early 1920 to late 1922, a
wide coalition of public officials, including Secretary of State Adolf Köster
and Chancellor Gustav Stresemann, activists, politicians, and journalists
378
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bitterly complained about the alleged sexual and violent transgressions of
African soldiers against the German population – especially women and
children.

While

the

German

government

quietly

supported

and

coordinated private activities, such as independent civic initiatives, against
the “Black Shame,” newspapers ensured that horror stories about rape
and murder reached all corners of the country.380
To be sure, the press and authorities either exaggerated or plainly lied.
Even German observers asserted that African troops381 were often more
disciplined than their French counterparts and that there was no evidence
of systematic transgressions. In other words, the stories were a campaign
of fabrication and myth, which played into the racist prejudices of both
elites and many “average” Germans.

382

Individual cases of sexual

transgression and violence against the German population, especially
women and children, were used to argue that African soldiers were, by
their very nature, sexual predators. “The image of a white (often naked)
German woman raped by a black soldier endowed with dangerous,
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‘primitive’ sexual instincts lies at the heart of the ‘Black Shame’ discourse,”
writes Iris Wigger, who recently published the most exhaustive account of
the period thus far. 383 However, if there ever was any concern for the
putative victims, it was marginal at best. After all, “German women on the
Rhine were predominantly not physical victims of black troops, but
symbolic victims of a campaign which peddled racist, sexist and
pornographic imagery and manufactured a nationwide crisis where one
did not exist.” Wigger argues that such figurative victimization and
humiliation reflected patriarchal anxieties and repressed sexual fantasies
projected onto a context of national crisis. Mistreated female bodies, in
that sense, became symbols of a defeated, powerless German nation and,
equally important, a threatened white race.384 More than merely insulting
Germany, campaigners argued that the black troops weakened the
whiteness of the German people. By sending them to Germany, the Allies,
and particularly the French, metaphorically excluded Germany from
membership in the white world and undermined the “political solidarity of
Europe.”385
From a contemporary perspective, it is hard to miss the cruel irony
behind such statements only months after the military tactics of the “Great
War” had contemptuously abandoned the morality and human dignity of
“civilized nations” – let alone solidarity among Europeans. This irony did
383
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not escape everyone, but the protests against the “black shame”
nonetheless enjoyed popular support from the German public and nearly
all political parties. 386 It seemed as if the simultaneous international
discourse on eugenics and “racial purity” that I have discussed above
remade female German victims into a “suitable metaphor for [the] idea of
the nation, grounded in blood.”387 The ideology behind the notion of “white
civilization” was, after all, transnational in scope. As the campaign against
the “Black Shame” took off, German nationalists quickly realized that
many former enemies shared the same commitment to uphold racial
hierarchies. Support for the campaign came from all over the globe,
including Great Britain, the United States, and even France and it became,
according to historian Julia Roos, “one of the most important propaganda
efforts of the Weimar period.” 388 In England, the well-known British
journalist E.D. Morel drafted a pamphlet, in which he protested against the
“colored outrages,” while the American feminist Ray Beveridge actively
lobbied for the cause in Germany.389 The case became an “international
cause célèbre“ when more and more public figures – politicians, scientists,
386
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activists – joined the cause and various government agencies organized
and sponsored demonstrations and protests, particularly with the support
of women’s groups.390
After the Allies rejected initial attempts to discourage the stationing of
black troops in the Rhineland, 391 campaign organizers realized that the
United States was their most likely ally, not least because of the large
German American community. As I have discussed above, the United
States was hostile towards its own minorities; the race riots of 1919 had
their roots in white hostility to their own black troops in the American
Expeditionary Forces. It is hard to ascertain whether or not German
activists adapted American “race tactics” in order to combat occupation
and French domination. But groups like the Deutsche Studentenschaft
(DSt), a German student organization, whose overtly racist message
included a warning that “[t]hese coloured beasts covet the fair, blueeyed
daughters of the Moselle,” 392 seized the opportunity and sent a large
number of pamphlets across the Atlantic as early as Spring of 1919.
Though the exact organizational structure behind these international
efforts, if one ever existed, remains unclear, there can be no doubt that
groups like the DSt specifically targeted German American organizations
390
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like the German Society of Pennsylvania to spread their message.393 This
strategy was completely in tune with the official line of German foreign
policy at the time, which – though incapacitated – had finally begun to
understand that culture would be a viable political argument in the years to
come. A positive image of Germany could bring great political and
economic advantage, and Germans abroad became an important factor,
especially in countries were they could wield significant political influence
– like the United States, which rapidly emerged as a global leader.394
Accordingly, those behind the “Black Horror” activism attempted to rally
Americans of German heritage group around a common cause.
Pamphlets, which were often sent in both English and German,395 usually
contained the appeal in bold letters: “Give this paper to every body
[sic]!”396 Similar pamphlets regularly reached the German Society in 1919
and 1920. These publications frequently contained images that depicted,
for example, black French troops guarding historical castles on the Rhine
River.397 [Fig. 1+2, see end of chapter] They also demanded that Germans
abroad heed their duty to support the fatherland: “We remind you of a
great duty: Respond to lies and canards of the enemy press with all
certainty. Report to us and send us the articles for or against our work, so
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that we can rip off this world’s mask of lies and deception.” Listing the “lies”
of the allied presses, the same pamphlet proclaimed in bold letters: “The
whole world is against us.” 398 Later editions of the pamphlet contained
reprints of similar articles and cartoons from around the world, particularly
the United States. [Fig. 3]
To be sure, we do not know enough about the motives, goals,
strategies and impact of the plans of those behind those pamphlets.
However, the point of this chapter, as noted above, is not to provide a
complete history but rather to establish a novel storyline, a way of
transnational storytelling that opens up a new historiographical realm for
future research. In order to do so, we must now turn to the enactment of
the “Black Horror” in the United States, or, in other words, its
Americanization.
4. The Americanization of the “Black Horror”
The news of a potential conflict in the Rhineland reached the White
House almost immediately after the Armistice. President Woodrow Wilson,
a fierce and aggressive defender of white supremacy and segregation,
pressed the French Premier Georges Clemenceau on the matter of black
African troops as occupation forces: “I have been told that the French
government has the intention of sending Senegalese into the left bank [of
the Rhine]. Is this true?,” he asked Clemenceau in early 1919. The French
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Premier responded that he planned to withdraw the one battalion currently
in the Rhineland, “for I believe as you do that it would be a grave error to
occupy the left bank with black troops.” 399 A few weeks earlier, an
American official had warned a French colleague that the presence of
black occupation soldiers could be exploited for political purposes: “One or
two cases of rape, committed by your blacks on the German women, well
advertised in the southern states of America, where there are very definite
views with regard to the Blackmen [sic], would likely greatly reduce the
esteem in which the French are held.”400
First reports reprinted from German newspapers – a common practice
during the time – appeared in the German American press in the spring of
1920; by early June enough letters from angry American citizens had
reached the State Department to prompt President Wilson to investigate
the matter. He solicited reports from several officials working in Europe,
among them the American commissioner in Berlin, Ellis Loring Dresel, and
the American commander in Coblenz, General Henry T. Allen. Both
reports concluded that the German claims were vastly exaggerated. But
while the Wilson administration consequently did not further pursue the
issue, German American nationalists like George Sylvester Viereck
399
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increased their public pressure. His magazine Viereck’s American Monthly
reported extensively on the issue, arguing that “French niggers rape, slay
and mutilate German women,” 401 and favored a proactive German
American response to defend German purity both in the United States and
in Europe: “German-Americans Organize!”402 Viereck allowed other writers
to use his magazine as a platform for similar agitation. For example, in its
November 1920s issue, the conservative American actress Ray Beveridge,
who had spent almost the entire war in Germany, warned the Monthly’s
readers of a “Negro Reign of Terror in Germany.”403
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One particularly appalling example of German American activism
appeared in the December 1920 issue of the Monthly. Viereck reprinted
an open letter by the playwright, poet, and protégé of Ambrose Bierce,
Herman George Scheffauer (1878-1927) to James Weldon Johnson
(1871-1938) of the NAACP: “You yourself, sir,” Scheffauer wrote
addressing Johnson, “as an enlightened and cultured man of color must
surely be aware that it is an unforgivable crime to introduce these savages,
fresh from the wilds […] into a community of highly-cultured white people
[…].” Scheffauer noted that “the orderly and educated American negro”
was surely above “these savages,” but warned Johnson that the atrocities
“will irreparably damage the just cause of the American negro and alienate
all European sympathies for the wrongs and tortures inflicted upon him.”
Thus, Scheffauer concluded, the “National Association must denounce in
the most unsparing terms the bestialities of theses savages, and put the
blame where it belongs—upon the white French.”404 Apparently, Viereck
had taken it upon himself to forward the letter – along with a copy of the
Monthly – to Johnson, who wrote back to Viereck on December 11, 1920.
His letter was a polite and firm response to a type of racism that Johnson
was surely familiar with – a type of racism that drove the ideology
contained in terms such as “civilization” and “culture.” The NAACP
believed, Johnson wrote,
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that crime is crime and is no whit worse when performed by
Africans on Europeans than it is when committed by
Europeans on Africans.
We therefore strongly condemn in unmeasured terms such
passages in your propaganda as imply or seem to imply that
the heinousness of these alleged crimes lies principally in
the color of the accused.
On behalf of his organization, Johnson refused to participate in the
activism against the presence of black troops. But, he added, turning his
response into an anti-colonial critique, “we would gladly join you and
anybody to ask for the removal of all troops from all parts of this war-sick
world.”405 Viereck, of course, did not recognize (or ignored) the references
to colonialism and racial injustice. For him, it was a missed opportunity for
African-Americans to join ranks with German Americans. His ethnic group,
Viereck argued, supported African-American demands for legal, political,
and social equality. But the fact that Johnson and the NAACP now
declined to take a strong position against such sexual breaches of the
social contract regulating the coexistence of black and white in the United
States, was reason enough for Viereck to issue a stern warning:
BUT ONCE LET THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SUSPECT
THAT BEHIND THE COLORED MAN’S DEMAND FOR
SUCH EQUALITY THERE LURKS A FUTURE PURPOSE
TO CLAIM RIGHTS ALSO TO WHITE WOMEN—AND THE
FIRES OF BLIND, IRREPRESSIBLE, RACIAL CONFLICT
WILL BE LIT IN AMERICA.406
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Viereck surely hoped for broad support from the American public for
his strong position. And indeed, Viereck’s activism must be seen as an
attempt to steer German America back into the political and cultural center
of U.S. society. During the presidential campaign of 1920, Viereck and his
co-editor Edmund von Mach, one of the founders of the Steuben Society,
thus juxtaposed the issue of racial purity and political equality in a quest
for ethnic cohesion among German Americans and their acceptance
among other Americans. They enlisted other prominent members from
within and without the migrant community in an effort to mobilize public
opinion against the “traitor” Wilson, who was deemed responsible for the
terms of the Versailles treaty and thus the presence of the African troops
on German soil.407 Supported by wealthy donors from the German and
Irish American communities they established “The New York Campaign
Committee Against the Horror on the Rhine” and printed thousands of
pamphlets, which were distributed across the country.408
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By October, hyphenate newspapers across the East Coast and the
Midwest printed agonizing accounts of the purported and largely unproven
crimes committed by African soldiers, while also introducing various
activities organized on a local level. In leading publications like the New
Yorker Staatszeitung 409 and the Philadelphia Tageblatt, the Schwarze
Schmach – the “black shame” – became a leading topic. The Tageblatt
published eleven lengthy articles on black African troops in Germany in
October and early November 1920, denouncing the “severe crimes
against morality [schwere Sittlichkeitsverbrechen]”410 committed by French
colonial troops. Usually reprinting or paraphrasing articles previously
published by German newspapers, the Tageblatt listed specific details of
the crimes and even names of the victims. Comparing the incidents to
scenes from Dante’s Inferno, one report described the “dreadful agonies,
which constantly, hourly threaten reputable German women, innocent girls
in the spring of their lives and boys, still in their delicate childhood”. The
“wild, African soldiers,” the article continued,
indulge in their bestial appetites, uninhibited, even protected
by their superiors. […] Blacks, […] savages from the darkest
George Sylvester Viereck, vice chairman Reverend Dr. William Popcke, a
Lutheran clergyman who later served as the president of the United German
Societies of New York and vice chairwoman Frida Muller Spiering, the wife of
renowned violinist Theodore Bernays Spiering. (Addresses Delivered at the
Horror on the Rhine Mass Meeting, passim).
409
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Africa are dragged to the banks of the Rhein, to the heart of
Europe, where they are to guard a white nation in a country
of European culture a thousand years old. The black man,
fetched from his clay hut from Africa’s Ivory Coast, to guard
and threaten like slaves in Bonn and Mainz, in Worms and in
Speyer, the descendants of those, who built the soaring
Romanic and Gothic cathedrals there. The life and health of
the members of a white Kulturnation at the mercy of the
stupidity and wildness of black barbarians!411
The outrage against the presence of black soldiers, manufactured as it
was, transcended the social boundaries that otherwise divided the
readership of Tageblatt and Staatszeitung. If there were any differences in
reporting, they could be found in the stronger anti-French sentiments
voiced in the latter. “The France of today,” one editorial on October 17th
argued, “can no longer uphold the pretense that it will lead civilization to a
good end and it shakes the current social order. The France of tomorrow
will be barbarism [sic].”412
By early 1921, the purported crimes of African soldiers in Germany
were the dominant topic in the Tageblatt, while ranking second in the
Staatszeitung, where the aid for hungering children in Germany attracted
the greatest attention. In February, during the last four weeks before the
mass meeting in New York City, 32 articles appeared in the Tageblatt,
including six that were prominently displayed as national news on page
one. On February 22nd, for example, the Tageblatt featured an article on
the “Senegal-Neger” on its front page, two editorials on the topic and a
411
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lengthy article critical of the American Legion’s attempts to mark the
movement against the “black shame” as disloyal. 413 The Staatszeitung
published the same number articles, 32 in total, in less than two weeks
before the mass meeting in New York. It even specifically called on its
readers to attend the meeting, for example on February 20, 1921 on page
1 [See Fig. 4]. 414
German Americans uttered the same fears of black violence. For them,
the presence of black troops was an affront to German culture and
civilization and as such encapsulated the experience of many Germans
around the world, whose self-confidence was shattered after World War I.
After all, the years of the Great War had arguably been the period of
German America’s largest humiliation to date. Moreover, activists
repeatedly pointed out that public outrage was not directed against the
black soldiers themselves but against the French government, who aimed
to humiliate and, ultimately, erase the German nation. While German
American leaders were not responsible for the defeat in World War I, they,
too, had to explain why the German American community was subjected
to such persecution and scrutiny during the war. The American fear of
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German American disloyalty was, after all, not entirely unfounded.415 Just
like in Germany, then, this discourse of victimization replaced self-critical
reflection and an analysis of one’s own shortcomings.416
Beyond these seemingly similar debates, however, the American
campaign had developed into a distinctly unique discourse on the future of
U.S. society. The climactic meeting at Madison Square Garden on
February 28th provided the space where the national implications of this
international discourse were pronounced in a public setting large enough
to capture the entire nation. Why was it important for the campaigners, to
bring, as they proclaimed, “the whole question of the Horror on the Rhine
to the attention of the American people”?417 Was it simply another case of
propaganda instigated by the German government, as the American
Legion, a veteran’s organization, and other critics alleged? Or were the
campaigners merely “concerned” – in the racist dictum of the time – about
the wellbeing of their German cousins abroad?
Of course, leaders like Viereck und von Mach had recognized that the
issue resonated with many German Americans, not least because racial
hierarchies also thrived in an American context. The organizers hoped that
415
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the issue would become a rallying point for German Americans. The “chief
reason” for the meeting’s success, they wrote in a pamphlet published
after the meeting, was
the growing sense of strength and dignity of American
citizens of German blood. By them the meeting had been
arranged, they bore the brunt of the attacks—and they stood
firm as honest Americans of German blood should stand.
As American citizens they feel the moral responsibility for the
use which is being made of the victory won by America.
They feel the shame which the presence of uncivilized
French colored troops on the Rhine brings to the fair name
and the honor of America. Knowing conditions on the Rhine
to be as they are, these American citizens would be
unfaithful to their duty if they did not do everything in their
power to awaken the conscience of their fellow-citizens to
the Horror on the Rhine.418
This passage points to the transnational identity that German American
leaders attempted to cultivate after World War I. Resisting the “attacks” of
the preceding years, they wanted to be able to speak up as “honest
Americans of German blood” and to gain respect for their heritage and for
their achievements. Owing loyalty to the United States, they thus felt
entitled to claim its ideological foundations for themselves. Countering
allegations of disloyalty and treason, Dr. Joseph Rummel, a New York
Catholic priest, argued that if their protest was treason
then it is the treason of George Washington. (Applause.) It is
the treason of Abraham Lincoln. (Applause.) It is the treason
of William McKinley. (Applause.) Or even the treason of the
two million sturdy boys who under the flag that knows no
stain or dishonor, and that has no greater mission than the
418
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defense of the innocent and helpless, crossed the seas to let
the world know where America stands on the question of
civilization, and what it can do when innocence is assailed.
And if this be treason, I say in your name and in the name of
all decent Americans, make the most of it. (Applause.)419
If they had been pushed to the periphery of society during World War I,
German Americans now aimed for their complete rehabilitation. In this
regard, the narrative created around the “Horror on the Rhine” allowed
them to achieve a critical objective: instead of divorcing their fate as
Americans from the German homeland – as many commentators
demanded at the time – they could reemphasize the European roots of
American culture. If the war had been about the freedom of all people, as
President Wilson had claimed, they should be entitled to express their
opinions as well as pursue their own rights and ends, especially in the
United States.
The speakers at the mass meeting belabored these points time and
again. For example, Colonel Alexander Edward Anderson, a veteran of
America’s imperial adventures in the Philippines and a member of the
American Legion,420 argued that the meeting was “American in scope, in
that it calls upon the people to recognize and acknowledge the purpose for
which we went to this war: in the interest of all of humanity.” 421 And,
Anderson continued, Germans were no different from Americans, they
419
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were not the “Hun” of World War I propaganda. To emphasize that point,
Anderson drew a telling comparison: “If we choose to be liberal and fairminded and just, we must realize that the occupation of the country
inhabited by those God-fearing, liberty-loving people is no different that
would be an occupation of our own glorious country inhabited by a like
people.”422 The blame, for Anderson, lay not with the black troops, who
were simply “dragged and coddled and inveigled out of the wilds of
darkest Africa”, but with the French, “the people responsible for putting
them there”. The French, he argued, had undermined one of the central
foundations of Western civilization at the time: The rule of the white race.
Addressing the audience directly, Anderson argued that as Americans,
“you have a duty to protest against such kind of occupation. (Applause.)
You would not be loyal to your own blood, you would not be loyal to
humanity, and not being loyal to humanity, you could by any manner of
chance be loyal to the traditions of America. (Applause.)”423 America was
built on the tradition of a white racial order and it was the duty of
Americans to protect it.
Transcending previous definitions of whiteness, many of the speakers
used the term “race” to evoke race as skin color, which reflected
contemporary scientific opinions around the globe. But the discussion
always had a uniquely American twist: Otto Stiefel, an attorney from New
422
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York and co-founder of the Steuben Society, believed that America had
not been created “by one race and for one race,” but by God, “and he [sic]
didn’t even ask the help of one Englishman in the performance of the task.
(Great applause.) My friends, those blessings exist for the people who
inhabit America, all of them—all children of Europe—all are equally
entitled to the benefits which God has bestowed, without distinction.”424
The distinction that all “people” equaled “all children of Europe” was critical.
The speakers at the event agreed (and probably many of its critics as well)
that whiteness signified privilege. While they were not specific on where
exactly the boundary between white and non-white lay, it was very clear
that African-Americans were by definition not white, and thus had no place
in the American body politic. “I am very glad that the issue we are raising
here tonight is not a race issue,” proclaimed the feminist Sara Bard Field,
pointing to the complex and shifting meaning of race during the time. “We
have no quarrel with the black people as a people,” she continued:
When I consider how America and other nations have
treated the black people, bringing them here in the past
under all sorts of promises [sic!], to make them slaves, and
then keeping them enslaved for so long, I feel that we have a
great obligation to the black people, and therefore I am very
glad that this is not a matter of race prejudice, but is a matter
of knowing that you cannot bring people of a primitive
civilization into touch with a people of higher civilization
without the most menacing results ensuing. And, therefore, I
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am making this protest on the ground of morality and not on
the ground of race prejudice. (Applause.)425
Stiefel even spoke of the “human race” when he evoked his German
heritage as the foundation for his call for racial order in the United States:
“I am proud of my German origin because events have demonstrated that
the creative energies of the Germanic people are unsurpassed in the
history of the human race.”426
The cultural sense of superiority voiced by Stiefel prefigured the fine
line that German American ethnic nationalism would tread throughout the
1920s. Negotiating the increasingly exclusionary definitions of national
identity in both Germany and the United States was a balancing act. After
all, if Germans were “unsurpassed” in their achievements, how should
they stand on equal terms with other white Americans? For now, however,
Stiefel settled for equality, nothing more and nothing less, when he
proclaimed that American citizenship “has been hideously outraged,
hideously debased by the influences that have controlled the destinies of
this nation for the past four years.” Now, he continued, it had to be
“restored to its full heritage, the full development of its power. (Applause.)
Of citizenship by tolerance we have had enough! (Applause.) Of
citizenship by effacement we have had enough. (Applause.) Of citizenship
by the grace of a dominant race we have had plenty and enough.
(Applause.)” Germans did not simply want to be tolerated or, even less,
425
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dominated by more established Anglo-Americans. They wanted equal
rights and access to power. And Stiefel was certain that “a new
consciousness is sweeping slowly over America.”427
The new consciousness envisioned by Stiefel was a blend of Horace
Kallen’s pluralism, which stressed the diversity of the American nation,
and the ethnic nationalism that German immigrants shared with Irish,
Polish, or Jewish immigrants. 428 As an American of German heritage,
Stiefel believed he should be entitled to the same pride and
connectedness that Anglo-Americans felt for the British Isles:
Köln, Koblenz, Heidelberg, Mainz—all the beautiful
Rhinepfalz, and the Rhine […]. My friends, I have never
seen them; I have never seen them except through the eye
of imagination. I have never seen the majestic river, the
smiling valleys, the vine-clad hills; by I hope to see them
some day (applause), and when I see them may they be free
from the Black Horror!429
By invoking these historic German cities and the mythic Rhine River,
Stiefel grounded his own Anglo-Saxon heritage in the German homeland,
included Germans in the narrative of white progress and stressed the
necessity for solidarity among the European civilizations. “What idea can
contain more virulent corruption than that any race should bring about the
pollution of its own women?” Stiefel asked. “That is the lowest step to
which humanity can sink.”430 By endangering German women, the French
427
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were endangering the survival of the entire white race. To Stiefel, the
policies of the French – Stiefel also placed the blame squarely with the
French and exculpated the African soldiers – violated “every instinct that
[Nature] planted in the breasts of man for the preservation of his race. The
men who [pollute their own women] are traitors to the whole white race,
and foes to every other.”431
***
Generally, the Irish-American speakers adopted a similar message.
They, too, argued that the presence of African occupiers on German soil
“is a problem, that every true American every true man [sic] in the world
should make his own.” 432 Nonetheless, it became clear that the Irish
based the discussion on their own peculiar discourse of race and
belonging, which had historically evolved in the century of Irish
immigration to the United States. Like the Germans, their nationalism had
developed in part as a reaction to American nativism as well as the
developments back home, in particular the movement to liberate Ireland
from British rule. Like many of the German speakers, they assumed a
biological and cultural difference between Irish and Anglo-Saxons. They
were also convinced that they had been forced away from their homeland
because of the hunger and poverty caused by British imperialism. If
German nationalism was anti-French, Irish nationalism was anti431
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English.433 Still divided from “white” America by a “razor-thin line,”434 the
Irish had held conventions to voice their nationalist dissent as early as
1916. It is very likely that the organizers of the German mass meeting in
February 1921 had consulted with Irish activists like Daniel Cohalan, a
leading organizer of the Irish-American cause, who spoke for the German
Americans at their event.435 Cohalan argued that there “is no group in this
country […] who are [sic] entitled to rule over the rest of us. There is no
strain of blood in this country that is in any way superior to any other
strain.”436 He also reminded his audience as an Irishman “that you have
put up for too long a time with this thing of permitting one group of men to
step on you as if you were not American citizens. (Applause.)” Their
service for the country had translated into a right of being American, this
was not a matter of privilege:
But bare in mind that American citizenship means something
more than rights; American citizenship includes necessarily
the ideas of duty, the idea of responsibility. You have no
right, as you have done for too long a time, to give over your
judgment to another group of people. You have no right to
withdraw yourselves as a class apart. The man who comes
here, the woman who comes here, the race which comes
here and which is not satisfied to be American, ought better
never to have come.
This duty included “the duty of taking an active part in the public affairs of
the country, the duty of helping to create a public sentiment by which the
433
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country is going to be swayed, the duty of examining every question.”437
Irish-Americans like Cohalan were prepared to lead that fight, especially
against the Anglo-American establishment. “Do you realize, those of you
who are of German extraction,” the Reverend Patrick Mythen asked the
audience,
that if we who are of Irish extraction and you will come
together in this land […] – as we have the right to do, we are
the majority here, and we act as the majority should act –
that we would mighty quickly banish into the mists when it
came this phantom of Anglo-Saxonism? […] And this, my
friends, shall be our work, and this shall be our endeavor,
that we Americans shall decide what it means to be 100 per
cent Americans. We shall decide that […]. We are
Americans.
The crowd responded with enthusiastic applause and “three cheers for the
Irish Republic.” 438
But immediately after Mythen had finished his speech, von Mach, who
acted as a moderator, quickly reminded the audience that it should not
forget that “a few unfaithful American citizens of Anglo-Saxon blood do not
give us the right to overlook the splendid qualities of the broad-minded
and open-hearted members of that race.” 439 Von Mach was far less
interested in building a German-Irish front: he, like his fellow organizers,
wanted that German culture and achievements would be accepted by the
Anglo-Saxon elites who ran the country and that these elites invited
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German Americans into their midst. His vision of the “white ethnic,” after
all, included all white people, however broadly defined.
Many listeners must have agreed. There had always been a sense of
disappointment, of hurt feelings in the complaints about the injustice done
to German immigrants during World War I, about the apparent indifference
and disregard that the American public showed towards the achievements
of its German “element.” When critics again attacked the activists as
peons of the German government and the meeting as “organized chiefly
for the purpose of creating discord and ill-feeling between the people of
this country and the people of France,”440 many German Americans were
surely reminded of World War I. Yet, there was also hope for redemption.
In the days after the meeting the German American press celebrated the
“voice of the people” [Des Volkes Stimme] and reiterated the argument
that the attendees had not simply followed the call of German propaganda,
but that they had aimed to awaken the “national conscience”
[Volksgewissen] of the entire United States and to protest the “crime”
against the German nation, which “constitutes a crime against the entire
civilization.”441
Nonethless, in the weeks after the meeting support dissipated in the
face of criticism mounted by the media, the American public and from
public
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in

Philadelphia).442 With memories of fifth column activities during World War
I still fresh, many Americans felt the protests against the “Black Horror”
were based on German propaganda and consecrated the service and
sacrifices of American soldiers during the Great War. In mid-March, an
event organized by the veteran’s organization American Legion drew
about as many as 15,000 supporters to Madison Square Garden in a
demonstration of patriotism. “Loyalty is demanded to America and to
America alone; and he who seeks under the protection of the American
flag to make this country a brew house of sedition and revolution and
probable war is endangering the peace and welfare of the nation that
protects and defends him,” said Senator Frank Willis of Ohio at the event.
“He whose chief interest is in a foreign land is not a whole-hearted
American.”443 The event showed that Americanism was a powerful force in
the 1920s and those who wanted to remain invested in old world culture
and traditions were well served to do so privately.
Over the next several years the issue occasionally resurfaced. For
example, during a November 1922 visit of the former French Prime
Minister Georges Clemenceau, senators Robert L. Owen (Oklahoma) and
Gilbert M. Hitchcock of Nebraska renewed the charges, arguing, as the
New-York Tribune reported, that the sole purpose of the black troops on
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German territory was “to exasperate Germany into resistance in order that
France might have an excuse for dismemberment of Germany.”444 But the
German American press largely stayed away from the matter and adopted
a markedly subdued tone. The Tageblatt, for example, always made sure
to distinguish between the French government and the French people, or
in other words, protest a policy but not an entire nation. Internal divisions
among German Americans took over once more and the Tageblatt
attempted to divest itself from any bourgeois influence – especially after
Social Democrats and Communists came under increasing attack in
Germany and conservative German Americans like Viereck and von Mach,
“the German Philistine elements of America [deutschspießerischen
Elementen Amerikas],“ threw their support behind the reactionary and
undemocratic elements in the homeland.445 Moreover, women – as I will
discuss in more detail in Chapter 5 – had become a driving force in
German American life during the 1920s and felt misrepresented by a
discourse that saw them merely as victims.
5. Conclusion and Outlook
If silence had helped German Americans walk the fine line between
loyalty and disloyalty during the First World War I, they had erred in their
belief that challenges to their cultural citizenship, to their rights to speak
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and argue, had been temporary. World War I changed the relationship
between the American state and its citizens, and profoundly so. A “culture
obligation” had evolved that was directed in particular against ethnic
particularism and political radicalism and that was enforced by both the
state and the public through a blend of state coercion and civic
voluntarism. 446 The German American campaign to resist the culture of
conformity and obligation447 by stressing white ethnic pluralism set back
attempts at reconciliation, since many Americans saw in their activism a
continuation of World War I disloyalty. Especially among more
conservative Americans, who strongly identified with the Allied cause, few
bought into the “rotten black troop propaganda”
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and leading

publications like the New York Times, the Nation and New Republic
distanced themselves quickly from the movement.449 Yet, even though the
erosion of socio-political connections to the homeland was unstoppable,
many migrants – and this was certainly true for German Americans –
would earn their rights as “Caucasians.” This chapter has attempted to
show that the white ethnic – a coalition that transcended ethnic and
446
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religious boundaries – was molded in part in racial discourses like the one
discussed here.
In the years to come the migration of African-Americans increasingly
took center stage in the struggles over public space and belonging in the
American city. Whiteness became “a monolith of privilege” and the “racial
differences within the white community lost their salience, as they lost their
reference to important power arrangements of the day.” 450 It was no
coincidence that Lothrop Stoddard, who had so viciously demanded
immigration reform in his 1920 book The Rising Tide of Color against
White World Supremacy refined his argument only seven years later in
Reforging America: “[M]ost of the immigrant stocks are racially not too
remote for ultimate assimilation.” Stoddard was talking specifically about
European immigrants. On the other hand, Chinese, Japanese, Mexicans
and particularly African-Americans, he concluded, would remain unable to
become full members of the body politic: “Here,” he wrote, “ethnic
differences are so great that ‘assimilation’ in the racial sense is
impossible.”451
The 1924 Immigration Act further reduced the immigrant threat and
signified a critical step towards a monolithic acceptance of whiteness as
the norm for Americanness. Ethnic differences became less significant,
and the notion of the Caucasian “brought the full authority of modern
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science to bear on white identity, and it did so in a way that challenged the
scheme of hierarchically ordered white races […]. The idea of a
‘Caucasian

race’

represents

whiteness

ratcheted

up

to

a

new

epistemological realm of certainty.” 452 If there had been “white races”
before, now there was simply a “white race.”453 At the same time, however,
the Immigration Act signaled a critical point of departure, in which German
and American understandings of race and belonging drifted apart.
Whereas Americans would soon no longer consider race and nationality
as equal, discourse in Germany steered more and more towards that
conclusion. Whereas race came to signify skin color in America, it signified
nationality in Germany. And in Germany, a different skin color was
tantamount to being alien.454
For German migrants it was not always easy to navigate both worlds.
When hundreds wrote to the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland
more than a decade later, many of the tensions between race and
nationalism were still unresolved. Writers commented on the “hodgepodge
nation” [Misch Masch Nation] USA and wondered about the implications of
miscegenation that were hard to overlook, especially in America’s cities:
“All nations are here, from all over the world. And all of them are
intermarried. How many half-blacks [Halbschwarze] are running around
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here, with veritable jew-faces [Judengesichter].”455 As for other European
immigrants, Fritz Strecker of Staten Island believed that Italian politicians
like New York mayor La Guardia would remain the exception, since
“Southern Humanity” belonged to the Southern hemisphere of the
Americas. “North America will remain, if God permits, Nordic, Saxon! Well,
let’s say Germanic; the Anglo-Saxons are a part of it, Scandinavians and
Dutch, too.” 456 And F.J. Ehrhardt considered moving from the Bronx to
Minnesota, the Dakotas or Montana, “because the temptation of getting
involved with a Jewish girl [Judenmädchen] or worse a Negress (Mulatto)
is especially big in this part of town. But so far I have been mindful of my
German blood and will continue to do so.”457 All of them participated in
discourses defining the intersection of race and nation in the United States
– and they did so through a transnational perspective that is essential to
understanding the history of American society in the twentieth century.
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[Fig. 1:] Front page of a pamphlet distributed by the Deutsche
Studentenschaft (DSt). Date: Presumably in the Spring of 1919. (See Fig. 2 for
detailed view of image; source: Horner Library, German Soc. of Pennsylvania)
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[Fig. 2:] Detailed view of image on front page. The image shows two French
African soldiers guarding the ruins of a medieval castle, presumably on the
Rhine. (Source: Horner Library, German Soc. of Pennsylvania)
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[Fig. 3:] Undated pamphlet, approximately between 1919 and 1921 (Source:
Horner Library, German Soc. of Pennsylvania)
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[Fig. 4:] “Auf zum Protest!” From the New York Staatszeitung, February 20,
1921, page 1.
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Chapter 4: “Deutsche Arbeit,” the American Way – Transnational
Negotiations of Social Belonging in German America

1. Introduction
In the New York Staatszeitung on May 4, 1920 an anonymous writer
using the alias Alpendorn summarized his thoughts on the present state of
German America in a letter entitled “Regarding the Chapter: Unity.” The
author stressed the importance of the historical lesson learned during
World War I and the new “trust” and “love” many migrants had discovered
for their native Germany. “It is possible that the war evoked an invigorating
homesickness among the Germans,” wrote Alpendorn. Before the war, the
author argued, German Americans were dismayed by the arrogance and
self-righteousness of upper-class elites who policed immigrant behavior in
ethnic organizations. Alpendorn, for example, recalled being rebuked by
an “older German woman, belonging to the better class and well
educated” for the use of a German word in an English conversation. In the
German clubs, Alpendorn had observed, “the Germans are more proAmerican than the natives themselves. Discord and sarcasm ruled. […] A
new member was treated so arrogantly that he quickly wished for its
exclusion.” But during the war, German Americans had learned their
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lessons: “The war had its good side after all. It showed the stubborn
Germans that they have to be unified once more.”458
This chapter explores the role of social and political boundaries in
German America between World War I and World War II. I argue that the
persistent investment of many immigrants in competing ideas of
Germanness at home contributed to the ways in which they viewed and
responded to the interwar experience in the United States – nativism, antiimmigration legislation, the Great Depression and the rise of the Third
Reich. As I discussed in Chapter 3, there had always been a social bias in
middle-class accusations of assimilation and decline, which were directed
– to a large degree – against less affluent members of the migrant
community. Like Alpendorn, many of these “yankeeified” Germans were
repelled by the condescension directed against them by wealthier and
more educated representatives and they rejected the argument that they
were any less “German.” On the other hand, they often utilized the social,
racial, and cultural undertones of Germanness, as propagated by the
middle-class, to improve their own situation in the United States.
To explore that ambiguity through a transnational lens, I use the trope
of Deutsche Arbeit – “German Work” – as an instructive example. Dating
back to the nineteenth century, the idea that there was something unique
458
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and exceptional about the German work ethic was an important
component in the larger development of German nationalism – and it was
an integrative element in the migratory experience to the United States. In
fact, many German migrants of all social backgrounds relied on their
heritage and on the reputation of Deutsche Arbeit abroad, to master the
challenges of life they encountered there. At the same time, many
working-class migrants rejected the idea that the middle-class had a
peculiar role to play in the preservation of these qualities. This ambiguity
resurfaced in many of the letters written to Volksbund für das Deutschtum
im Ausland (VDA), which had presented migrants with a new vision of
work that leveled social boundaries and promised an alternative vision to
the alienating experience of American capitalism. Rather than simply
buying into this ideology, however, respondents attempted to reconcile
their attraction to and at times admiration for the achievements of the
Third Reich with past experiences and present realities. Moreover, rather
than simply accepting the notion that as German workers they had a duty
to the Third Reich, they incorporated the ideals of Deutsche Arbeit into
their sense of belonging to the “American Way.”
After discussing the origins of Deutsche Arbeit in the middle-class
imaginations of German national identity during the second half of the
nineteenth century, I examine how the idea sustained a persistent strategy
to idealize Germans in the United States. Next, I point to some instances
that exemplify how transnational negotiations of ethnic identity shaped the
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history of German America between the two World Wars, followed by a
discussion of such negotiations in the letters the VDA.

2. Imagining Germanness: Deutsche Arbeit Before World War I
2.1. Class and the Origins of Deutsche Arbeit
During the nineteenth century, millions of individuals and families left
their rural villages in Central Europe to find stable jobs and new
opportunities in growing industrial centers or overseas. 459 Those that
ended up in German cities soon learned that industrial life could not keep
many of its promises. Being a wage earner had its advantages, especially
during periods of economic prosperity, when industrial labor provided
consistent occupation with competitive wages. However, at least until midcentury many laborers – men, women, and children – were forced to work
14 to 17 hours a day, six days a week with no insurance against
unemployment or sickness. Their livelihoods were threatened by illnesses,
accidents, and – worse – economic downturns, which resulted in reduced
hours (and thus wages) or mass layoffs. With little money to spare,
workers were forced to live in overcrowded neighborhoods that could
hardly manage the overbearing rush of new arrivals and lacked clean
water or any medical infrastructure.460
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With opportunities for individual advancement almost non-existent,
urban workers were permanently caught in a vicious cycle of hope and
desperation. For the factory owners, they were little more than replaceable
parts of a machine aiming to produce profit, and until 1867 they had no
voice in the political process. Sharing that experience with countless
others, however, the “proletariat” began to develop a social consciousness,
one formed by the hierarchies and injustices of the factories where they
worked and the cities where they lived. After early successes of workingclass activism were revoked following the Revolution of 1848 and 1849,
the labor movement resurfaced with full force during the early 1860s.
Workers’ goals included not only improvements of working conditions
(such as reduced hours and better pay) but also their recognition as equal
members of the polity.461 However, German states (and after 1871: the
German Empire) greeted such ideas with hostility and force. State police
and military often violently disbanded meetings and demonstrations;
workers retained only a tangential role in the political process.
Consequently, an increasing number of industrial workers from German
cities joined the flow of migrants across the Atlantic, believing that the
United States offered better opportunities and greater political freedoms.
By the 1870s, industrial workers replaced artisans and skilled craftsmen
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as the largest social group among German-speaking immigrants to the
United States.462
At

the

same

time,

middle-class

German

intellectuals

began

investigating possible solutions to what they termed “the social question.”
Some like Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels realized that the exploitation of
workers was part of the fundamental logic of capitalism and envisioned a
proletarian society, which worked not for profit but for the common good.
To overcome the alienation of the industrial process, the proletariat was to
experience individualism through social community.463 Incidentally, many
radical nationalists like the journalist Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl found similar
answers to the same questions. Riehl initially dreamt of a classless
community as well, though not one of the workers, but of the people, the
Volk. He, too, abhorred the mere profit-oriented approach of capitalism
and emphasized that workers should joyfully toil for the German nation.
Ultimately, however, there was no room for the collectivist ideas of Marx
and Engels in the nationalist approach. Riehl wanted to dissolve the
international proletariat and answer the “social question” by providing a
“national” counter-narrative. He aimed to define “German” in opposition to
and as a protection against the influences of a globalizing world and was
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convinced “that Germans possessed a special, and indeed superior,
approach to work, one centered on the idea that work is its own best
reward, and is alone capable of giving meaning to human existence.”464
By making workers aware of these rewards and their duty to perform for
the fatherland, Riehl and other nationalists later who adopted his
arguments hoped to solve the problem of proletarian alienation through a
sense of fulfillment and joy in work. In his book Deutsche Arbeit, published
in 1861, Riehl valorized the supposedly unique work ethic embedded in
German society and the qualitative superiority of German labor and
industrial production. To him, the idea that there was something unique
and traditional about the ways in which Germans performed their daily
tasks, whether on the field or in the factories, provided historical continuity
in a time of uprooting social transformations.465
For themselves, Riehl and other members of the educated middle
class – educators, academics and artists – envisioned a mediating
position between labor on the one side and industrialists as well as the
government on the other. Their role was to be in the education of the
people by “teaching” workers and peasants about the values and morals
of the German work ethic. Consequently, their narrative proscribed
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traditional middle-class values, such as frugality, cleanliness, timeliness
and hard work as the norm to be imitated by the Volk. “Correct table
manners, sartorial codes, the emphasis placed on cleanliness and
hygiene, the importance attached to timetables, whether in the school, on
the railway or at mealtimes,” writes David Blackbourn, “all are instances of
the way in which bourgeois values informed everyday life.” Bourgeois
writers also stressed stability and restraint, rejected social mobility and
polemically criticized the pursuit of “Mammon” (to be found especially in
the United States).466
The ideal of Deutsche Arbeit was propagated in advertisements and
pamphlets as part of a national discourse, defining what it meant to be
“German” both at home and in the world. It was part of a grand narrative
that attempted to establish the unique qualities of the German nation – a
nation that was not yet an empire like France; a nation with no grand
history of global trade and maritime hegemony like Great Britain; a nation,
furthermore, that lacked a frontier like the United States. “In the global
context of the beginning of the twentieth century,” writes Sebastian
Conrad, “the notion of ‘German work’ can be understood as a typical
latecomer discourse, a form of protest against the underprivileged role
Germany appeared to play in the international arena.”467 Simultaneously,
466
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Deutsche Arbeit became a symbolic justification for Germany’s desire to
assert itself among the likes of Great Britain, France, and the United
States. “It was a foundational term, suggesting that Germany’s position in
the world was the product of her own efforts and achievements.”468
Although initially expressing admiration for folk culture, nationalists like
Wilhelm Riehl increasingly dismissed peasants and workers, finding the
greatest value in the work ethic and culture of the Protestant urban
middle-class. The more the division of labor became the norm, and the
louder the working-class protested against its exploitation, the further the
intellectual middle-class drifted into an antagonistic relationship with
workers and closed ranks with industrialists and government aristocrats.469
The theologian Heinrich Lhotsky became well-known for his popular
diatribes against workers. The historian Joan Campbell writes that
according to Lhotsky the bourgeoisie retained “what the proletarian had
lost, namely belief in the German idea of work.” If the German Empire was
to rise up among the echelon of empires, Lhotsky insisted, “the masses
must once more be taught that work is at the heart of a meaningful
existence, because it alone enables people to experience, and therefore
comprehend, the world, their fellows, truth, God.”470 Not surprisingly, such
chauvinism and arrogance contributed to the social and political
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fragmentation of the German nation. Between the 1880s and World War I,
a permanent divide opened up between the middle-class and the people
whom they purported to represent: the working class.
2.2. Deutsche Arbeit, Migrants and the United States
While predominately used to explain the German experience at home,
the concept of Deutsche Arbeit was also employed to analyze
manifestations of industrialization elsewhere – especially in the United
States. For many Germans, the burgeoning power across the Atlantic
Ocean was the epitome of modern capitalism and perceptions of
American industrial life greatly impacted the ways in which they thought
about work (and themselves) well into the twentieth century. “America,”
writes Philipp Gassert, “was considered the Mecca of the rationalization
movement and was seen as the exact opposite of a traditional agrarian,
static, and hierarchically organized society. The terms Americanism and
modernism were therefore used almost synonymously.”471 For some, the
United States thus became a model, a prototype to be emulated in order
to overcome the constraints posed by a traditional society like Germany,
which was organized precisely around such hierarchical social structures.
But for others – including the proponents of Deutsche Arbeit, who profited
from those very hierarchies – the United States was a nightmare, one
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which threatened the status quo and the stasis they preferred. 472 The
soulless nature of American capitalism, they argued, was demonstrated by
the superficial pursuit of profits and consumer goods, of individualism and
self-interest. American capitalism stood as the antithesis of Deutsche
Arbeit, which emphasized community and culture, not individualism and
profit, even while upholding inequality, social hierarchies and privilege of
the few.
Migrants were crucial to German views of the United States. They
wrote letters and frequently returned home to talk about their experiences
in Amerika. But the ideology of Deutsche Arbeit also shaped the ways in
which they interpreted their experiences. Workers, for example, who may
have rejected the bourgeois culture at home, often internalized what it
meant to be “German” abroad – ideas about their superior skills, about
their work ethic and workmanship. Already profiting from their “whiteness”
473

in the United States, they additionally drew on such qualities

propagated as German since their employers – many of them of German
heritage themselves – preferred workers with the “correct” heritage. At a
time when character was equated with race and nationality, the ideal of
Deutsche Arbeit thus became a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts: In the
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competitive world of industrial America, German workers gained respect
by aspiring to ideals, which ultimately made them stand out. Paul Buhle,
an historian or American radicalism, found that even among German
socialists in the United States, there was a strong sense of national
identity. “Quoting in bold and rebellious style some of the greatest German
writers, emigré [sic] Socialists laid claim to the best of their country’s
national culture as they tried to build a viable tradition in America.” 474
Meanwhile, socialist newspapers “dripped with nostalgia for German
culture.” 475 Moreover, pride for the unity of the German Empire, finally
achieved in 1871, and for its military and economic prowess was rampant
among many Germans, even though they had escaped political
restrictions and military duties of the German Empire and accused the
middle-class of “the most submissive, expiring royalism and veneration of
Bismarck.”476
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Bourgeois immigrants to the United States, on the other hand, often
came to the United States to explore working-class immigrant lives across
the Atlantic. The journalists who published their works in popular
magazines like Die Gartenlaube were especially interested in learning how
migrants fared under the reign of American capitalism and their findings
embodied many of the ambiguities present among Germans about the
United States. Descriptions varied between romanticized representations
of ideal Germans abroad, who diligently cultivated the land and preserved
their heritage, and more pessimistic accounts that noted a general
absence of German culture among these emigrants and worried about
“yankeeification.” 477 Meanwhile, scholars of industrialization like Hugo
Münsterberg (1863-1916) and Max Weber (1864-1920) came to the
United States in order to study the implications of rationalization and
scientific management and find ways to attenuate the alienation that many
workers experienced on a daily basis.478 Often fascinated with the ideas of
innovators like Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford, they wanted to reconcile
the American way of work with the German approach. Münsterberg, who
came to Harvard University in 1892 and stayed until his death in 1916,
attempted to combine the best of both worlds in his approach to applied
psychology, which incorporated scientific management while remaining
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committed to the goal that “mental dissatisfaction in the work, mental
depression and discouragement, may be replaced in our social community
by overflowing joy and perfect inner harmony.”479
This desire to remain true to the ideals of Deutsche Arbeit while
simultaneously embracing the American way was a defining element of
the German migrant experience in the United States. As I have discussed
in Chapter 1, the turn-of-the-century chroniclers of German American life
set out with the explicit objective to emphasize the peculiar qualities of
German settlers on the frontier (and of German soldiers on the
battlefields). Using the theme of Deutsche Arbeit, German ethnic
nationalists attempted to unite Germans in the United States, while also
partaking in American public discourse as full-fledged members of the
polity: Celebrating the extraordinary qualities of German settlers was in
line with German nationalist thinking, compatible with the American logic
of capitalism, and it homogenized a diverse group of migrants according to
a set of norms that could be proscribed and regulated by the German
middle class – by them. By merging German bourgeois values with wellknown characteristics of American ideal types – the frontier, or self-made
man; the soldier; etc. – the ethnic nationalists who came together in the
National German American Alliance wanted to create a valid hyphenated
479
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identity that would allow them to celebrate the culture they loved while
earning the cultural capital to participate in the American public sphere.
But the world they described never mirrored the reality of German
American life. Despite their joint interest in Deutsche Arbeit, an “intimate
alliance” between workers and the middle-class never developed. 480 To
the

dismay

of

the

German

middle-class,

German

working-class

immigrants immediately gained a reputation for political radicalism as
many of them participated in the conflicts between industrialists and the
working class. Most infamously, a group of German anarchists was
accused of (and eventually executed for) the bombing on Chicago’s
Haymarket Square on May 4, 1886. 481 The “Haymarket Affair,” as it
became known, significantly impacted American public opinion of German
immigrants – and it prompted almost immediate responses by worried
German American leaders, who had already been concerned about the
status of the “German element” in the United States. “Especially now,
when a few German socialists and anarchists violate the laws of the
country,” wrote the German-language newspaper Der Long Islander in
1886, it was “important to show the nativists, already encouraged to new
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activity by such acts of a minority, that the German immigrant has always
provided his patriotism, nay, often has surpassed the native in love of his
adopted country.”482
The disconnect between reality and imagination manifested itself in a
persistent, underlying mistrust of the lower classes, which, German
American leaders argued, stained the image of the entire community. In
fact, the literature produced by members of the NGAA or German
American Historical Society483 abounded with cultural chauvinism, which
was frequently directed against the very readers it was trying to motivate
and unify: German Americans. For example, the Lutheran pastor Georg
von Bosse complained about Americanized descriptions of German
culture such “Sour Crout Kitchen,” which apparently spoiled his enjoyment
of the food. Von Bosse thus concluded that “German-Americans cared
little about the glories of German culture, [and] that socialists among them
had abandoned the God of their fathers along with the Reich and
Kaiser.”484 His remarks epitomize the fundamental and persistent inability
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of wealthy middle-class observers to relate to the everyday exigencies of
lower-class immigrants, of those trying to make a living by marketing “Sour
Crout” – or any other product – to an American audience. Selling a
traditional product an Ocean away from Germany preserved communal
ties to the homeland in a way that was equally effective – if not more so –
than the publication of academic literature about the qualities of mythical
frontiersmen. Selling “Sour Crout,” in other words, was the reality of
Deutsche Arbeit – not a myth imagined by the middle-class.485
Such divisions defined the history of German America and were an
important reason for the continuous disunity among German immigrants in
the United States before World War I. The “conflicting material interests,
which divide German culture into various camps of battling interest groups,
make themselves apparent in all areas,” an article in the Chicago Vorbote
summed up a raging debate about the future of German America during
the 1890s. It continued:
The fragmentation of German culture can only be prevented
by drawing those interests into the foreground which would
offset the social and economic class conflicts within German
culture. But since a stunt like this is impossible in modern
society, we will have no other choice but to let matters run
On Goebel, see Retterath, Deutschamerikanertum und Volkstumsgedanke, 406.
Goebel’s review appeared in Americana Germanica, I (1897): 102.
485
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their course, until the victory of socialism makes possible
tomorrow what is impossible today.486
If German culture was to represent the interests of all Germans, it needed
a more accommodating ideology to support it. And that included a more
inclusive vision of Deutsche Arbeit. Those who agreed saw their
opportunity arise once the carnage of World War I had led to the collapse
of the German Empire.
2.3. A New Message: Deutsche Arbeit after World War I
After World War I, the politics of Deutschtum entered a new phase that
redefined Deutsche Arbeit. The collapse of traditional power structures, of
monarchical rule and aristocratic leadership opened up new possibilities
for those who believed that different interests in the nation needed to find
common ground to solve current problems and rehabilitate Germany in the
eyes of the world. But amidst recurring crises, the new Weimar
government struggled to gain legitimacy. Critics from the left and right
viciously attacked its inability to put people back to work and restore
economic wellbeing. In this context, the meaning of work was once more
widely discussed. Conservative defenders of social order appropriated the
terminology and emphasized “German” character of labor to undermine,
for example, the transnational socialist movement. At the same time,
nonpartisan organizations like the Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland
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(VDA) used the discourse of work to present a vision of national
community that transcended all social boundaries – a Volksgemeinschaft,
united in work. It was this vision, among others, that provided a common
ideological foundation for a divided country and eased the transition into
the successor regime of the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich.487
The movement to refocus German nationalism on the wellbeing of the
people, the Volk, was led in no small part by a new generation of activists,
whose voices had carried less weight prior to the war. Traumatized by the
experience of World War I and its aftermath, this new generation was
much more devoted to reconciling the social differences, which had thus
far prevented a popular appeal for the movement. 488 The VDA, for
example, owed its success during the 1920s and 1930s in part to a group
of writers and journalists like Hans-Christoph Kaergel (1889-1946),
Herrmann Ullmann (1884-1858), and Max Hildebert Böhm (1891-1968).
All hailing from modest backgrounds, they challenged the existing
structures of the organization, which had always been led by aristocrats
and upper-class intellectuals. During the early 1920s, Ullmann, Böhm and
others successfully asserted a more pluralistic agenda, whose principal
aim was non-political, cultural assistance of all Germans – including those
living in areas outside of immediate political interest. 489 The VDA’s
487
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message refocused on the utopia of the Volksgemeinschaft, a classless
society without party divisions, in which every member worked for the
common good. Crucially, this community transcended national boundaries
and was independent of citizenship – even beyond Europe. However, like
many of their older compatriots, Ullmann and Böhm found democracy
inimical to the development of the Volksgemeinschaft and were hostile to
some basic principles of capitalism, such as individualism and even
private property.490
Under the influence of these new voices, the VDA reached out with
particular zeal for workers at home and abroad. For example, in its 1922
yearbook the VDA published a “Letter to a Worker” [Brief an einen
Arbeiter], which attempted to reconcile old divisions between conservative
elites and the working class, because “it is, to speak in your [the workers’]
language, not customary for a worker to sit down at a table with professors
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and businessmen.”491 Appealing to national solidarity the VDA called on
German workers to overcome their own social prejudices and inhibitions in
favor of national community, stressing neither civic nor social but ethnic
belonging. In light of what the writers perceived to be continuing attacks
on German language, culture, and economy, the article argued, it was
“simply very necessary that you and your brothers put as much value on
your German nature as other people put on theirs and that you, just like
others, are not merely conscious comrades of class [Klassengenossen],
but also comrades of people [Volksgenossen], that is Germans.”492
This vision of a new community of people was in many ways an
alternative model to American capitalism. Germans continued to feel
ambiguous towards the United States, at once admiring the efficiency of
American industry and fretting about labor conditions and alienation in
American factories. 493 Some, like Herrmann Ullmann, also feared that
Germany was threatened by “American world capitalism” and argued that
“Dollar imperialism” endangered German national sovereignty. The most
vicious criticism, however, was leveled against the impending invasion of
American culture, which would destroy German Kultur.
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strongly in the constitutive role of culture in the process of protecting and
preserving Deutschtum, these activists were concerned about the
excitement among German consumers for American music, dance, film
and many other cultural phenomena imported from the United States.
Many of them took it upon themselves to explore the situation in the
United States first-hand. These trips often helped manifest the idea that
the corrupted democracy of the United States and its “hodgepodge” of
peoples was no model for Germany’s own future. In the countless books
and articles495 produced from these trips, writers claimed a fundamental
dichotomy between Germany and the United States: American capitalism
was like a machine that bred materialism, artificiality, largesse and greed,
while the German counter-model cultivated organic simplicity, idealism,
and spirit. If the United States promised civilization, Germany promised
Kultur.496
For many, the key difference between both models was the work ethic.
Joan Campbell has shown that a demand for quality in production and
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community (as opposed to individualism and quantity) were common
elements among otherwise disparate political movements during the
Weimar Republic. Influenced by the harrowing experience of mechanized
warfare and indiscriminate killing during the war, almost all utopian
movements in post-war Germany shared a vision of communal “joy in
work” as a solution to the nation’s economic and political woes. The idea
was appealing to a generation of young Germans, who embraced the idea
that work could level social boundaries and bring about the “reconciliation
of intellectual with manual labor” – that is, of bourgeoisie and proletariat.497
The popularity of the idea that a German work ethic could provide a
common ground may help explain the immediate appeal of the National
Socialist idea of the Volksgemeinschaft, which was conceived around the
dogma of national salvation through work. The global economic crisis that
had its origin on New York’s Wall Street in 1929 hit Germany hard, but
affected especially white and blue collar workers: Entire factories were
closed, unemployment was rampant, and poverty raged across the
country. Even worse were the psychological consequences of long-term
unemployment and exclusion from the production process, which left
many workers hopeless for a better future. 498 For many, the crisis
solidified the idea that democracy led to chaos and that capitalism led to
ruin. It opened the doors to the ideological arguments of the political fringe
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on both left and right, which proposed increasingly extreme remedies for
the chaos. Most successfully, of course, the National Socialists catered to
the prevailing anti-Capitalist atmosphere and “espoused a ‘German
socialism’ designed to restore joy in work and to reintegrate the workers
into the body of the nation. A class-free Volksgemeinschaft would save the
nation thanks to an altruistic work ethic.”499 The model of communal work
promoted by the Nazis was at times diametrically opposed to American
capitalism – for example in its endorsement of the common good rather
than individual success – but also showed some intriguing similarities with
rationalized modes of industrial labor, which hailed efficiency and made
status contingent upon performance.500
For the writers of the Heimatbriefe, who reached out to a global
audience in late 1934, Deutsche Arbeit “explained” the success of the
“New Germany.” The Nazis, they argued, had leveled social hierarchies,
resurrected the failing German industrial landscape and brought prosperity
to its people. Especially in its initial phase, between 1934 and 1936,
rhetoric describing the special qualities of German labor pervaded the
magazine, which frequently displayed images of bustling cities and towns
with smoking chimneys and praised “German honesty, […] German

499

Campbell, Joy in Work, 276 and 312.
Campbell, Joy in Work, 312. It should be noted that National Socialist ideology
was consistently incoherent. After the Nazis had swept into power “the Nazi
ideology of work revealed its internal contradictions.” (Campbell, Joy in Work,
313)

500

212

industry [Fleiß], German cleanliness and German self-respect.” 501 One
editorial mirrored an interior monologue of a German worker and thus
connected individual labor – intellectual or physical – to the collective work
of the nation: “I am serving the community, - my work, my ploughing and
building and saving, as well as all my recreation, my reading and
wandering, all that does not only serve my self, but constitutes work in the
chain of generations that stretch from the eternal past into the eternal
future – [it] is service to the Volk.”502 The National Socialists, so the letter’s
implicit argument, had erased boundaries instead of dividing society into
social categories. It had reconciled intellectual with manual labor –
everyone now was a worker and everyone contributed equally to the
success of the nation, “all of us equally as workers, as workers of the
monumental construction, planned and handed to us for execution by
providence: Germany.”503
This was a twentieth century version of Deutsche Arbeit, one that
included peasants, workers, and emigrants. Instead of lambasting
emigrants, the VDA showed a great deal of understanding for those who
had left the country before and after World War I. Migrants had left, one
editorial argued, at a time when
not the products of our workmanship [“Wertarbeit”] left but
the German workers [“Arbeitsmenschen”] themselves and
501
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that is why you have the deepest understanding for the
entire German fate. That is why you are called upon to do
your part for the construction of the new Germany, which no
longer allows the unconscionable waste of its people’s
power [Volkskraft] and includes all of you.504
This inclusive vision was expressed in a very appealing way: Editorials in
the Heimatbriefe were written in the form of letters forging a personal
connection with readers by using the informal Du as opposed to the formal
Sie and by explicitly soliciting responses featured prominently in
subsequent issues. The Heimatbriefe were, as one editorial argued, more
than just a magazine but “a private letter between comrades, worthy of
your personal response.” 505 Rather than pressing an openly partisan
agenda, the VDA purported to be apolitical, emphasizing emotional
representations

of

the

homeland

and

imagery

of

industry

and

improvement.506
The message of reconciliation and inclusion appealed to many,
particularly in the United States. In 1934, many German Americans were
still traumatized by the impact of the great depression. For example,
Richard Stelzmann, one of the thousands of German migrants who wrote
back to the VDA, only sarcastically referred to the United States as “the
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land where milk and honey flow”.507 While he observed that industry had
recovered from the Great Depression by and large and that the number of
“sitdown-strikes” had decreased, he noted a “real American tragedy.
There are still Millions unemployed.” Having emigrated to the United
States in 1906, he had seen more than two decades of almost
uninterrupted economic growth. Now, however, the impact of a corrupt
political culture became clear: “But that’s how it goes in a country ruled by
unscrupulous politicians.” 508 Similarly, Helene Bemmann of Pikesville,
Maryland described a country “rich in products but poor in heart and soul”.
She and her husband Fritz had immigrated to the United States in 1923,
but were still yearning for “our beloved Heimat.”509
Indeed, many immigrants, who had hoped for a better future in the
United States, were disillusioned by the economic impact of the Great
Depression on the land of “milk and honey” – for them the American
Dream had collapsed. “The magic that surrounded America in the years
1919-1929 is gone,” wrote Felix Altenkirch, who worked in a mill in Union,
South Carolina.510 “Along with the economic crisis, many – erroneous –
ideas have disappeared from the minds of the people in this land. […]
Nowadays is the best time to make many Germans at least conscious of
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their peoplehood [Volkstum].”511 This was especially true for those, whose
lives had been impacted by the Great Depression. Among them was
Albert Helmer of New York City, who wrote of his constant search for work.
Although he had just recently landed a job, he could not feel at home in
the United States. “Even though I am a U.S. citizen I cling to the dear, old
Heimat with every fiber of my true German heart, and especially here in
New York, where one only hears and reads in the newspapers bad things
about the New Germany.”512
The Heimatbriefe sent a somewhat subdued political message
throughout the first years – as did the early foreign policy of the Third
Reich, which pursued a public campaign for peaceful reunification
throughout the 1930s and attempted to convince in particular the United
States that Germany’s demands were justified and legitimate.
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to attracting the working-class, for example, the February 1936
Heimatbriefe, enthusiastically called the “world issue,” argued that the
number of emigrants under Hitler had decreased to 9600 and proclaimed:
“The Germany of Adolf Hitler is capable of captivating514 especially those
[farmers and workers], many of which did ‘not know a fatherland named
Germany’ in the past.”
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After the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle had

subsumed the VDA in 1937516, the message did become more aggressive,
shifting from a focus on the Volk as the foundation of Nazi ideology to a
focus on Hitler as the supreme leader. For example, the spring issue of
1938 was devoted to showcase the improvements made under the new
leadership and stressed how “not only the people of the Third Reich but
also their deeds are concentrated on one goal, to serve the will of the
Führer.”517
In order to contextualize the responses of those who actually explained
themselves and their situations to the VDA in the 1930s, a closer look at
the social relations in the United States in the interwar era is necessary.
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3. Class and German America During the Interwar Era
3.1. The “Social Question” in the United States
As much as German migrants retained a connection to the homeland
and continued to stay invested in its political transformations, they still
lived in the United States and dealt with challenges to the social order very
similar to those experienced in Germany. Social coexistence within the
capitalist economy was a primary concern in public debates across the
United States immediately after World War I. During the war, there had
been protests by workers, socialists, women, and many other groups
demanding equal political rights, but it was the 1917 Revolution in Russia,
which alerted many Americans. “Lenin’s Bolsheviks were radical
opponents of capitalism, offering the downtrodden communism […] as a
far more equitable and just social system than the private-property system
prevailing in the United States and other capitalist citadels.”518 Although
American radicals never reached the numbers and influence necessary to
pose an actual threat to the status quo, they were strong enough to instill
a sense of urgency among American elites – both in corporate
headquarters and the White House. Industrialists and politicians shared a
growing sense that the government needed to step in and ensure the
long-term stability of American, even global capitalism. President
Woodrow Wilson, for instance, was greatly worried about the impact of
Communism and his internationalist vision for a more equitable global
518
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order after World War I – manifested in his support for the League of
Nations and national self-determination – aimed to undermine its
appeal.519
In

the

United

States,

countless

domestic

initiatives

targeted

Communism and other transnational anti-capitalist movements. During
and after the war, corporations and patriotic associations launched
Americanization campaigns, while the government-sponsored Committee
on Public Information utilized a variety of visual tools – films, advertising,
posters, and even cartoons – for propaganda against political dissent.520
Immigrants bore the brunt of these attacks. Working predominantly in
industrial jobs, in mines and factories, they were most visible to a national
audience during strikes and “in the minds of many Americans the fear of
communism commingled with the fear of the new immigrant.” 521 The
strong racial component contained in this fear (see Chapter 5) had
beneficial consequences for many German Americans, who had suffered
from nativist attacks and some government persecution during the war.
Indeed, by the 1920s the focus had shifted away from the “German
element” towards those hailing from Southern and Eastern Europe – areas
of the world many Americans believed to be the cradles of radical thought.
However, many of the new legislative innovations aimed to protect social
519
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order in the United States had consequences for German Americans as
well: Prohibition, which robbed many workers of their favorite pastime and
destroyed public spaces for the congregation of the working-class like
bars and breweries (not to speak of the economic livelihood of many
immigrants); the Espionage and Sedition Acts that legalized the immediate
deportation of troublemakers and undermined free speech; coercive
Americanization campaigns, which made English the required language in
schools; and, of course, a series of immigration laws that culminated in the
infamous 1924 Immigration Act, which introduced a quota system and
closed the door on immigration. German American activists correctly
assumed that the legislation would aversely affect immigration from
Germany and that the lack of new “blood” from the homeland would
undermine their efforts to maintain and preserve a coherent and
numerically strong ethnic community.522
Despite these measures, however, the 1920s were also a period of
national reconciliation. Many of the laws and prohibitions, which targeted
ethnic particularism and political dissent, such as the Espionage and
Sedition Acts and Prohibition, proved ephemeral. And immigration reform,
though staying in place until the 1960s, took European immigrants out of
the line of nativist fire and allowed them to partake in the Americanism
campaigns of the interwar era with a more casual sense of belonging to
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and being a part of “America.” “By limiting the influx of foreigners to
America’s ethnic communities, the 1924 act accelerated the process of
acculturation.”

523

Moreover,

during

the

1920s

three

consecutive

Republican presidencies replaced the progressive ideology that had
dominated the prewar years with a pro-business atmosphere that
withdrew the influence of the government and celebrated the paternalistic
relationship between boss and worker – the image “of the responsible
capitalist protecting his employees’ welfare.”524 In a process not unlike the
parallel discourse on Deutsche Arbeit in Germany, the “mystique of
Americanism,” the idea that in the United States owners and workers were
all devoted to a common cause, provided the ideological foundation of this
political rapprochement between capital and labor as well as between
bourgeoisie and proletariat. “Welfare capitalism” had, as Lizabeth Cohen
acknowledges, some real impact on the ways in which workers felt about
the companies they worked for: “They came to expect benefits along with
the job. And they judged a good company, in contrast to a bad one, by
how close it came to meeting welfare capitalist standards, offering the
steady, well-paying, decent work that workers could reward with their
loyalty.” 525 Many workers, Cohen argues, believed more strongly in
capitalism – American capitalism – and were more willing to admit that it
could serve society well. By the 1930s, proponents of American socialism
523
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– among them many of German heritage – had begun to come to terms
with cultural Americanism and consumer capitalism. “No longer would a
major thrust in American socialism be ‘alienated’ from the American world
(as it appeared to many to be in the 1920s). […] American socialism had
joined Americanism with a vengeance.”526
But Americanism itself had changed, too. Many ideas, which
Americans would have rejected as “socialist” only a few decades before,
had become reality.
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Frank Tannenbaum, a socialist who had

immigrated to the United States from Austria in 1905, found that American
socialism and American capitalism had greatly influenced each other and
that the successes of the former were quite remarkable.
We have socialized things as water, public highways,
education, lighted streets, bridges, medical service for the
sick through public hospitals, dental services for children in
public schools, parks, museums, books through libraries,
and information services of various kinds…To this must be
added sickness insurance, unemployment insurance, care
for the old though old age pensions and for the young
through maternity pensions, factory and mine inspections,
and legal enforcement of protection against dangerous
machinery.528
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At the same time, the working-class never lost sight of persistent
inequalities within the American system: Throughout the 1920s roughly 40
percent of workers remained stuck in poverty. Many could not afford the
consumer goods of the “Roaring Twenties” – the washing machines,
vacuum cleaners, and cars – and they remained crowded in urban
neighborhoods,

where

unemployment,

seasonal

instabilities

and

hopelessness loomed large.529 Consequently, the bonds among workers
from different ethnicities grew in strength along with awareness that only a
multiethnic (even multiracial) front could adequately protect the working
class. This significant change in political orientation among workers, away
from the disparate and often antagonistic ethnic communities of the
prewar era, eventually led to successful collective action during the
1930s. 530 Whereas ethnic particularisms and urban fragmentation had
prohibited unified action before, strong post-war nativism, the immigration
reforms of 1921 and 1924 as well as the global financial crisis after 1929
set in motion a process that resulted in the retreat from European
nationalism among immigrant workers: “The struggle for nationhood had
long provided the focus for ethnic activity. Now, those who wanted to claim
their new European citizenship could return home. When most ethnics

529
530

Gerstle, American Crucible, 125.
Cohen, Making a New Deal, 5-7. Wall, Inventing the ‘American Way,’ 25.

223

realized that they preferred to remain here, new questions about the
meaning of nationality arose.”531
However, the financial crisis of 1929 posed a fundamental challenge to
the ways in which Americans thought about their nation. Many Americans
had been convinced that despite crises and individual failures the nation’s
capitalist progress towards abundance was unstoppable. Especially for
the middle-class, the collapse was not only a financial but also an
ideological disaster. The Great Depression was the first crisis that
permanently disrupted the upward social movement of skilled artisans,
small businessmen, white-collar employees and many others, who had
been thoroughly optimistic about the potential of the American way and
the power of capitalism.532 The financial collapse of 1929 demolished that
belief. “It will be many a long day before Americans of the middle class will
listen with anything approaching the reverence they felt in 1928 whenever
a magnate of business speaks,” wrote the historian Gerald Johnson. “The
whole pantheon of their idols has been demolished. The Big Business
Man, like Samson, has pulled down the pillars of the temple…and he is
pretty well buried under the ruins.”533
3.2. Social divisions in German America
How exactly German Americans navigated the turbulent decade and a
half between the end of World War I and the ascent of Nazism is still
531
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largely unknown. The very few studies of that subject dealt largely with the
educated middle-class.

534

The experiences of wartime persecution,

nativism and anti-immigrant rhetoric produced an indignant response from
German American leaders, who believed they could reunite the entire
migrant community around the common cause of post-war rehabilitation
and political equality. During the 1920 presidential campaign they strongly
supported the Republican presidential candidate Warren G. Harding and
urged all German Americans to vote based not on their social background
but on their national heritage. They persistently denounced the outgoing
Democratic President Woodrow Wilson as a “traitor,” because he had led
the United States into war and had been responsible, at least in part, for
the Versailles Treaty, which had brought so much misery to Germany.535
This argument carried some weight in the early 1920s, when memories of
anti-German campaigns were still fresh. Working-class papers like the
Philadelphia Tageblatt followed suit and accused the Democratic
Candidate James M. Cox of leading the fight against the German
language and culture in the United States. Reprinting an article from the
influential Cincinnati Freie Presse, the Tageblatt echoed a popular
argument among German Americans after the war that “no differences of
class and race can be permitted in this country.”536
534
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Despite such proclamations of equality, even the Tageblatt was
sufficiently enraged by the collective shame brought upon the German
fatherland at Versailles to engage in continuous ethnic confrontation and
the occasional race bating.537 After all, the editors believed, the qualities of
the German worker had thus far driven German industry and had
contributed to the overall grandeur of the Second Reich prior to the war.
One exemplary article, entitled Deutsche Arbeit, discussed the differences
between Polish and German labor through a racial lens, which
incorporated many of the elements prevalent in the rhetoric of German
racial and cultural superiority. The article compared German cultural
achievements to Polish Unkultur, “un-culture,” using the pre-war imagery
of the poet Max Hecht:
There is no bigger difference than the image of the [River]
Vistula on German and Polish soil! Here, it debouches wild
and untamed across the wide plains of Poland, while [in
Germany] one can see the obvious imprint of high cultivation.
The difference between the Polish and the German Vistula is
the same as between a raw son of nature and highly
educated human being.
After the Versailles Treaty had turned over some of these former German
territories to Poland, the article argued paraphrasing Hecht, hundreds of
years of German diligence and labor were destroyed in a process
tantamount to rape.538
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But this was not to say that a German working-class paper like the
Tageblatt, one devoted to ideals of socialism and committed to its cause in
the United States, would simply embrace the ideology promoted by their
bourgeois compatriots. In fact, much of the ostensible “pro-German”
rhetoric employed by the writers was directed against American nativist
vigilantism and anti-radical activism immediately after the war. The
Tageblatt editors simply rejected the argument that every dissenter or
isolationist was “pro-German.”

539

With the much-despised President

Woodrow Wilson out of office, the Tageblatt quickly turned back to its old
foes and resorted to social tirades against the “capitalist class” as well as
the “Ku-Klux-Organization of the steel capital.” Much criticism was also
leveled against the “German-bourgeois elements of America,” whom
editors criticized for their support of industrialists in the United States as
well as the reactionary and undemocratic elements in the homeland.540
The latter point is important: Despite their commitment to ideals they
shared with other ethnic activists, German American socialists – at least
those that wrote for the Tageblatt – never abandoned their investment in
German politics. “When,” one poignant editorial asked, “will the socialist
proletarians and the free-thinking German citizens in our country [i.e the
United States] finally remember their moral duty and testify in front of the
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entire world for the German Republic […]?” 541 Americans of German
heritage, the editors argued, had a moral duty to support the success of
the Weimar experiment and the middle-class failed to fulfill that duty. The
persisting, even strengthening differences among German Americans
were in great part rooted in disagreements over Germany’s future.
The Tageblatt writers had a point. Despite an ostensible commitment
to national unity, many German American organizations old and new, like
the established Pennsylvania German Society (founded in 1891)542 or the
Steuben Society (founded in 1919), continued to make social background
a prerequisite for leadership and rarely permitted working class members
to rise up the ranks (or even denied them membership).543 In Philadelphia,
the Deutscher Klub und Technischer Verein (“German Club and Technical
Association,” short: DKTV) required new members to be recommended
and vouched for by at least two other members and only permitted
educated professionals.544 The support among leading bourgeois German
Americans for the democratic institutions back home was not as
unequivocal. The rise of National Socialism during the late 1920s and
early 1930s further testified to that tendency, as many middle-class
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German Americans failed to distance themselves effectively and were at
best ambivalent about the Nazis.545
Political conflicts at home thus greatly affected the ways in which
German Americans interacted with each other in the interwar period. Of
course, publications like the Tageblatt or the New York-based Neue
Volkszeitung strongly opposed the rise of fascism in Germany from the
start. The Nazis were the main enemy and fascist ideology directly
antithetical to everything they stood for. 546 The further the situation in
Germany deteriorated in their eyes, the more many of them believed in a
better future in the United States. Throughout the 1920s papers like the
Tageblatt retained “a socialist commitment to an international working
class,” which was based upon the joint “experience with fellow unionists of
Polish, Italian, and Russian Jewish background.” 547 However, they also
remained invested in the fates of those who were still in Germany – family,
friends, and comrades. Fashioning themselves as the “true bearers of
German culture,” socialists (and many others who disagreed with the
politics of the Third Reich) vowed to defend the image of their fatherland in
the United States.548
Interestingly, many of the respondents to the VDA used the same
rhetoric as those on the political Left, namely the notion that it was their
545
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particular political point of view that represented the “real” Germany, that
they were “the true bearers of German culture.” This similarity is
remarkable and important. It testifies to the parallel constructions of
Germanness, which were mutually exclusive, yet often utilized the same
nationalist tropes. Deutsche Arbeit was one of them. Workers, which
made up the political base of both the Left and the Right, believed that
their efficiency and diligence made them exceptional among the workers
of the United States. Those who considered themselves middle-class,
such as skilled artisans and educated white-collar workers, believed that
those same qualities were the foundations of their economic wellbeing and
protected them from potential decline. They may have embraced their
American citizenship and seen their future here, but many of them
retained the belief that their German heritage was a fundamental part of
their Americanness. When the economic crisis hit in 1929 and especially
in the years after, however, this narrative, which had been a consistent
companion in the years and decades before, faced a major challenge.
4. German Americans Respond to the VDA
4.1. Integrative Germanness
Reconciling the expectations contained in the rhetoric of Germanness
with the reality of the Depression-era United States posed one of the
biggest challenges to the respondents when writing to the VDA. Many
migrants had gone or were still going through some hard economic times
and reported of lost jobs and forced relocations. Others were employed,
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but could no longer find occupations in the trades they loved and knew.549
"My husband simply can’t find any work,” wrote Käte Küchler, who had
recently moved from Detroit to New York, “for five years I have not even
known what that is, a permanent job for the husband!”550 After explaining
their situation in great detail, Küchler added a post scriptum:
Don’t think that my husband is incapable or not resolute
enough for this country. I want to tell you that he has already
swept the streets here, worked as a poster painter, as an
ordinary painter, also as an art painter, worked in an Italian
restaurant. Likewise for a time as a cabinet worker and
finally he painted silk scarfs.551
By pointing to her husband’s willingness to take on various positions,
Küchler – whether deliberately or not – stressed the family’s resilience and
self-reliance as well as their determination to succeed. Living only blocks
away from Fifth Avenue on New York’s East Side, Küchler was confronted
daily with the upper crust of society, the “atmosphere, elegance, [and]
wonderful cars.” 552 Her letter did not carry any signs of envy, but she
struggled to justify that the decision to emigrate to a railroad flat in
Manhattan was the right one. However, she was not complaining: She and
her husband were taking care of themselves. And this was true for many
of the writers, who explained their personal stories through a transnational
lens that stressed their origins, though rarely as directly as Johanna Kuhn
from Paris, Illinois. “So far,” she wrote,
549
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we have not, maybe because of our German skill
[Geschicklichkeit], encountered any unemployment or
hardship, those two sad comrades, which expelled us from
the motherland. But we have not received any presents
either, we have had to work for everything diligently and
relentlessly.553
For Kuhn, her Germanness defined her status in the United States. “There
are so many opportunities here and diligent, ambitious people are very
necessary here and well received everywhere and especially the
Germans.” The reputation of German migrants and their work ethic, Kuhn
wrote, made it easier for to integrate into and become an accepted
member of American society. 554 Just as generations before her, Kuhn
relied on old narratives of diligence and character to ease the transition
into America’s public sphere and create spaces of familiarity for herself
and her family.
Likewise, many migrants found that being German was not an obstacle
in that process. Mrs. Kuhn was surprised about the frequent complaints
that Germans were not valued in the United States. “Believe me,” she
wrote, “ you are mistaken. […] I, we, have always found that everyone has
respect for the German Man [Mensch] and can understand the political
uprising in Germany as well […].” 555 Written in 1937, her letter was
thoroughly apolitical and she voiced her hope for international
553
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reconciliation and peace between all people. It carried no sign of antiSemitism or belligerence towards Germany’s neighbors. But even those
that were aligned with the aggressive, ugly side of Nazism frequently
found that being German opened doors, rather than closing them. One
such letter was received from Harald Arias, an artist who traveled
throughout the United States and made no secret out of his anti-Semitism.
Arias reported that Hitler’s policies had won him admiration in some
American circles: “I have already met countless 100%-Americans who tell
me bluntly: What we need overhere [sic] is not one Hitler, but 10
Hitlers!” 556 Similarly, John Rehnig of New York, who had immigrated
around 1905 and naturalized in 1921, used his German heritage to assert
his Americanness and continued to draw strength from what he believed
to be the achievements of the Nazis. “As an American citizen with a real
German heart, I greatly respect your ‘Führer’,” he wrote in German, “over
here in America we need six of the kind of your Dear Adolf Hitler.”557
Many

Germans

complained

about

the

anti-German

views

of

newspapers or worried about a Jewish world conspiracy. But it is worth
noting that, like Mrs. Kuhn, not all of those who experienced their
Germanness as an integrative element during the 1930s were outspoken
supporters of Hitler’s racist and anti-Semitic policies. And among those
that were, not everyone felt excluded in the United States.
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4.2. Experiencing the Volksgemeinschaft Abroad
The fact that many writers still felt a strong connection to their
ancestral homeland brings up the question of whether or not the idea of a
transnational Volksgemeinschaft, manifested in work, had any impact
among German Americans after 1933. Some responded directly to the
theme invoked by the VDA. Martha Osterwalder of New York, for example,
pointed to the importance of work not simply for one’s survival but to
create meaning and community across social boundaries: “We are all
dependent on each other, from the smallest scavenger to the great Führer.
The worth of a human is his [sic] performance and his character. Only
work and true camaraderie can bring an ideal life for the general public
[die Allgemeinheit].”558 Osterwalder, who worked as a maid at the Swiss
Embassy, was one of many writers, who found comfort in the
Volksgemeinschaft, in the prospect of it anyway, which elevated the
meaning of work beyond mere financial gain. Already, she believed the
common suffering that the German people experienced across the globe
“can only bring us true solidarity and camaraderie, in Germany, as abroad,
without interference of class pride [Klassenstolz].”559
But for the majority of those who wrote to the VDA, being German still
meant local, not transnational community: “We are sticking together,”
summarized the wife of Otto Krause her experience as a member of the
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German community in Wethersfield, Connecticut. Many writers reported of
ample opportunities to preserve bonds to the homeland in the United
States. “Of all the Auslandsdeutschen [in the world],” wrote A. Stock, “we
probably have it best. Here in New York, there are over 100 German
associations, there are German hours on the radio and we have here
several German streets with German stores.”560 “We really shouldn’t be
homesick here in New York,” George Durschmidt concurred, “after all,
there are so many German churches, clubs, amusement facilities etc. And
yet,“ he continued, “especially among the urbanites no intimate alliance
will develop, something that is so much easier to do on the
countryside.“ 561 Indeed, there was a persistent sense of disunity that
pervaded many of the letters – and especially those from the cities562 –,
which mirrored the sentiments published in the German American press
and in the literature about German America.
Why was it so hard to unite German Americans beyond the local
village or neighborhood? The reasons that was cited most frequently by
the writers were political disagreements and social differences. For
example, Max Lippold of Hartford, Connecticut railed against the
“troublemakers and club enthusiasts [Vereinsmeier], who cannot let go of
socialism and communism.” As a supporter of the new Nazi government,
560
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he especially chided one particular speaker at the Hartford Sängerbund,
“who used to be a Minister of Justice in Prussia and stole the pennies out
of the little man’s pocket.” The fact that this man had spoken against the
Third Reich did not come as a surprise to Lippold, who believed that the
Sängerbund and similar organizations were responsible for the disunity
among German Americans.563 Lippold’s letter points to a larger trend that
was noticeable among socialists as well: an increasing equation of political
and national identity. Everyone outside of one’s own political conviction
could not represent the “real” Germany.
For the supporters of the new Nazi government, being “German” in the
1930s meant supporting the Nazi cause. Many immigrants, like Christoph
Klinger from Providence, Rhode Island, who “have not found a new
Heimat across the ocean” celebrated the ascent of National Socialism as
the incarnation of the Volksgemeinschaft, while condemning its critics and
those who neglected to defend Nazism. Klinger offered a familiar
argument when he pointed out that anti-German propaganda in the United
States was only successful because “the number of the few real Germans
is oh so small.”564 Throughout the 1930s, many recent immigrants viewed
expressions of German identity in the United States in increasingly
exclusive terms: Arthur Rentsch from Jackson Heights, New York, bought
into the Nazi logic that saw the National Socialists as the only true
563
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manifestation of Germanness at home. He thus rejected all cultural events
that did not explicitly acknowledge Hitler as Germany’s leader.
“Unfortunately,” he wrote, “only few Germans abroad have followed the
call of the Führer. How many of them deny directly or indirectly their
membership in the German Volksgemeinschaft. […] Singing and
gymnastics festivals are held in the belief that they performed German
Kulturarbeit but they still deny the great Führer of all Germans.“565
But very few were unequivocally determined to let the Nazis stand in
for the entire Germany, even among the sympathetic group of writers, who
responded to the VDA. Many immigrants could not forget the boundaries
of class that had divided the homeland and had prompted them to leave
for the United States. Emigrants had often left for good reasons, which
featured prominently in respective assessments of life in the United States.
Migration had not been mere adventurism, but a dismayed escape from a
nation whose elites had repeatedly betrayed the people. In 1935, many
migrants remembered leaving Germany unwillingly, in order to escape
poverty, insecurity, and a lack of opportunity. Many blamed their departure
on social divisions and class difference. Karl Ficker from Miami, Florida
wondered, if there still was
that damned German class difference, the affluent, parasitic
boasting of the shirt-and-tie people and the ugly disdain
that your, our brothers have for the poor class of human
existence, is there still the cheating and dumbing down of
the lacking mass of Germans […]. Is there respect for
565
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everyone, or is the opportunity for a real life […] just given
to the class of owners and capitalists. [sic] 566
Many German Americans found ways to answer that question for
themselves. They stayed informed about developments in Germany.
Communication with the homeland was faster and cheaper and many
emigrants used the opportunity of expedited and more affordable travel to
visit relatives as often as possible.567 During a visit to Germany in 1933,
eight years after his migration to the United States, J.G. Mühlhausen from
New York recalled meeting several old acquaintances now rising in the
Nazi hierarchy: “many of them were and still are everything but honest
Germans.” Having recently met some members of the German Foreign
Service, he complained, “the caste spirit [Kastengeist] and class
arrogance [Standesdünkel] in these circles goes beyond anything I saw in
the Second Reich.”568 Consequently, Mühlhausen expressed doubts about
the future of the Third Reich.
While these critics rejected the classism of the Reich, they could only
muster an ambiguous embrace of the opportunities and securities for
migrants in the United States. An anonymous writer reported having lived
in the United States for 30 years and though the writer still “remembers
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the old Heimat with melancholy”, “my new Heimat has become dear and
valued to me. I received my citizenship papers years ago. Und during the
war time nobody hurt me because of my German descent.”569 Similarly,
Helene Sachse of New York City remembered having to emigrate from
Germany in hard times and described a place where “those that cannot
keep pace with the course of time will be trampled mercilessly. But still,”
she continued, “it would be ungrateful, if we were not to be thankful to the
country that had to become our new Heimat for giving us work and income
in hard times. Our emotional and spiritual life, however, had to withdraw
itself; deeply inside the heart it is encapsulated.” 570 This pragmatic
assessment of their situation connected many writers to the United States.
Regarding their livelihood, many German Americans preferred the United
States over Germany. “Everything is much cheaper here and workers like
me don’t have to pay taxes,” explained A. Stock from New York City, who
worked for a Jewish family. “We like it very much here in America, but still
we are saving our money for the next trip to the Heimat.”571 Fritz Strecker
of Staten Island noted a recent severe sickness and added that “my family
received very selfless assistance from American official and private sides,
financially and otherwise, during my stay at the hospital [though] I do not
want to give the impression that we were under duress, except for the
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state of health.”572 And Käte Küchler praised the American health care and
education systems, food and electricity prices, the radio, and the
availability of consumer items, such as electric washing and sewing
machines. Even though her husband, the painter, had trouble finding
steady employment, a union salary ensured that all bills were paid. “I don’t
know how a worker scrapes by a living in a Berlin tenement,” Küchler
ruminated, “maybe he envies me.”573
5. Conclusion
For

many

German

Americans,

the

idea

of

a

German

Volksgemeinschaft was appealing after 1933. But in a nation with diverse,
multi-ethnic populations, being German could never be more important
than being American – at least not in public life. Those that disagreed
could return to Germany, though only very few did.574 Among those that
remained,

many

attempted

to

reconcile

the

transnational

Volksgemeinschaft with the American Way of Life, which meant to
reconcile a concept of belonging based on community with a concept of
belonging based on individuality. The bridge between both was an ethnic
identity that marked its members not only as white but also productive
contributors to society – as hard-working, diligent, clean and effective.
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In this chapter I have explored one of the reasons why this ethnic
identity never developed comprehensive unity during the interwar era, a
unity as imagined by Alpendorn and many others after World War I:
Persisting social boundaries among German Americans and a focus on
the exigencies of everyday life among lower-class immigrants, who made
up the majority of those considered “German American.” As conflicts
between the various social and political fractions in Germany became
more vicious and violent throughout the 1920s, competing ideas about
what it meant to be “German” affected the ways in which migrants thought
about themselves in the United States – but they never forgot why they left
the country of their ancestors to seek a better future elsewhere.
The traces of those divisions can still be found in American life today.
For much of the second half of the twentieth century, belonging to either
the political left or the political right has been determined in part by
individual social and cultural origins. In a radio interview with NPR, the
writer Michael Lind once described the rift between left and right as
follows: “The right’s fundamental narrative has been that liberals or
progressives

are

snobbish,

upper-class

unpatriotic

traitors.

The

progressive narrative is that no person could possibly disagree with liberal
positions […]. There is […] constant fear on the part of progressive
intellectuals that at any moment their fellow citizens will turn out to be
secret Nazis and round everybody up.” Lind specifically ascribes this
development to the presence of Marxist immigrant intellectuals from

241

Weimar Germany, like Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno and Max
Horkheimer who used their experiences back home to interpret what they
witnessed in the USA. They were, Lind told the interviewer, “interpreting
American politics through the lens of their traumatic experiences.” 575 As
did, I would add, the hundreds of thousands of immigrants from the
working class who may or may not have disagreed with these social elites.
Either way, the role of German Americans in the politics of the 1950s and
beyond has not been studied. I argue it should be.

575

Emphases mine. Interview with Michael Lind on NPRs On the Media “Lies,
Lies, Lies,” December 4, 2015. (available online:
https://www.wnyc.org/radio/#/ondemand/557375, accessed January 15, 2016).

242

Chapter 5: “As Familiar as an Old Friend” - Consumer Culture and
Gender in German America

1. Introduction
Immigration to the United States has often been described as a oneway street that forces those who travel it to abandon old customs and
conventions in order to be accepted – culturally, politically, and
economically – as full members of American society. “Being American is a
matter of abstention from foreign ways, foreign food, foreign ideas, foreign
accents,” the cultural anthropologist Margaret Mead wrote in 1975.576 At
the same time, Mead’s argument was decisively assimilationist:
immigrants could signal their belonging by literally buying into the
“American Way of Life.” New Americans were made, so to say, in
department stores, amusement parks and movie theaters, where
newcomers displayed their ability to navigate consumer culture.577
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But was an embrace of the “American Way” always tantamount to the
abstention from “foreign ways,” as Mead proposed? I argue in this chapter
that consumption could also be quintessentially conservative, a process
that strengthened old values and helped immigrants stay connected to the
homeland. This argument is not new of course,578 but German American
historiography – perhaps unlike any other – has centered on the
assumption that migrant participation in the American marketplace
signaled “a retreat from ethnic concerns and from the German ethnic
component of multiple identity.”579 I will demonstrate that such arguments
are certainly not inaccurate, but miss the considerable investment in the
Old World that accompanied migrants’ navigations of American consumer
culture. During the interwar era German Americans trusted in a variety of
norms that determined their patterns of spending in the American
marketplace. And they negotiated these norms through a variety of
transnational discourses in German language newspapers, ethnic
advertisements, and magazines like the Heimatbriefe, which allowed
German Americans to synchronize their own evolving sense of the

freedom and vice versa; e) unlimited and insatiable desires are celebrated and
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578
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ed. Randall M. Miller (Philadelphia: The Society, 1984), 14-36.
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consumerism back home.
To provide a concrete example of continued investments in the Heimat,
this chapter discusses the 1932 campaign by a coalition of GermanPhiladelphians to bring back recently cancelled advertisements placed by
the Wanamaker department store in the German-language daily GazetteDemocrat. German American consumers saw the advertisements as more
than shopping guides by a trusted member of the local community. For
them, the advertisements were “maps of modernity,” to use the words of
sociologist Don Slater, which not merely replaced traditional authorities
but established connections between the old and the new.580 Moreover,
readers realized that advertisements helped ensure the financial wellbeing
of the newspaper – a space where American life (or life in America) could
be discussed and understood in a familiar language and a familiar cultural
context.
The fact that women led the protests speaks to the important role that
consumer culture played in the negotiation of gender roles during the
interwar era. As primary authorities on domestic finance, consumption,
and ethnic conservation in the home, German American women wielded
enormous influence over the choices that migrants made in the
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marketplace.

581

And while many of them embraced the liberating

opportunities of consumerism, others found solace in stability and
continuity. The image of the nuclear family582, for example, that eventually
became a staple of “American Way” iconography, was largely consistent
with traditional German gender norms and thus provided a space for
migrant women to realize their American dreams while staying connected
to and consistent with old world traditions.
This chapter lays out the interconnected evolution of consumerism and
gender in the context of migration. It first discusses the German discourse
on Americanism, a synonym for modernity in the interwar era, and
explores how conservative objections against consumption impacted the
ways in which German Americans saw themselves as consumers in
America. 583 After providing an overview of competing discourses in the
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United States, I examine the transnational culture of German America and
close with a discussion of the campaign to return the Wanamaker
advertisements.
2. “Americanism” and German National Identity
2.1. Consumer Culture
As the global economy vacillated between booms and busts
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, proponents and critics
debated the promises and pitfalls of industrialization, internationalization,
and consumer culture. On the one hand, innovations in mass production,
technology, distribution, and marketing put within public reach a variety of
products that mitigated the backbreaking routines of rural life, provided
new opportunities for social advancement and opened up the world of
leisure and amusement to the lower classes. On the other hand, those
same innovations were in part responsible for the economic struggles of
peasants, artisans, and local traders. The new industrial order rendered
obsolete traditions and customs and undermined the cultural authority of
old elites.
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While the German Empire certainly embraced the
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opportunities of the new age and established itself as an economic and
military power during the late 1800s, a persistent, stubborn antimodernism became entrenched in Wilhelmine society. Critics of
modernity 585 were particularly concerned about the corrosive effects of
consumer culture, which purportedly threatened the integrity of the
Kulturnation Germany. When the monarchy collapsed at the end of World
War I, this concern turned into outright fear about the future of the country.
For many Germans the specter of modernity bore the name of a rival for
global supremacy: Amerika.586
The United States had inspired both dreams and nightmares long
before the war, of course, but during the 1920s America “emerged as the
symbol of modernity tout court.”587 To many conservatives it seemed as if

Transatlantic Visions of Individuality in Modern Mass Society,” Contemporary
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585
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die Deutschen. Bestandaufnahme einer 300jährigen Geschichte, ed. Frank
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587
Peukert, Weimar Republic, 179. For a fantastic account of U.S. consumerism
in Europe, see Robert Rydell and Rob Kroes, Buffalo Bill in Bologna: The
Americanization of the World, 1869-1922 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2005), especially 97-169.

248

American culture was taking over the Old World. American bands played
Jazz in Berlin nightclubs, movie theaters showed Hollywood films, and
department stores sold American fashion. “The nation’s thinking has
indeed become Americanized, through and through,” warned the
Protestant cleric Günther Dehn in 1929, “it is not socialism but
Americanism that will be the end of everything as we know it.”588 Such
laments could easily be dismissed as the last gasps of a disappearing
conservative minority, but the reality was more complex. After all,
throughout the 1920s Germany continued to suffer economically and
many Germans were concerned about the future of humane values in a
time of increasingly unregulated capitalism. By pointing to the failures of
the American system, many critics participated in a legitimate debate
about the country’s path into the future. “The public debate about ‘America’
was really a debate about German society itself and the challenge that
modernity posed to it.”589
In many ways, then, the discourse on consumer culture epitomized
ambivalences about the arrival of global “Americanism” and vice versa:
Germans addressed their anxieties about the country’s future in an
American century through debates about consumer culture. Having lived
through the war, many craved for American products and fashion, which
remained out of financial reach for the majority. Germans across all social
588
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and political boundaries praised the rationalization of the American
marketplace and household, and welcomed similar methods in Europe.590
At the same time, however, there was a popular push for economic
nationalism, driven, for example, by leading German housewives’
associations. Seeing poverty and misery as the result of global pressures,
activists denounced everything from department stores and mass
produced clothing to oranges and white bread as foreign to German
society and responsible for its economic disintegration. 591 Patterns of
American consumerism were often the main point of criticism after
delegations had visited the United States. American products, the visitors
argued, were mass produced and sold under questionable circumstances
in department stores that offered little to no service.592
Especially widespread among critics was the idea that American
culture seduced individuals. Catchwords like “Americanization” and
“Yankeeification” signaled the conviction that American-style mass
consumerism incapacitated the willpower of individuals, particularly
German immigrants, who embraced it all too eagerly. “In America,” wrote
Adolf Halfeld in his widely read Amerika und der Amerikanismus (1927),
590

Nancy Reagin, “Comparing Apples and Oranges: Housewives and the Politics
of Consumption in Interwar Germany,” in: Getting and Spending: European and
American Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century, eds. Susan Strasser,
Charles McGovern and Matthias Judt (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 241-261.
591
Reagin, “Comparing Apples and Oranges,” 241-261; See also: Heike
Hoffmann, “Völkische Kapitalismus-Kritik: Das Beispiel Warenhaus,” in: Uwe
Puschner et. al., eds., Handbuch zur ‘Völkischen Bewegung’ 1871-1918 (Munich:
K.G. Saur, 1999), 558-573.
592
Reagin, “Comparing Apples and Oranges,” 245-247.

250

“the civilization of the mass has been realized […]. There is certainly
something great and new here – a machine that works with impeccable
precision, but also displays all disadvantages of the machine: total
sovereignty of the rule and death of the free will.”593 The journalist HansChristoph Kaergel found a fitting metaphor for that perspective when he
argued that the amusement park Coney Island resembled American
capitalism in that it was like “a single giant gyroscope, whirling around
Millions of people, defrauding every one of their reasoning and
independence.”594 This perspective of the consumer as object or hapless
pawn perspired in many observations: pulp magazines “dulled” their
readers,

sensationalized

movies

“vulgarized”

the

masses,

and

advertisements misled buyers. “At best, consumers were worrisomely illunderstood, unpredictable social figures. At worst, their needs were
identified with the demands of lower orders, volatile, ravenous, capricious,
hence contributing to the unpredictability of economic trends, political
polarization, and the degradation of national culture.”595
It should be noted in this context that neither exuberant celebrations of
American abundance nor prejudicial condemnation of the United States
rested on broad objective or scientific observations but rather betrayed the
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subjective nature of this surrogate debate.596 In fact, anti-modern critics
prided themselves on their lack of objectivity and scientific observation,
which they derided as benchmarks of American civilization. Instead they
promoted emotional depth and spirituality as unique qualities of German
culture.597 Kaergel, for example opened his book with a frank confession
of his own subjectivity: ”I have not examined this new world with statistics
and new economic gauges. I have seen it as a human, but most of all as a
German.” 598 The point here is not merely that German observers often
indulged in obvious, intentional misrepresentations of the United States.
Instead, discourse on U.S. consumer culture and modernity helped refine
a German cultural exceptionalism in the struggle against capitalism’s
consequences. By emphasizing the special qualities of German Kultur as
a safeguard against the pitfalls of modernity, cultural nationalists offered a
model that was applicable around the world. Whether in Germany or the
United States, uprootedness and alienation could be mitigated by a strong
connection to the Heimat, a “conscious living with a German soul,” as
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Kaergel called it. “Those that successfully preserve the soul of the old
Heimat, are […] always at home. […] Maybe that is the core of the
German question. Those that have given away their innermost core to
false gods, have been lost to themselves and us.”599 In a book about the
United States, this was a direct charge at German Americans, and in
particular at German American women, the domestic guardians of culture
and main culprits in the anti-consumerist tirades of the Weimar Republic.
They held the key to Germanness in their spending.
2.2. Gender and Domesticity in Weimar Republic and Third Reich
“I don’t have to tell anyone what a Girl is,” wrote Hans-Christoph
Kaergel to open his chapter on gender roles in the United States. 600
Indeed, by the 1920s the omnipresent icon of American femininity, the Girl,
embodied modernity for many Germans, not least because changing
gender roles were a central aspect in the postwar renegotiation of German
national identity.601 Even before World War I, Germans had discussed the
role of women in American society with a mix of admiration and
apprehension. While praising their civic engagement and high level of
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education, many conservatives felt that American women pursued their
public goals too aggressively. Female “shopping” became a particular
annoyance for those who believed that American-style consumerism was
a careless and rather pointless act of waste and vanity, which, if imported
to Germany, threatened the fabric of traditional society. 602 During the
1920s, the rise of feminine iconography propagated in newspapers and
magazines, in novels, movies, and advertisements, seemed to confirm the
worst fears: suddenly it seemed as if independent women were taking
over German society “armed with bobbed hair and made-up face,
fashionable clothes and cigarette, working by day in a typing pool or
behind the sales counter in some dreamland of consumerism, frittering
away the night dancing the Charleston or watching UFA and Hollywood
films.”603
Though little more than “male-generated fantasy” – the vast majority of
women continued to work in domestic settings and those that did not could
rarely afford the propagated lifestyle 604 – the feminine threat from
overseas triggered a very real German angst about social stability and
traditional gender roles.605 Such anxieties were exacerbated by first-hand
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reports like Kaergel’s Wolkenkratzer or Halfeld’s Amerika und der
Amerikanismus. While admitting (and occasionally admiring) the selfconfidence that American women displayed in public, both Kaergel and
Halfeld saw female independence as a threat to society. In their view,
women’s advances in factory and white-collar labor had devastating
effects on masculinity and the social fabric. American men were
submissive and had ceded all control in the household to their wives, who
were focused on themselves, neglected their duties as mothers and
domestic caretakers, spend most of their time working and shopping and
gave birth only if the budget allowed it. 606 Such views of American women
permeated German society and even though many Germans knew better
than to believe every rumor, some of the stereotypes stuck. German men
of various social and intellectual backgrounds saw the United States as “a
land where women rule and men are slaves,” in the words of the German
American journalist H.L. Mencken, who was well-known and widely read
on both sides of the Atlantic.607
Once more, the question was what all this meant for the future of
Germanness around the globe. For Kaergel, at least, female conspicuous
consumerism symbolized the decline of tradition and its consequences. To
him, make-up, hairstyles, and the culture of smiling proscribed in
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American advertisements were dangerous manifestations of the very
mass society that threatened to erase cultural differences, which set apart
German women from other nationalities. “I may have seen hundreds of
thousands upon thousands [Hundertausende und Abertausende] female
beings [in America]. And yet not a single exceptional, memorable face has
remained […]. All I see is the Girl. Entirely without a name. Entirely without
exceptional appearance.” 608 Following his description, Kaergel asked
rhetorically, whether or not his readers really wanted the Girl as the future
of German femininity. “No,” he answered preemptively,
we want to go back to nature! I believe that the German,
female being will be far ahead of the Girl in this competition.
[…] All I want is that we realize that the Girl is not a special
creature, but an unnaturally acquired character[;] that we
seek beauty […] the beauty that makes everyone into a
human individual […], into a Mädchen [German: girl], a
woman, a mother. But never into a Girl.609
Many Germans shared that view. For the bourgeoisie, the Girl
embodied the conspicuous, uncultured, and uneducated masses.610 And
this was as true for the conservative, völkisch right as it was for the
intellectual left wing. The sociologist and journalist Siegfried Kracauer, for
example, described a troupe of female American line dancers, the Tiller
Girls, and their highly organized, choreographed performances, as the
608
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incarnation of the capitalist age and the self-organizing masses, or what
he called a “mass ornament:” “[t]hese products of American ‘distraction
factories’ [Zerstreuungsfabriken] are no longer individual girls, but
indissoluble female units [unauflösliche Mädchenkomplexe], whose
movements are mathematical demonstrations.”

611

Kracauer largely

refrained from moral judgment; he even argued “that the aesthetic
pleasure gained from the ornamental mass movements is legitimate.”612
Nonetheless, his observations, too, bore the signs of fear omnipresent in
the German middle-class – a fear of the masses. More importantly, he
recognized in the Tiller Girls and their routine the inauguration of an
“American age” in Germany, particularly an age of mass production and
consumption. They were “a representation of American virtues, a flirt by
the stopwatch.” 613
On the conservative, völkisch end of the political spectrum, there was
little sympathy for this American import. Many feared that the entire
German nation would be emasculated if American-style feminism and
consumerism took over. And even the organized women’s movement
complained that American notions of femininity undermined German
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domestic and motherly virtues. 614 Groups like the League of German
Housewives’ Associations argued that American patterns of consumption
undermined the German nuclear family and the nation. Whereas American
women shopped for cheap clothing and canned foods and wasted money
on beauty products, the idealized German woman, the “master housewife,”
was devoted to thrift and saving: “She put up, canned, or stored foods of
every kind when they were in season; sewed clothes for all family
members; repaired and altered worn clothes; ensured thriftiness through
meticulous bookkeeping; and wasted not.” 615 This model was almost
diametrically opposed to the stereotypical image of the American
consumer Girl, who “wasted” all her money on conspicuous consumer
items, cared little about her children and even less for her husband or the
home she was in charge of. The extent of the misinformation circulating in
German society is probably best exemplified by the belief that Americans
never washed their underwear. “People simply buy cheap underwear and
throw it away after they have worn it….Heaven preserve us from this
Americanization of the household,” one article in Die Deutsche Hausfrau
[“The German Housewife”] argued.616
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Again, the point is not to suggest that all Germans believed such
rumors or, obviously, that they reflected reality. But many thought that
American notions of femininity and consumerism threatened the very
ideals of separate spheres that were formative for a gendered German
national identity. 617 Not surprisingly, the alternative model of German
womanhood promoted by conservative circles during the Weimar Republic
and by the Nazis during the Third Reich was in many ways the direct
opposite of the public German image of the Girl. Though recent
scholarship on gender and nationalism has shown that women took on
various public functions in the 1920s and 1930s,
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responsibility in propaganda and ideology was that of mother and
domestic housekeeper. This traditional image was propagated across the
global German diaspora as well,619 for example through publications like
the Heimatbriefe.
2.3. Gender, Nation, and Migration in the Heimatbriefe
Not surprisingly, the writers of the Heimatbriefe looked back
unfavorably at the Weimar Republic, “when it seemed […] as if many a
German woman had almost forgotten her high destiny. She wanted to be
totally free and independent, free of her highest duty, only wanted to live
according to her own wishes, be as equal as possible to men.” Such
characterizations were strongly informed by stereotypical descriptions of
egoistic, profligate American women and ignored decades of pre-war
history, when women in Germany had already contributed financially to
household incomes. The Heimatbriefe blamed the “chaos” of the 1920s on
the intrusion of “foreign” ideas, such as democracy and consumer
culture.620 With little use for democracy and perhaps even less respect for
its privileges, the writers behind the magazine did not account for the
possibility that some women had actually embraced the opportunities of
the previous decade. During the Weimar Republic, “fate had denied
women the fulfillment of their destiny, to give to their Volk new life” by
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giving birth.621 The Heimatbriefe thus strongly denounced gender equality
and made clear the separate purposes of men and women in the
Volksgemeinschaft.
The man is discoverer and pioneer [Vordenker], leads in all
matters of spirituality, of science, of state, and of war. While
working, he is directly exposed to all kinds of difficulties and
dangers. The gift of the woman, however, is internal: in heart
and mind […]. In home and family, at the domestic stove is
the domain of the woman and her strong responsibility.622
To be sure, there were many women on both sides of the Atlantic
Ocean who would have disagreed with such antiquated gender norms and
it is one of my arguments that German American “assimilation”623 was as
much a rejection of restrictive German nationalist norms as it was an
embrace of the American Way.624 However, it should not be ignored that
the Heimatbriefe did not simply deride women but celebrated their
important function in the trans-national community, the Volksgemeinschaft.
“Nobody feels as deeply the living togetherness [Zusammengehörigkeit] of
the Volk as the German woman! It is she who […] keeps alive the flame of
love for Volk and home soil, in far away lands as here in the Reich.”
Women, the Heimatbriefe argued, were literally saving Germanness at
home and abroad by devoting themselves to the preservation of a
community of people “of equal blood, equal type and custom, and equal
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mother tongue.”

625

They taught children language and respect for

traditions and customs. “She imparts upon the child in songs, fairy tales
and stories the beginnings of language, in play and cheerful dance she
introduces [the child] for the first time into the community life of the
Volk.”626
Ultimately, then, the Heimatbriefe argued that it was the obligation of
women to preserve German morale and ensure that families remained
“brave, diligent and decent [anständig].” They were to provide a safe
haven for children and husband, who could return to “the home, the cradle
of peace.” 627 Equally important, the mother was in charge of the
Volksvermögen, a term that could mean both national wealth and wealth
of the people. “Here in the Heimat, the woman takes her house wife’s duty
as administrator of the Volksvermögen, which has been earned through
hard labor, as seriously as any soldier his military duty.” Whether simple
commodities of everyday life, clothing or groceries – German women
could not spend money thoughtlessly and were required to be as thrifty as
possible

“so

that

no

damage

will

be

inflicted

upon

the

Volksgemeinschaft.”628
The readers of the Heimatbriefe did not simply accept the ideology
presented by the editors wholesale, but adopted parts and portions that fit
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their needs and thus constantly renegotiated what their “Germanness”
meant to them. For example, Martha Osterwalder from New York asserted
that “[m]y Heimat means more than anything else to me.” Having lived in
the Americas for 21 years, “I have not lost my Germandom and I will never
lose it as long as I live. How many times have I been forced to defend my
fatherland abroad, oftentimes better than any man.”629 As a maid in the
Swiss embassy, she was well capable of earning her own income and
seemed to reject the idea that women should be restricted to home and
hearth. However, she also complained:
Women whose husband has a good income are taking away
the work from single men and women. And [from] mothers
whose husband is out of work. They want to save money
where others have not enough to eat. They do not care for
their fellow human beings and the poor hungry children. As
long as they can enjoy their rich lives. […]
If they [presumably: the government] were to send home
female teachers and teach them how to cook their husband’s
soup, and replace them with men, so that the children enjoy
a better education […] they could not accomplish anything
better for the public good.630
Few women were as frank as Martha Osterwalder. Unlike their male
compatriots most refrained from criticizing the writers of the Heimatbriefe.
But even those that did comment, as is evidenced by Osterwalder’s
complicated remarks, could hardly escape the dominating beliefs in the
discourse on gender and domesticity at the time: In Osterwalder’s view,
US liberal individualism undercut national solidarity and the traditional
629
630

Martha Osterwalder to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1935- 89.
Martha Osterwalder to VDA, HSTA 12460, 41-1935- 89.

263

separation of genders trumped the female desire to participate in the world
of work and consumption.
The discussion about the future of German femininity had obvious
implications for migrant women, especially those living in the United
States. If consumerism undermined Germanness, then how should they
navigate the American marketplace? To be sure, there were many who
simply ignored such warnings and went about their business as they saw
fit.631 But as I will show throughout this chapter, there were many others
who took seriously their roles as managers of the household and
guardians of (some) cultural heritage. For them, ongoing debates about
the preservation of German culture took on special relevance and there is
some evidence that women found ways to participate in the American
marketplace while retaining a meaningful connection to the homeland.
Nonetheless, I also suggest that the increasingly restrictive vision of
German womanhood made such negotiations more and more difficult.
Their role in the Volksgemeinschaft obliged women to “lead an exemplary
pure life” and stand as an example for her children “as a stable and strong
personality”632 in the face of an ostensibly corruptive American Way. As
we shall see in the next section, however, American consumer culture was
not nearly as unequivocally modern as many Germans assumed.
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3. Migrants and American Consumer Culture
3.1. Consumer Culture in the United States
The discourse on consumerism in the United States was significantly
more optimistic than in Europe. Especially after World War I the positive
trajectory of the country as a rising industrial power with increasing reach
across the globe led many Americans (as well as many non-Americans) to
believe that its system of capitalist distribution was superior in both
economic sustainability as well as social equality and carried great
benefits for individual citizens. Even though it hardly reached every
American, the abundance celebrated in the interwar era increasingly
convinced the nation that mass culture meant mass prosperity and that
consumerism was citizenship: “The American citizen’s first importance to
his country is no longer that of citizen but that of consumer,” wrote Robert
and Helen Lynd in their influential 1929 study on “average” America,
Middletown. “Consumption is a new necessity.”633
For migrants, the American marketplace symbolized the promise of
equality and democracy, or at least some compensation for the loss of
633
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home. 634 By buying American products and partaking in leisure and
amusement, they not only reaped the benefits of their migratory sacrifices
but also signaled their embrace of and incorporation into American culture.
By choosing to spend their hard-earned American money on movie tickets
or washing machines, migrants could thus demonstrate individual selfdetermination, rational assessment of value, and social advancement.635
Moreover, in silent movie theaters and amusement parks they
experienced American culture first-hand, redefined social boundaries, and
broke down inter-ethnic barriers.636 The spectacle of difference celebrated
in these institutions, however, was both fascinating and terrifying, a rite of
initiation and a challenge to individual and collective identities. In the
words of one German immigrant, Käte Küchler, who wrote to the VDA in
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1935 with a mixture of shock and fascination: “The characters you could
see in Coney Island, an ‘entertaining’ tableau of international life of the
lower classes! Be still, my heart!”637
Küchler’s remark suggests that immigrants did not always embrace
American culture unequivocally, passively shedding all remnants of oldworld belonging in the course. Nor did American consumer culture simply
wipe out ethnic differences. The work of Roy Rosenzweig and Lizabeth
Cohen has shown that migrant immersion in American culture was a
process far more complicated than suggested by assimilationist narratives
of – positively – the “Melting Pot” or – negatively – “cultural suicide,” the
latter an accusation made with particular fervor by middle-class Germans
and German Americans against their lower class kin. Instead, participation
in the American marketplace frequently constituted a form of awakening,
which substantiated a more concrete ethnic sense of origin and allowed
migrants to appropriate products and leisure activities to pursue their own
ends, be it pleasure, profit, or politics. 638 Irish pubs and German beer
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gardens, for example, catered to those seeking familiarity in a world of
difference and created hyphenated experiences that helped shape public
representation of the ethnic group in the United States, even though they
rarely encompassed the heterogeneities of the Old World. Since
patronage was frequently universal, the existence of such “traditional”
establishments not only gave immigrants income opportunities and a
place to feel represented, to belong, but also provided a space to
introduce an ethnic group to others, initiate social interaction, and
negotiate the position of the respective group within society.639
It is worth remembering that until at least the 1920s even large
corporations were sufficiently impressed by the cultural resilience of many
migrants to devise entire marketing ploys to meet their demands.
“Immigrant consumers compelled American businesses to adapt to
preferences and traditions brought from their homelands and to develop
‘ethnic’ products and markets even as these immigrants slowly adjusted to
American-made goods.” 640 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, companies began to realize the potential markets behind these
ethnicities. Some advertised their products specifically to homesick Irish
Americans, while others amended their recipes to accommodate the
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kosher demands of Jewish immigrants. 641 During the 1920s, the soap
manufacturer Colgate hired advertising agencies to learn about the
specific desires of migrants in Chicago, Buffalo, or New York. Meanwhile,
ethnic radio stations drew huge audiences throughout the country.642 And
in Philadelphia American corporations like Chevrolet, Gillette, Lucky Strike
and Kellogg’s had their advertisements translated to German for print in
the local Gazette-Democrat. 643 American consumer culture was thus
“globalized” by immigrant markets and demands.644
This is not to say that the American marketplace per se fostered
pluralism. In fact, many of the products marketed specifically to
immigrants were merely vehicles “for greater Americanization and
uniformity rather than for heightening distinctive ethnic tastes.”
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an increasingly nationalized corporate culture demanded the assimilation
of tastes and abandoned diversity in the marketplace – often against the
resistance of consumers.646 At the same time imagery and language used
by advertisers obfuscated the destruction of “the old ways” behind a veil of
conservatism and tradition.647 For example, Roland Marchand has shown
how large enterprises and corporations capitalized on nostalgic memories
of family ownership by devising marketing campaigns that displayed the
“owner” as the good guardian of his workers despite the fact that
managerial structures had long divested many families of company
management.648 By thus simulating tradition and familiarity, commodities
catered to anxious customers and eased the transition into modernity.
According to Warren Susman, consumer culture took on a “conservative
and domesticating role” which helped Americans come to terms with fullfledged mass culture, especially concerning the renegotiation of gender
roles in everyday life. For example, rather then undermining traditional
646
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notions of separate spheres, advertisements reinforced female domesticity
by promoting products that intended to help women prepare meals and do
the laundry at home instead of utilizing commercial or collective venues to
achieve the same ends while they pursued their own careers. 649 Such
consumerist models of motherhood and domesticity allowed many
German American women still invested in the homeland and its culture to
excel in an area that was mutually respected in both the United States and
Germany. Even though many of them realized the apparent inequalities
inherent in the separation of genders, their role as mother, manager and
guardian of culture and morality allowed them to wield considerable
influence in a country that began to advertise the family as the most
important micro-unit of society and “American Way.”650
3.2. Women in Consumer Society
Once relegated to the private sphere of domestic housekeeping651 and
auxiliary labor, women across the Atlantic world seized opportunities in
industrial and white-collar work to gain access to the public sphere,
649
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financial independence from their fathers and husbands, and, eventually,
equal rights of citizenship. Some took advantage of leisure and
consumption to redefine themselves beyond the norms of traditional life,
while others embraced their new roles as managers of household finances
and consumption to escape the confines of the domestic.652 By the 1920s,
women were not only active as rational consumers and responsible
household managers, but also engaged in public activism and pursued
careers in the consumer industries. For example, under the leadership of
Florence Kelly the National Consumers’ League pressed department
stores to eliminate child labor and attacked retailers for their low wages.653
And the female employees of the J. Walther Thompson Company
Women’s Editorial Department successfully redefined boundaries of
womanhood and femininity in advertising. 654 More than simply giving
women access to the public sphere and a variety of products, consumer
culture provided the foundation for a “new individualism” that allowed
women to challenge their role in American society: “Mass consumer
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culture presented to women a new definition of gender that carved out a
space for individual expression similar to men’s and that stood in tension
with the older definition passed on to them by their mothers and
grandmothers.”655
In recent years, scholars have complicated that perspective. For
example, Margaret Finnegan’s analysis of consumer activism among New
York and Chicago suffragists shows that the protagonists expanded
female access to the public domain by utilizing modern methods of
advertising and marketing. When “department stores, manufacturers, and
a changing society made consumption central to middle-class women’s
lives, suffragists turned their roles as shoppers into arguments for granting
women

the

ballot.”

However,

Finnegan

also

demonstrates

that

consumerism curtailed the feminist imagination of American womanhood
by organizing the vision of women’s citizenship around white, middle-class
ideals that perpetuated old stereotypes and created new ones.656 Similarly,
in her work on the Get-Out-the-Vote (GOTV) movement, Liette Giedlow
discusses how women employed modern strategies of commercial
advertising to propagate their message, a message that encouraged the
white middle-class to vote, while explicitly excluding non-white workingclass Americans. The “commodification of political culture,” Gidlow argued,
655
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“helped to make politics the province of people who were white and middle
class or elite.” 657 Both Gidlow and Finnegan ultimately suggest that
“mainstream suffragists”658 of the interwar era often helped consolidate the
consumerist order rather than challenge predominant paradigms.
This argument is extended beyond the nation-state in Kristin
Hoganson’s Consumer’s Imperium, which investigates the intersection of
U.S. domesticity, consumerism and empire. White middle-class women,
Hoganson argues, “asserted agency through their shopping, decorating,
and dining preferences and their choices of leisure and reform
activities.” 659 For her, these women were actively involved in what she
calls the “globalization of the United States” since “consumption
constituted a form of interaction with the wider world.”660 At a time when
white global supremacy came natural to the people of Western nationstates,

those

that

successfully

mastered

imperial

culture

and

demonstrated their belonging to a superior civilization at home, by
consuming foreign foods or displaying exotic cozy corners, helped justify
both global and domestic hierarchies. 661 This was familiar territory for
many German American women. Despite all inter-national differences,
German migrants came from an imperial culture that was inspired by
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similar discourses of cultural superiority. 662 In this context, the culture of
consumption celebrated by American women often allowed for the
preservation of foreign traditions – as long as such traditions signaled a
belonging to Western civilization. The “immigrant gifts” movements, for
example, celebrated cultural artifacts, which linked Americans back to
their ancestral homelands, most preferably those lands that allowed them
to claim for themselves and the country a white European, Protestant
heritage. The movement, writes Hoganson, “made Americanization more
palatable by suggesting that it did not demand choices between
homogeneity and difference, modernity and tradition, or social control and
individual expression.”663
Hoganson’s conclusions, though aimed at the pre-World War I era,
thus open up an investigative space for the interwar period. Even though
the cultural space for expressions of hyphenate belonging began to close
between World War I and World War II in the wake of heightening nativism
and nationalization campaigns, the persistent identification of many
Americans with their ancestral homeland provides ample opportunity to
explore the ways in which American domestic life was influenced and
shaped by inter- and transnational currents – even though it was
simultaneously heralded as an insulated haven from global poverty and
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despair. The spread of foreign ways through American consumer culture,
whether driven by Hoganson’s middle-class consumers or by migrants
from across the globe, shows the openness of American culture to the
“foreign ways, foreign food, foreign ideas, foreign accents” that Margaret
Mead

denounced

as

distinctly

“un-American”

in

the

1970s.

664

Consumerism certainly provided room for German American women to
demonstrate their belonging by connecting them to both the ancestral past
and the American present. Nonetheless, as I have discussed in Section 2,
German and American conceptions of how an individual should approach
modern

consumer

society

were

hardly

equal,

sometimes

even

diametrically opposed. German migrant women had their own ideas about
norms and practices guiding their status within the family and society at
large, about individual and collective identities in the United States. But
rather than simply disappearing, with every migrant family that arrived,
such ideas about gender, domesticity, and national identity entered into
and became a part of what it meant to be American.665
4. German Migrants Navigate Consumer Culture
4.1. Consumerism and German America
Germany and the United States reacted differently to the ascent of
consumer culture, the latter more optimistically, the former with a certain
unease. Whereas Germany’s marketplace was defined by bourgeois
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social distinctions, American consumerism promised equal access to wellpaid jobs and, consequently, to an abundance of mass-produced goods.
The discrepancies between both countries were in part responsible for the
migration that connected them during the nineteenth and twentieth century.
In the United States, German migrants pursued opportunities they were
denied at home while simultaneously remaining skeptic about the impact
of modernism and conspicuous consumption. American culture, many
believed, threatened traditional gender roles and undermined family
values, community, and culture – all trademarks of German migrant life.666
Especially bourgeois proponents of German culture abroad advocated that
both countries, Germany and the United States, should help “each other to
supplant, wherever necessary, the wild egoism, materialism, greed,
sensuality and pleasure madness of the present time with a sound and
peaceful philosophy of life, useful activity and a full and pure enjoyment of
the short span allotted to us.”667
There would be no such cooperation, of course. Nonetheless, German
migrants left behind their imprints on American consumer culture, though
exactly how remains an unresolved question, since the intersection of
German America and American consumer culture has received so little
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attention by scholars in the past. 668 Kathleen Conzen has argued that
German festive culture with its beer gardens and social celebrations
developed parallel to American commercial culture with little interaction
between the two, and it disappeared subsequently.669 But William Leach
successfully demonstrated that the developing American consumer
society had distinctly German elements, which encompassed and
reflected the migrant experience. Leach specifically cites the example of
Gemütlichkeit, an emotional state of “contentment, ease, and satisfaction,
all in one” 670 that found expression in the mixture of food, music, drink and
sociability, which characterized German organizations and helped define
German

ethnicity

abroad.

Other

Americans

could

experience

Gemütlichkeit at events such as the Oktoberfests, which introduced the
public to the customs and culture of the group. 671 According to Leach,
German American businessmen, among them John Wanamaker,
incorporated the emotional connotations of Gemütlichkeit into their
department stores, introducing, for example, the custom of playing music
at all times. Their efforts, writes Leach, “did much to improve [American
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culture] by encouraging all Americans to love music, to relax a little more,
and to take pleasure in sensual and beautiful things.”672
Whether or not this particular argument is accurate: The point is that
the presence of German immigrants changed the shape of American
consumer culture and that their role helped them claim certain spaces and
traditions for themselves, even though exclusively German institutions
suffered in the course. Consumption, in this regard, offered an alternative
to many German migrants who loathed the social control they experienced
in ethnic organizations (see Chapter 4) without necessarily undermining
their sense of heritage and belonging. Though not exclusively German,
department stores like the one operated by John Wanamaker in
Philadelphia offered a glimpse of the migratory past and the products to
take that experience home. Moreover, through its advertisements
Wanamaker emphasized the department store’s “responsibility for sound
merchandising.” Since the market with its overwhelming plethora of
products remained unpredictable, volatile, and capricious, Wanamaker
thus assured its customers that “it is the endeavor of this Store at all times
to sell goods at the lowest fair and reasonable prices possible—but we
shall not reduce the qualities of our merchandise.”673 In another instance,
one of Wanamaker’s competitors, the American Stores Company, thanked
672
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“the German people of Philadelphia” and the Philadelphia GazetteDemocrat for their continuous loyalty. “This [loyalty] is proof,” its
advertising manager J.S. Kraemer wrote in April 1933, “that a people
highly discriminating in the quality of foods find that the American Stores
afford them many advantages in the way of thrift.”674 Similarly, American
corporations like Chevrolet, Gillette, Lucky Strike and Kellogg’s appealed
to values traditionally associated with the ethnic group, like product quality
and

reliability,

by

placing

translated

ads

in

German-language

newspapers.675
Consumers trusted such advertisements in their navigation of the
marketplace and relied on newspapers to bring them the ads. I have
discussed the continuing importance of ethnic newspapers in various
contexts throughout this dissertation. During the 1920s, they were still one
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of the few spaces that migrants could turn to on an everyday basis for
trusted information. Apart from advertisements, consumers could also
read advice columns, which told them what to buy and what to avoid. With
ethnic newspapers, however, such discussions became increasingly
transnational during the 1920s, since improving methods of travel and
communication facilitated exchanges between old and new world: ethnic
newspapers like the Philadelphia Tageblatt, the Gazette-Democrat, and
the New York Staatszeitung frequently reprinted articles from Germany
and criticized the impact of consumerism on German national culture at
home and abroad. The Philadelphia Gazette Democrat explicitly
emphasized the continued importance of the homeland by advertising its
Sunday editions, which contained an entire section with articles about and
from Germany, by announcing: “Intimate bonds with the old Heimat are
established through the Sunday edition of the ‘Philadelphia GazetteDemocrat’ and Your ‘Illustrated Weekly’ produced in Germany.”676 Even
though readership was certainly declining, many German Americans still
looked to such sources of comfort and guidance and the advice they
received influenced the decisions they made. Not coincidentally, a great
number of articles were directed specifically at women, whose role as
guardians of culture required them to be particularly careful to avoid the
forces of Americanization.
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4.2. Gender and Consumerism in German America
The general custom among German migrants families, even those
from the working class, dictated the presence of women in the home.
Similar to what they encountered in American society, migrant women
tended to take on the role of household managers in the emerging
consumer marketplace.677 As I have discussed in section 2.3, in the minds
of those who valued Germanness and wanted to preserve it, this role was
imbued with additional importance since wives and mothers were in
charge of maintaining a sense of “German identity behind the scenes, in
the domestic sphere.” 678 When women challenged such conventions or
male leadership, men often responded indignantly in private and public.
For example, Carl J. Hexamer, the president of the National GermanAmerican Alliance had a reputation for deriding the Women’s Rights
Movement.679 And the Lutheran pastor Georg von Bosse proclaimed: “In
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my house, I am Herr, and there does not rule some ‘New Woman’ or the
will of the child.”680
The conflict between tradition and modernity defined the ways in which
German American women renegotiated gender norms. Like their “native”
American peers, they carefully opened up spaces that allowed them to
engage publically without alienating the men of their community. This is
not to say, of course, that none were ready to cross such boundaries more
self-confidently despite male objections, for example by participating in the
women’s rights movement. But for the majority, their work in church
groups, charity or social events was often based, as Anke Ortlepp has
observed, “on a very conservative reading of gender relations, limiting
women to the home as mothers, educators, and faithful supporters of their
husbands and the church.”681 In this context, consumer activism offered a
unique way to enter into and influence a significant area of American
public life, an area in which both their husbands at home and the greater
society accepted women as legitimate authorities.
Scholarship on German American female consumerism and consumer
activism is rare, in part because historians have tended to interpret any
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engagement in the marketplace as a form of Americanization.682 Yet, the
little work that has been done shows how women often found old-world
familiarity in their navigation of American consumer culture.683 Following
the lead of other American newspapers, for example, German-language
dailies recognized women as readers and consumers and started
publishing regular women’s pages long before their German counterparts
did. “Capitalizing on women’s new roles as major shoppers in a rapidly
expanding consumer society, publishers across the nation began courting
the woman consumer.”

684

Far from proposing an abdication of

Germanness, German-language publishers recognized the importance of
women and their choices in the marketplace to the coherence of the
community and specifically aimed for the female consumer to stop the
perceived erosion of a cohesive German ethnicity in the United States.
Magazines such as the Milwaukee-based Deutsche Hausfrau, founded in
1904, informed its readers about the newest cultural and consumer trends
and survived into the 1920s and 1930s with a circulation between 40,000
and 50,000 nationwide.685 The Hausfrau was a guidebook to the American
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market for German readers that featured “a colorful mixture of sentimental
Old World memories, serialized German fiction, news of the world,
introductions to American life-style, household hints and domestic advice,
a fashion section, plus extended space for letters to the editors and other
avenues for reader participation.”686
Especially during and after World War I, German American women
embraced their unique opportunities as providers of spiritual, cultural, and
dietary nourishment. During the 1910s and 1920s organizations like the
Hilfsverein Deutscher Frauen (“German Women’s Aid Organization”), 687
the “Quarter-Collection (for Immediate and Permanent Relief)”, founded by
Margarete Cronau, 688 or Chicago’s Columbia Damen [“Ladies’”] Club
(CDC)689 established connections to the homeland as well as to other nonGerman organizations devoted to similar causes. The CDC, for example,
engaged in activities initiated by important feminists like Jane Addams and
supported diverse causes in Germany, such as a soup kitchen in
Karlsruhe, the Red Cross in Berlin as well as German theatre and
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education activities in Chicago. 690 Countering critics both in the United
States and in Germany, women proceeded carefully to avoid reprisals691
and accusations of negligence. As one contemporary writer noted, 692
potentially to address critics like Kaergel or Halfeld, who saw public
activism as a sign of assimilation and thus dangerous to German
womanhood: ”No fear need be entertained that German women will lose
their femininity, as is sometimes remarked by those that would restrict the
rapid rise of gifted women. The love of home and family is as vivid as ever
in normal German women and will enable her to find the right course to
assist in the uplift of her people.” 693
This spirit of trans-national continuity was also communicated through
the pages of newspapers such as the Gazette-Democrat, often very
similar in tone and message to the Heimatbriefe, advising women on their
duties towards home and family. For example, a daily page, the
Frauenseite [women’s page], advised women on topics such as “Silence
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in marriage,” suggesting that it was their responsibility to recognize and
alleviate emotional issues. Other columns provided advice concerning
“The naughty child,” “Burned Dinner,” or “The Dear Vanity.” 694 Another
column told its readers: “The way to a man’s heart, is through his stomach.
Therefore: Girls, wanting to get married, learn how to cook!”695 In these
sections of the newspaper, the German heritage was frequently invoked.
A regular series of weekly articles called “A Guide for Housewives” [“Ein
Führer für Hausfrauen”], which contained recipes, beauty advice, and
other tidbits of information, noted that the “German housewife in America
is always eager to receive recommendations to expand her knowledge in
the performance of her obligations as housewife and mother.” 696 The
column, which displayed images of women cleaning, cooking and reading
with a child, suggested that it could help women master their “obligations”
and thus reinforced a number of conceptions about the role of women in
American society and the specific qualities that particularly German
women brought to the task.
Not surprisingly, consumerism was one of the main foci of these advice
columns. How were women to navigate the treacherous world of American
consumer culture without belying their heritage? The “Frauenseite”
regularly advised women on how to use make-up or how to dress. “Our
694
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German woman does not need to be dressed particularly elegant—she
does not need make something of herself.” Unlike French women, the
article argued, German women were always graceful: “They always carry
a silent, bright flame deep in their heart, a holy belief in the victory of the
good, a pious hope in the grace of God and a modest, warm love for
Heimat, youth, and beauty.” 697 I am not suggesting that all German
American readers accepted such advice without hesitation. It is difficult to
determine how exactly women felt, since newspaper rarely provided space
for readers to respond beyond the realm of domestic and foreign politics.
But as the next section shows, many did indeed appreciate the newspaper
and the advertisements therein as important guidelines for the retention of
Germanness abroad.
4.3. Wanamaker Advertisement Controversy
In the final section of this chapter, I discuss the controversy around a
discontinued series of advertisements in the Philadelphia GazetteDemocrat that aroused the anger and criticism of the newspaper’s
readers, among them many women, who protested against the
discontinuation of the ads as individuals and as members of German
American organization. Though short-lived and minor in its extent, I
maintain that the incident exemplified the continued importance of
hyphenated belonging in the context of consumerism and mass culture. In
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their attempts to reinstate the ads, German Philadelphians showed that
even in 1932 their heritage mattered to them as they went shopping in the
city’s department stores. The gradual disappearance of a diverse,
hyphenated shopping experience was not merely the result of a disjointed
migrant community or increasing assimilation among second-generation
German Americans, but as importantly a consequence of economic
pressures on producers and providers in the Depression marketplace.
In the spring of 1932 the John Wanamaker department store, a staple
of Philadelphia shopping since the 1870s, decided to discontinue its
advertisements in the Gazzette-Democrat. The ads had been printed in
the newspaper since the late 1800s and were widely embraced by the
readership until they disappeared in late April 1932. As a response, the
newspaper received roughly 130 letters of protest.698 Russell Kazal has
interpreted the fact that most writers complained in English as a sign that
particularly younger German Americans now possessed the necessary
language skills to succeed in American society and were thus no longer
reliant on or interested in German-language newspapers. Using a familiar
“measurement” of Germanness – language – Kazal argues that despite
the protests, the letters showed “that consumer culture continued to attract
German Philadelphians, in ways that enabled some to de-emphasize their
698
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ethnic identity while partaking of new collective identities of consumption,
including those open especially to women.”699 As key evidence Kazal cites
a letter by Mrs. A. Castor who threatened to discontinue her subscription
to the Gazzette-Democrat if the Wanamaker advertisements were not to
return, since she did all her shopping there and it was her mother who did
not want to give up the paper. For the younger generation, Kazal
maintained, losing the Wanamaker ads “was more a matter of concern for
their parents’ generation; given their language skills, they could always
subscribe to an English-language paper ‘with the Wanamaker ad in it.’”700
Of course, Kazal’s argument reflects the larger reality of secondgeneration immigrants, who often felt less attached to a country they had
never seen than their parents, who were born there. Nonetheless, he fails
to capture the complexities of the protests and its implications for German
American life. Language is hardly the issue here. Most Germans spoke
both languages and it seems unlikely that they would have written to an
American department store in German, even one they regarded as
traditionally catering to German customers. By contrast, the vast majority
of those who complained directly to Gustav Meyer, the publisher of the
Gazette-Democrat, wrote in German. Moreover, among the roughly 45
letters (of the original 130) still archived at the Historical Society of
Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, Mrs. Astor’s letter is one of very few that
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threaten to discontinue the paper.

701

The majority of respondents

recognized the discontinuation of the Wanamaker advertisements as a
serious threat to their community. This was especially true for German
American women, the majority of the writers. 702 They protested as
individuals or as members of ethnic groups such as the Women’s Auxiliary
of the German Society of Pennsylvania, the Philadelphia Turngemeinde or
the German Club and Technical Association and clearly saw matters
pertaining to shopping and consumption as their territory. As such, they
were unwilling to give up on the ads, which they regarded as critical to the
performance of their duties as household managers.
The arguments brought forward by the protesters centered around
three main issues. First, there was the matter of tradition and history: John
Wanamaker’s department store had been founded by the descendant of
eighteenth century German immigrants, a fact celebrated by writers such
as Rudolf Cronau and Albert Bernhardt Faust (see Chapters 3 and 4), who
listed Wanamaker prominently and claimed him as a leader of German
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America.703 A letter signed by William Moennig and Carl F. Haussmann,
the latter a prominent figure in the affairs of German Philadelphia, who
later became and archivist for the German Society of Pennsylvania,
pursued this line of argument. German patrons, Moenning and
Haussmann wrote, “favor the Wanamaker House for the German ancestry
of the founder who frequently proclaimed his pride of the German blood in
his Grand [sic] parents.” 704 Another letter by the ladies auxiliary of the
Philadelphia Turngemeinde brought forward a similar argument, claiming
that Germans across the city “pride themselves of the German ancestry of
the founder of the John Wanamaker Store.”705 And Mrs. Auguste Senger
from Landsdowne, Pa. stressed how Wanamaker ads had been part of the
German communal experience for the last 25 years of her life. Senger
especially pointed to the “Writings of the Founder,” which were a
prominent part of the ads and “which often are real gems of psychology,
businessnowledge [sic] and common sense. These ‘writings’ are often
commented on during our gatherings.”706 Even though John Wanamaker
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himself had died in 1922, German consumers looked to the small columns
for advice and inspiration. Much like the “Frauenseite,” the “Writings of the
Founder,” though not exclusively aimed at German Americans, provided
readers with a sense of access and belonging to American consumer
culture – and, of course, with a sense of personal connection in the
increasingly anonymous world of department store shopping.707
While a number of writers thus pointed to the long tradition of reading
the ads over the past decades, an equal number acknowledged that they
missed them for practical reasons. Advertisements, as Don Slater has
argued, serve as “maps of modernity,” “authoritative (if unstable)
‘discourses through and about objects’ which allow us to orientate
ourselves to the social meaning of things in a commercial world.
Advertising thus replaces traditional authorities about such meanings (e.g.
religion and custom) with a modern information system.” 708 At a time,
when many German Americans were less enthusiastic about membership
in ethnic institutions dominated by social elites (while simultaneously
agreeing with many of the arguments advanced by those elites),
advertisements filled a cultural void. Through such strategies as the one
employed by Wanamaker, many companies successfully convinced
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consumers that they could help replace old authorities for the benefit of all.
This trend was exacerbated by the disappearance of local merchants and
small corner stores, as more and more Americans moved out into the
suburbs and only returned to the city for their weekly trips to the
department store. When the advertisements disappeared, it was the topic
of some debate. “I […] have been asked by quite a number of my friends
why it is, that we cannot get the 'News' of the Wannamacker [sic] bargains
in the Gazette,” wrote Mrs. Elizabeth Hummel, “please see to it that we
may see it again as we would like to take advantage of their bargain
prices.” Through the advertisements, readers of the Gazzette-Democrat
felt they were informed about the best deals in town when it came to
fashion, household items and other important products. Kate Krocker thus
hoped that the ads would soon return, “for the best of the Germandom”,
after all, it was “very annoying to drive into the city at random, only to find
out that it is better and cheaper to buy in a different store.” 709 Having
shopped at Wanamaker for 35 years, Mrs. A. Feyler was “at a loss not
seeing their daily advertising.”710
The question remains: why did so many German Americans decide to
protest the absence of the ads instead of simply switching their
709
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subscription to one of the countless English-language newspapers that
still published the Wanamaker ads, as any “assimilated” immigrant would
likely do. To be sure, there were some who did. Kazal’s assessment of the
“assimilating” effect of consumer culture is thus not entirely incorrect,
though I would argue that many second-generation German Americans
did not need to assimilate, mainly because they were born in the United
States, had grown up bilingual and shaped the country as much as they
were shaped by it. The point is that this example shows how many
German Americans still depended on newspapers and other ethnic
institutions that buffered their communal experience in the increasingly
diverse and anonymous American city. This was the third, and arguably
most important argument invoked by the writers. They understood that
newspapers such as the Gazzette-Democrat were critical to the cohesion
of German Philadelphia and that there was a mutual dependency between
the newspaper and its readers. The ads thus not only served as a guide
for the consumers, but also provided financial support for the newspaper
and ensured “that our favorite journals may enjoy a full measure of
Circulation and success in all of its various departments,” as one undated
letter by the German choir “Rheingold” to the Wanamaker department
store claimed. Without the advertisements, “our people” were at a
“disadvantage.”711 More than simply an act of disenfranchisement against
the German American citizen-consumer, discontinuing the ads was a
711
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“mutual loss to both the Wanamaker Store and the German Daily
Newspapers,” according to Mrs. Rosa Busch, the President of the ladies
auxiliary of the German-American Federation of Pennsylvania.712
Maybe the totality of all arguments was best summarized in a letter
written on May 25, 1932 by Albert Mansdoerfer. His family, he argued,
valued Wanamaker for its prompt delivery and great service and because
it had provided historical continuity during a chaotic time of change.
This store was as familiar to us as on old friend – after all, it
was [at Wanamaker] where we bought our first piece of
furniture, a ‘Standard’ sewing machine, which we are still
using and if we need needles for it, we still go to the same
saleswoman, who sold us this item more than a quarter of a
century ago. […] How we loved going to Wanamaker’s,
when a ‘good sale’ was displayed – no bargains – but
tasteful, durable things – and while shopping we always had
the opportunity [to listen] to the delightful sounds of the St.
Louisen organ […]713 it almost felt like being in a German
cathedral. The Wanamaker ad told us of all [those
experiences] every morning in the ‘Gazette’ [sic] and now we
miss that.714
Whether or not Wanamaker had actually tried to achieve an
atmosphere of “Old World” familiarity: Many German Americans claimed
the department store as one of their own and the ads as its guide. Their
absence was debated with friends and neighbors, who wondered,
according to Mansdoerfer, “why Wanamaker’s suddenly turn their backs
[sic] on the Germans.” Far from simply accepting defeat, a coalition of
712
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associations and individuals decided to do something about what they felt
was an important institution in German American life. They knew that
diversity was threatened by the economic depression and a nationalized
consumer culture that preferred uniformity. Nonetheless they asked:
“Wouldn’t it be possible to convince this department store to publish their
advertisement in the German newspaper again – we are subscribing to
the German morning paper, not least because of the kids so that they
won’t forget the German [language].” 715 Far from simply assimilating or
giving up their ethnic peculiarities, many German migrants in the United
States were still committed to the preservation of tradition and culture.
5. Conclusion
Ultimately, the attempts to have the Wanamaker advertisements
returned were unsuccessful – just like many other attempts to preserve
tradition and diversity in the face of an increasingly nationalized consumer
culture. However, the decline of the diverse consumer marketplace, as it
panned out during the 1930s, was a process much less smooth than has
been accepted so far, at least in the case of German America. Its
homogenization often occurred against the resistance of those who
treasured German immigrant culture for its emotional value and for the
access it provided to help navigate the complicated new world of mass
consumer society. Therefore, it is misleading to argue, as historians have
715
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done in the past, that German migrants simply turned away from their
heritage and assimilated. While many migrants certainly embraced
American consumer society, they often did so in ways that allowed them
to stay connected to the past. This was especially true for women, since
their role in the consumer marketplace extended beyond the domestic
sphere. As mothers, they were expected to preserve the memory and
traditions of the homeland and keep alive its language. But as household
managers, they were also in charge of domestic finance and, thus,
navigating the complicated American marketplace. For them, institutions
such as the Gazette-Democrat provided valuable guidelines to American
society, for example advertisements, which allowed them to compare
prices and learn about the newest trends. Their commitment showed that
many, though certainly not all, German American women merged their
identities as women in the United States with the duty ascribed to them by
the ethnic nationalism of German America. Ultimately, then, I suspect that
the question why German American institutions and ethnic enterprises
experienced such decline during the 1920s and 1930s has to be answered
by tying their history into, first, evolving nationalized mass consumer
culture and, second, diverging conceptions of Germanness in the United
States and back home.
And vice versa. Investigating and answering such questions is not
without consequence for the general history of the United States. During
the 1940s and 1950s, the war experience and the baby boom increased
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pressure on men and women to adhere to traditional visions of the nuclear
family. The role of women in the mass consumer society reverted to,
primarily, wife, mother, and consumer – and those who varied from the
norm faced condemnation. What role did German Americans play in this
process? To be sure, ethnic differences mattered less than they had a few
decades before. Nonetheless, as I have shown in this chapter, ethnic
traditionalists may have found ways to promote familiar values – traditional
motherhood, separate spheres, gendered consumerism – in post-war
America, thus driving the discourse instead of simply assimilating and
passively accepting it. The history of American consumerism thus offers
yet another field for scholars of German immigrants in the United States to
explore the remnants of “Germanness” beyond language, (high) culture,
traditions, and ethnic organizations.

299

Conclusion
On September 23, 2015, the journalist Erik Kirschbaum once more
asked that familiar question, which perplexed so many historians and
journalists in decades past and which has driven this dissertation: “What
Happened to German America?” 716 His answer, however, brought little
new information. After World War I, Kirschbaum concluded, “those who
could hid their Germanic roots; some switched their names; many others
canceled their subscriptions to German newspapers, which virtually
disappeared. Whatever vestige of German America remained after the
1910s was wiped out by similar pressures during World War II, not to
mention the shame that came with German identity after it.”
I have argued throughout this dissertation that it is time to move
beyond that paradigm. For one, I suggest that the period between World
War I and World War II offers plenty of opportunity to trace the history of
German migrants in the United States, and that ethnic identification
persisted, if one is willing to look beyond traditional measures of
“Germanness.” I have suggested different approaches to investigate the
ways in which German migrants interacted with American society, for
example its civic, racial, social, gender and consumer politics. The
sources I evaluated for this dissertation – German American newspapers,
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contemporary German American histories, internal documents from
immigrant organizations and the letters written by German Americans in
the 1930s – offer plenty of evidence. They show that migrants in the
United States continued to find ways to reconcile their German origins with
their desire to be included in the American body politic. Instead of
passively assimilating they used their transnational knowledge of racial
and social relations, of gender roles and consumer society to actively
shape the society they lived in. Instead of failing to adapt to the “American
Way,” many migrants quite successfully became part of and shaped the
America they called “home.”
At the same time, nothing comparable to Irish-American or ItalianAmerican culture survived in German America, no proud remembering of
the European past celebrated in popular culture and on the streets of the
United States. The reasons for that absence cannot simply be located in
the anti-German hysteria and the Americanization campaigns, which
rarely, if ever successfully pressed immigrants of any group into
“assimilating.” 717 Instead, the answers lie in the disparate nature of the
community, its inability to overcome internal divisions, and its failure to
craft a transnational culture adaptive of American society, its conventions,
values, and norms. Individuals adapted for sure, but the ethnic community
did not.
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Most importantly, however, at least in the context of this dissertation,
many German Americans actively turned away from the Third Reich and
its policies. While applauding Germany’s ostensible economic revival, few
became permanent and unequivocal supporters of National Socialism
during the 1930s. If we are to understand this process, simple dichotomies
fall short. The historian Valdis O. Lumans, for example, has argued that
while “a few [German Americans] were unabashedly Nazi sympathizers
and saw themselves as true Volksdeutsche, the vast majority regarded
themselves as Americans and valued their Germanness merely as cultural
heritage, void of any political predispositions.”718 Even Cornelia Wilhelm,
who rightly laments the lack of critical engagement among German
American scholars with the period, notes a diametrical opposition in the
existing scholarship between National Socialist “race politics and
Volksgemeinschaft” on the one side and Americanization on the other.719
To be sure, there were many who simply celebrated their Germanness in
cultural

organizations.

Yet,

such

a

dichotomy

obfuscates

the

interconnectedness of ethnocultural and political representations of
national belonging. Among those involved in the German American Bund
or other American organizations supporting the Third Reich, not all were
simply unabashed Nazis and among those not involved, many were.
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Instead of simply viewing their origins as cultural heritage, many
German Americans remained invested in the politics of the homeland. In
fact, events back in the old world were one of the dominating factors in
ethnic American life and among the leading topics in the ethnic press
during the 1930s. The publishers of the New York Staatszeitung, for
example, were initially elated about the rise of Hitler and the Nazis – they
hoped, as did many German Americans, that a revival of German strength
could also improve their status as citizens of the United States. While
critical of Nazi anti-Semitism, the editors of the Staatszeitung viewed the
accompanying violence as “temporary” and evaluated events in Germany
with “some patience, some understanding and some optimism.” It was not
until the late 1930s that the Staatszeitung took a stronger stand against
the Reich and condemned its regime.720 The Steuben Society was more
openly supportive of Hitler, but it too attempted to stake out a position that
would allow its members to assert their Americanness while retaining their
connection

to

the

homeland.

It

frequently

clashed

with

Jewish

organizations and resorted to anti-Semitic rhetoric reminiscent of Nazi
diatribes in Germany. 721 And then there was the infamous GermanAmerican Bund, an organization that has garnered much attention both by
contemporary observers and historians. But, as I have noted, its
membership was small and it short-lived publicity was much less evidence
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of a particular German American consciousness than a representation of a
new American culture less tolerant of totalitarianism and ethnic
nationalism.722
In fact, by the late 1930s, moderate German Americans had
recognized that the American public had turned “on the German-American
element in the mistaken opinion that we agree with the harassment, which
is now being promulgated in Germany.”

723

Many tried to position

themselves accordingly. An editorial in the Baltimore Sun, for example,
called on German Americans to take a stand and denounce the Nazis:
“Unless we Germans act, the people of the United States may be justified
in believing that all Germans approve of the present German policies as
announced by Herr Hitler. Germans in this country are peace-loving and
law-abiding, but if we do not express ourselves accordingly, we may be
looked upon with suspicion as emissaries of the German Government.”724
German Americans had to choose sides. Among those who conversed
with the VDA, this painful process was laid out in some of the letters sent
back across the Atlantic in the late 1930s. “I have endangered many of my
friendships here with my sympathies for Germany,” wrote Rudolph Blank
from New York City to the VDA in September 1937. “I am a faithful [treuer]
American citizen, but one that clings to the tribal culture of Germandom.”
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Perhaps unlike any other, Blank’s letter speaks to that inner strife among
many German Americans who, to use Blank’s words, attempted to “raise
an understanding” for Germany, its culture and its people in the United
States, but did not agree with the anti-democratic militarism of the Third
Reich. Blank was clearly not a Nazi. In fact, he abhorred the regime and,
not understanding the connection between the government and the VDA,
he challenged the editors of the Heimatbriefe to put a stop to the regime’s
“mischief [Unwesen]”. “Dear God,” he pleaded, “all of you help put an end
to those enemies of Germandom.”725 Blank wasn’t simply an assimilated
American. But in the United States, there was no place for his
“hyphenated” nationalism anymore.
Many others were similarly torn between their love for the homeland
and the pressures of American life. They were not sure whether or not to
believe American newspapers, even though doubting the reports from
Germany became harder and harder as the decade progressed and the
Nazi regime became less and less apologetic about its actions. “We read
so many things in the newspaper, you never know if it is true,” wrote
Martha Hesse from Evanston, Illinois. “To be honest, sometimes I hope it
is not true. It is not only nice things that one reads. But let the newspapers
write what they write.”726 Her minced words do not reveal her real thoughts
or relate to any specific event – it is the timing of the letter that is telling: It
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was written November 10, 1939, one day after the Kristallnacht, when the
Nazis attacked and looted Jewish stores and synagogues, killing more
than 80 individuals. Like many others, Hesse never wrote another letter to
the VDA.
To be sure, many German Americans continued to be invested in the
homeland and their contributions to the political discourse of the 1930s
and 1940s certainly helped rebuild the German-American relationship
after World War II.727 They had to tread carefully, of course, but many did
so successfully. The New York Staatszeitung effectively maneuvered
through the 1940s by appeasing authorities, who viewed all German
newspapers with suspicion. The newspaper was published and sold until
1991. 728 Even the Steuben Society found a way to survive the Second
World War II. In the late 1940s, it began re-entering the political scene
collecting relief funds for Germans across Europe and taking on an antiCommunist stance. It continued to defend “the German characteristics of
self-reliance, personal sacrifice, and a capacity for hard work.” 729 It still
exists today.
This is not to say that ethnic institutions did not struggle. Many
German-language newspapers all across the nation, like the Philadelphia
Tageblatt, folded in the 1940s and the 1950s. German-languages services
at religious institutions also faded away, though some still exist. But as
727
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second, third and fourth generation German Americans grew up into an
American society, whose culture and prosperity was the envy of the entire
globe, it came as little surprise that there was less and less interest in
institutions that attempted to foster the culture, language and traditions of
a nation that had just caused the single greatest catastrophe in human
history: World War II and the Holocaust. “It was no time to take pride in
German heritage.”730
In the light of that history, it is surprising how resilient the historical
artifacts of German America have proven to be. There are countless
communities across the Midwest and beyond that still bear the traces of
German influence to this day: In architecture, regional culinary traditions,
and heritage sites, for example at the University of Wisconsin, where one
of the largest student cafeterias, the Rathskeller, pays tribute to its
German roots; or in celebrations of German origins, particularly the many,
many Oktoberfests from Pierz, Minnesota and Glendale, Wisconsin to
Chicago, Illinois and Cincinnati, Ohio, which hosts the second largest in
the world after Munich, Germany. But more importantly, German migrants
left their traces American culture by participating in the “white flight” that
shaped American suburbia as we know it today; by working on the
transatlantic relationship after World War II and creating a lasting
partnership between the United States and Germany; by establishing
American brands in Germany, thus contributing to post-war U.S.
730
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prosperity; or by participating in the anti-Communist agitation of the Cold
War era.
To underline that argument, I want to provide just one additional
example: Historians of the modern conservative movement often find the
roots of anti-Communism among the frustrated white working class that
moved from the urban centers into the suburbs in the 1930s and 1940s
and formed a “fusionist consensus,” in the words of the journalist E.J.
Dionne, around a common anti-Communism. 731 Early traces of these
ideas, though not yet consolidated around a movement, can be found in
many of the letters written to the VDA, especially from German American
living in urban areas. For example, in 1935, Albert Brueckner from
Flushing, New York wrote:
It is today an open secret in the United States that the socalled New Deal of President Roosevelt has its origins in
Moscow, Roosevelt is often connected to Jewish and
Communist actions and the recognition of the Soviet
government by him at the time caused bad blood among the
real Americans and by that I mean those that have been
living here for several generations.
Brueckner observed the rise of Communism in the United States and
denounced several New Deal initiatives like the National Recovery Act
(NRA) as unconstitutional. His hope was with the presidential election of
1936. But, he wrote, “it would obviously be completely wrong to propagate
National Socialism in the United States. […] Let us leave to the United
731
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States its own salvation and redemption from the danger that is
approaching with rapid strides.”732 I am convinced that “salvation” was in
part shaped by German Americans like Brueckner. American history
would be incomplete without an investigation of the transnational origins of
such debates.733 This dissertation does not actively write such history –
but it opens a methodological door for others to follow.
At the same time, to keep the narrative focused on the conceptual
renegotiation of German American historiography, this dissertation
disregarded plenty of intellectual and historical ground. For example,
German American life beyond the 1920s and its influence on American
society overall cannot be accurately portrayed without exploring the role of
religious institutions, ethnic “safe spaces” where German language was
spoken, its culture and values preserved, well beyond World War I.
Protestantism, Judaism, and Catholicism furthermore provided common
grounds, where German migrants could form alliances with other migrant
groups and where they could help shape American views on a variety of
discourses, from changing views on gender and family to U.S. foreign
policy in the Middle East, particularly U.S. relations with Israel. Old world
religious views and experiences helped shape the new world politics of
such influential characters as Henry Kissinger, Hannah Arendt or Reinhold
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Niebuhr. They could not be explored here, but they should be in future
research.
Moreover, the history of German migration to the United States, the
fate of the ethnic community and its interaction with American society at
large are also relevant for historians of contemporary Germany. While this
dissertation’s narrative has mostly taken place in the United States, I
suggest that it would be an instructive comparison to examine how
conceptions of “Germanness” have drifted apart on both sides of the
Atlantic during the first and the second half of the twentieth century – and
how they didn’t. Culture and language, rather than civic norms, have been
stubbornly defended as markers of “Germanness” both in the United
States and in Germany and the debate on its ethnic roots are far from
over. As hundreds of thousands of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and
Subsaharan

Africa

stream

into

Germany,

debates

on

German

womanhood, the preservation of its Kultur and the erosion of its language
emerge once more.734 Historical perspectives such as the ones offered in
this dissertation complicate black-and-white narratives by showing the
historical precedent and its possible consequences.
Most importantly, however, there is a rich history here that has so far
been left unexplored. Originally, I set out to investigate the subjective
734
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historical environments of eight German Americans, who took part in a
1942 German World War II mission to sabotage the American war effort.
Two of them defected and turned themselves in to the FBI, betraying the
other six and thus causing the mission to fail. In a widely reported trial, the
two defectors were sent to prison and eventually deported. The other six
were executed in August of 1942. I was interested in the consequences of
this trial on the families of the failed saboteurs, on the German American
community, and on American society as a whole. Moreover, I wanted to
know what drove them to return to Germany during the 1930s and sign to
participate in a mission that brought them back to the United States. When
I began my research, I quickly learned that the research on German
American life in the 1930s and 1940s simply didn’t exist – that I had to set
out and do it myself. This dissertation is the result. Along the way I have
come along countless fascinating stories of German American life that are
worth exploring. Some of them I have touched upon in the pages above. I
hope I will inspire others to probe deeper and resuscitate the lost histories
of that period.
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